Abstract. This essay examines the history of Pontiac’s War from the perspective of the western Algonquians’ entry into the Anglo-Iroquois Covenant Chain alliance system in 1758. Recognized formally as equal diplomatic partners to Great Britain and the Six Nations by Sir William Johnson in 1761, the Great Lakes and upper Ohio Valley peoples directed their military and diplomatic efforts over the next five years toward securing and extending that status. The 1766 Treaty of Oswego represented a political victory for the western Indians, as it established their territorial integrity and confirmed their status as independent allies in the Covenant Chain.

Pontiac’s War and the Covenant Chain

Historians are now revising earlier interpretations of Pontiac’s War, which stressed the Indians’ military shortfall and overlooked their diplomatic success.1 Michael McConnell characterizes Pontiac’s War as a defensive conflict on the part of the Indians; he argues that the war represented an effort by the Indians to restore their alliance with the French of Canada.2 Gregory Dowd builds on McConnell’s thesis, contending that the war constituted an Indian attempt to manipulate France into returning to North America as a counterweight to the westward expansion of the American colonies, while also stressing the significance of native religious revitalization as a motivating factor in the conflict.3 Richard White portrays Pontiac’s War as a qualified success for the Indians in the reestablishment of a diplomatic “middle ground” of common understanding and cooperation between themselves and the British.4 Recently, Ian K. Steele has pointed out that Pontiac’s War was the first major multtribal war against Europeans in North America to create a balance of power between the Indians and the British.5

Despite significant advances in historical understanding of Pontiac’s War, there still exists a need for deeper exploration of the complex diplomacy that surrounded the conflict. To date, no historian has analyzed in detail the involvement of the Great Lakes Algonquian peoples in the Anglo-Iroquois Covenant Chain alliance system after 1758. While we must remain aware of the instances in which colonial Indian treaties served as a “license for empire” by which imperial powers bent diplomatic structures to exploitative ends, we should also recognize the uses of diplomacy by Indian peoples for advancing and protecting their own interests in eighteenth-century North America. Consideration of the critical shift in kinship alliance politics orchestrated by the Indians of the Great Lakes and upper Ohio Valley region vis-à-vis the British and the Six Nations from 1758 to 1766, when they acquired status as equal partners in a new, tripartite version of the historic Anglo-Iroquois Covenant Chain, sheds new light on the origins and outcome of Pontiac’s War.

During the colonial period, Indians entered into alliances with other Indian groups, and with intruding Europeans, by offering kinship to these outsiders. Many Native American diplomatic rituals (including those of the Covenant Chain) served to place new allies into specific familial categories considered appropriate for the kind of interaction intended. These events usually involved the creation of an ancillary or fictive kinship tie. Fluidity characterized these methods of placing cultural outsiders into recognized social positions, and any rights or obligations associated with a specific term of kinship affiliation were open to negotiation each time the ritual process occurred.

The Algonquian peoples of the trans-Appalachian West employed a variety of kinship terms in council dialogue to denote their affiliations and alliances with other groups and to regulate these interactions. Concerned with gaining the Indians’ consent to their presence, early French explorers of the Great Lakes region exerted considerable effort to cultivate the friendship and cooperation of the native population in order to justify their own political authority against the claims of other European powers. The French became “father(s)” to the western Indians: they mediated the Indians’ internal quarrels, forgave their transgressions, lived among them, intermarried with their women, and shared their goods and resources generously. As “children” of the French father “Onontio,” the western Indians maintained sovereignty over their lands, avoided the status of “subjects” to New France (owing to their voluntary entry into this alliance), allowed the presence of religious missionaries among their people, and assisted in the military endeavors of New France. “Brother,” another form of intergroup address, signified a relationship of equals living at a distance
from one another. More a means of facilitating economic dealings between two parties, a brotherly relationship involved less regular interaction, less intermarriage, and fewer direct mutual obligations than a “father-child” structure. Reciprocal acts of kindness did occur between allied brethren, with an obligation placed on those designated elder brothers to assist their juniors in times of duress.\textsuperscript{14}

In the latter years of the Seven Years’ War in America, the western Indians constructed a new kinship alliance with the English as brethren. What the Algonquians regarded initially as a temporary accommodation to secure a supply of needed trade goods from their British brother as they awaited the fate of their French father, involvement in a revised, tripartite version of the Covenant Chain evolved into a vital political strategy for them. After 1761, the Algonquians directed their diplomatic and military efforts toward securing and extending their new status as equal partners to the British and the Six Nations Iroquois in the Covenant Chain.

The Algonquians Explore New Diplomatic Opportunities

Following a series of French victories from 1755 to 1757, the effects of the British naval blockade of North America helped turn the tide of the war decisively against the French by 1758. The inability of the French to supply goods to the \textit{pays d’en haut}\textsuperscript{15} that spring caused significant unrest among their western Indian allies.\textsuperscript{16} The few Algonquian warriors who did travel east for the campaign of 1758 demonstrated marked unwillingness to share in French defeats and disappeared quickly after suffering losses.\textsuperscript{17} Growing belief among the western Indians that British general John Forbes’s army marching toward Fort Duquesne late in the summer of 1758 was “beginning to learn the art of war,” along with a desire among the Delaware and Shawnee to prevent their Anglo-American captives from escaping to the British forces, prompted many of these French-allied warriors to withdraw deep into the Ohio Valley.\textsuperscript{18} Those who remained entertained overtures for peace from Christian Frederick Post, a Moravian missionary sent out by Pennsylvania officials to secure the Indians’ neutrality. On 18 August 1758 Post’s efforts bore fruit. The Delaware acknowledged their desire for a separate peace and promised, as the “nearest of kin” to the British among their Indian allies, to carry any good news to the western Algonquian tribes.\textsuperscript{19}

With the prospect of drawing off not only the Ohio Indian allies from the French but also warriors from the Great Lakes tribes, the British made significant promises to the Indians. The October 1758 Treaty of Easton,
negotiated by Pennsylvania officials, included a settlement boundary line in Pennsylvania, immunity from future British attacks, and a pledge to “take the Indians by the hand and lead them a safe distance from the French,” which to Indian minds amounted to a promise of sustaining their well-being. Thus encouraged, the Ohio tribes adopted a policy of neutrality, which forced the French to detonate Fort Duquesne on 24 November 1758 and to retreat to Fort Venango, further up the Allegheny River. Five days afterward, Delaware emissaries left to advise the western nations of the peace concluded with the British.

Forbes's successful campaign ended with a peace conference at newly renamed “Pittsburgh” on 4 December 1758, when Lieutenant Colonel Henry Bouquet assured the Ohio tribes that their English brethren had no designs on their hunting lands and sought only a “large and Extensive trade” with all Indians that “chuse to live in friendship with us.” Delaware demands that the British “go back over the mountains,” however, received no support from Six Nations “cousins” present at the conference and failed to find their way into the official minutes of the proceedings. The Iroquois' fears of a Delaware and Shawnee alliance with the western Algonquians to “cut off the Six Nations as Allies to the English” seemed on the verge of realization, and they could not risk alienating British officials by supporting the inconvenient claims of Indian groups ostensibly subordinate to them.

Circumstances in 1759, however, caused the French continued difficulties in maintaining their Indian allies and relieved some of the pressure on the Six Nations. Several Algonquian warriors, surveying the poorly supplied troops remaining in the Ohio Valley in the spring of 1759, remarked, “’Tis not the French who are fighting, 'tis we.” Also, at the urging of British Superintendent of Indian Affairs Sir William Johnson, General Jeffery Amherst allowed traders into the western country to supply eager Indian customers with much-needed goods. Deputy Indian Agent George Croghan arrived at Fort Pitt in June 1759, and his lavish presents, peace overtures, and promises to respect the Indians' territorial integrity further alienated the western Indians from their French fathers.

French frustration with the behavior of their Algonquian allies came to a head at Fort Niagara on 24 July 1759, when French officers refused the Indians' request for a cessation of hostilities in order to parley for peace with a British-allied Iroquois legation. This caused all but thirty Ottawa, Ojibwa, and Detroit Huron warriors to abandon the French, and later that day the French and Indian force suffered severe casualties in battle, when pursuing Six Nations warriors killed several western Indians in the confused French retreat from the field at La Belle Famille. Commandant
Pierre Pouchot surrendered Fort Niagara to Sir William Johnson's besieging force the next day, and the French withdrew still deeper into the pays d'en haut.27

Despite the battered condition of the French, the western Indians sent more warriors to assist in the last-ditch effort against the British at the Plains of Abraham in September 1759 than at any time since 1757. Yet at almost the same time, an Ottawa speaker advised George Croghan at Fort Pitt that the western tribes had “thrown away the French” and expressed his earnest desire to return to “hunting and planting again.”28 Herein lay the basis of the western Indians’ factional diplomatic strategy (often based on existing clan or moiety distinctions within given groups), also known as the “play-off” system. As the French historian La Potherie observed in 1753: “The policy of those peoples is so shrewd that it is difficult to penetrate its secrets. When they undertake any enterprise of importance against a nation whom they fear, especially the French, they seem to form two parties—one conspiring for and the other opposing it; if the former succeed in their projects, the latter approve and sustain what has been done; if their designs are thwarted they retire to the other side. Accordingly, they always attain their objects.”29

News of the 13 September 1759 capitulation of Quebec to the British, therefore, led Croghan to believe that significant numbers of Algonquians would withdraw from the hostilities. This pleased him immensely, since he knew that while the British “may say we have beat the French . . . we have nothing to boast from the war with the Natives.”30 For their part, the western Indians retained an independent policy. They ignored a March 1760 message from the Six Nations urging them to “unhang the war kettle,” probably because the Iroquois failed to make any offers of condolence for the warriors killed at Niagara.31 Also, while the western Indians continued to promise that they would never attack their “brethren” again, they denied British emissaries access to the country west of the Allegheny Mountains throughout the summer of 1760.32

With the surrender of Canada less than a month away, representatives of the Ottawa, Wyandot, Miami, Potawatomi, Shawnee, Delaware, and Iroquois assembled at Fort Pitt from 12 to 17 August 1760 to hear General Jeffery Amherst’s “Talk to the Several Tribes of Indians.” General Robert Monckton, commander of Fort Pitt, reiterated Amherst’s promises that if the Indians behaved as “faithful allies,” the British would not deprive them of their lands; that the Indians would receive payment for any British posts retained in the western country; and that no interior settlements would be permitted.33 With Delawares acting as temporary mediators between hostile Algonquian and Six Nations delegates, the Great Lakes speakers
boldly shifted from their traditional diplomatic policy and pledged allegiance to the existing “Chain of Friendship” between the British and the Six Nations as equal brotherly partners. Far from accepting British or Iroquoian hegemony over their lands, the western Indians established instead a formal treaty relationship with the Covenant Chain in order to secure a supply of needed trade goods. An Ottawa chief named Pontiac, who heard the August 1760 British promises of presents, low prices for trade goods, and rivers “running in rum,” returned to Detroit and repeated them before the French commandant “with much insolence.”

The French surrendered Canada to General Amherst at Montreal on 8 September 1760. Immediately after this triumph, Amherst ordered Major Robert Rogers (busy only the year before with destroying French-allied Abenaki settlements in eastern Canada) to secure the evacuation of the French interior posts and take possession of as many of them as possible. Rogers, informing the western Indians of the capitulation of Canada on his way to Detroit in November, urged them “not to mind their Fathers no more as they are all prisoners to your Brothers.” He also noted that while the Indians allowed him to proceed through their country, a certain chief, whom he later identified as Pontiac, “was far from considering himself a conquered Prince.”

The western Algonquians exercised all political options available to them in late November 1760 at Detroit. Prior to Rogers’s arrival, they summoned the French commandant, François-Marie Picoté de Belestre, for a conference. They implored Belestre to resist Rogers’s attempt to take possession of Detroit, assuring him that they would never accept the king of England as a replacement for their French fathers. The French officer, however, offered only a weak promise to inform Onontio of their sentiments. George Croghan held the first British conference at Detroit from 3 to 5 December 1760, opening with presents and familiar promises of free, open trade and peaceful coexistence. Detroit Huron speaker Achenonave promised that the Indians would never break the Chain of Friendship, but he placed the onus of peacekeeping on the British, as they were “an able people to preserve it.”

**Defining a Brotherly Alliance**

The new brotherly relationship forged over the last years of the Seven Years’ War represented a viable diplomatic alternative for the western tribes after the French surrender of Canada. Events in late 1760 and early 1761 reflected the Indians’ disappointment, even disgust with their old fathers. A French column retreating from Montreal renewed a peace treaty
and distributed a few presents to some Illinois on 19 December 1760, but the commander recognized the emptiness of his gesture, which only bought him time to reach safety at Fort Chartres, just east of the Mississippi River. The Indians’ contempt for the French resonated at a conference held in the Illinois country in January 1761. Indian speakers, including some from Detroit who were wintering in the region, rejected the request of the French commandant of Fort Chartres that they assist the Cherokee, then at war with the British in the backcountry of South Carolina. Expressing their desire to return to their “Antient Employment of Hunting,” the Indians mocked the French for having “always said the English was Old Women, and could not fight, but now we know better, they have beat you every where, and are your Masters; So Father we Will think for ourselves, and listen no more to anything you say to us.”

The British and the western Indians entered into the brotherly alliance with reservations about each other, and each group maneuvered to further its own interests. In exchange for supplying meat to the garrisons in the West and trading their furs exclusively at those locations, the Indians expected a minimal degree of economic support and recognition in their lands from their new brethren. The Delaware warned that British failure to acknowledge the Indians’ ownership of their hunting grounds would doom the new alliance. The Indians looked on the British as a wealthy people after their victory over the French and argued that they should overlook petty crimes (such as horse thefts) committed between brothers at peace, since the success of the British allowed them to withstand such transgressions as an elder sibling would. Allied brethren had responsibilities to one another, but neither could govern the other’s actions.

The British viewed matters differently. They had staggering expenses to cope with after the Seven Years’ War, and in his zeal for economy, General Amherst ignored long-standing terms of diplomatic protocol by placing a ban on presents to the Indians and denying any extension of credit to Indians in the fur trade (thereby dismissing the Indians’ views of unpaid debts as the guarantors of a continuing reciprocal relationship). Amherst also tried to restrict the sale of arms and ammunition to his former Indian enemies, and he neglected his earlier promises to issue payments to the Indians for British forts on their lands. In Amherst’s view, reduced contact between the Indians and the British minimized the potential for future difficulties.

The British did have money for other projects, however. Reconstruction at Fort Pitt throughout 1761 greatly enlarged its dimensions from those of French Fort Duquesne. Detachments of troops also trickled slowly into the western country throughout 1761, taking possession of former
French posts at Michilimackinac, Miami, La Baye, and St. Joseph. By June 1761, the western Indians expressed concern at "the coolness and indifference" shown toward them; they complained that their new brethren withheld ammunition from the trade "with a design of falling upon them." Amherst's ban on presents created a serious grievance among the western Indians toward the British Army, which limited their capacity to exploit the growing divergence between the colonial hunters, traders, and settlers who impinged directly on their lives and the imperial forces that attempted after 1760, albeit with little success, to police the colonists' actions. This situation contributed to an atmosphere of uncertainty and instability in which rumors and plots flourished.

Encouraged by French promises of support from Louisiana, transmitted through the Cherokee, two Seneca messengers (Kayahsota and Tahiadoris) arrived at Detroit in June 1761 to secure the Detroit tribes' support for their plan for "all the Nations from the Bay of Gaspy to the Illinois . . . to take up the Hatchet against the English." But the Detroit Huron, revealing their concern with unresolved disputes involving the Iroquois, rejected the overtures and reprimanded the two emissaries for their failure to speak their opinions publicly, in the presence of "our English brother." The Huron speaker, professing an attachment to the "chain of friendship" established the year before between all three parties, insisted on the integrity of that alliance and resisted Six Nations attempts to relocate the "council fire" closer to their own sphere of influence. Despite belated efforts by the Seneca messengers to condole the deaths of Detroit warriors at Niagara in July 1759, the Detroit delegates turned over the Seneca's large, red war belt to Captain Donald Campbell, the British commander at Detroit on 3 July 1761. Citing their brotherly behavior in thwarting the Seneca plot, the Detroit tribes besieged Campbell with requests for presents.

Alarmed by the degree of unrest in the western country, Sir William Johnson took it upon himself to call a large council at Detroit in order to secure the pays d'en haut tribes formally in the brotherly alliance. News of this development upset the Six Nations, and they reproached Johnson for his departure from the permanent council fires of the Covenant Chain at his manor and at Onondaga. Ignoring these complaints, Johnson proceeded to Detroit, opening the conference with representatives from thirteen different western tribes in attendance on 9 September 1761. Announcing that he had "brought a brand from his Council Fire in the Mohawk Country," Johnson promised the Indians that the British had no designs on their lands, chastised them mildly for their horse thefts and for their recalcitrance in surrendering the last of their prisoners of war,
and then formally welcomed the western tribes as an equal, independent partner in the existing Covenant Chain of Friendship between the English and Six Nations. For emphasis, the superintendent lit a new council fire at Detroit, acknowledged the Huron as titular heads of the new western “confederacy,” and issued belts of wampum with the figures of three men with hands joined to cement the new tripartite alliance.53

Johnson’s true motives at Detroit in 1761, however, proved much less salutary. When “a great deal of altercation” broke out at the conference between representatives of the Great Lakes and Ohio tribes over Kayasota’s attempt to disavow involvement in the events of the past June, Johnson dismissed the Indians with liquor, hardly an act that would assist in calming excited disputants.54 Johnson later described his actions in private conferences at Detroit as an effort to “create misunderstandings” between the Great Lakes, Ohio Valley, and Six Nations tribes in the hopes of preventing them from allying together against the British.55 Entering the western Indians into the Covenant Chain also represented a significant achievement for Johnson, since it buttressed (despite his council rhetoric) theoretical British claims on the Algonquians’ lands. Johnson himself figured prominently among the land-speculating advocates of the Six Nations’ “conquest by proxy” theory, which held that the Iroquois “owned” the pays d’en haut by right of seventeenth-century military victories over the western tribes. Anglo-Americans often touted their Iroquoian associations in the Covenant Chain alliance as the basis for the “true” British claim on Ohio Valley lands, in opposition to that of the French.56 Johnson could now argue that he had also the current occupants of the Great Lakes region in more direct “dependency” on Great Britain.

Yet, despite Johnson’s negotiations in less-than-ideal faith, the western tribes made significant positive accomplishments in the Detroit conference of 1761. The Algonquians welcomed recognition as equal partners in the Covenant Chain and employed their new status as a platform to complain vigorously to Johnson about the state of the trade. To their minds, the peace proclaimed at Detroit remained contingent on the superintendent’s ensuring their continued security in their lands and rectifying such abuses as high prices and the absence of ammunition they desperately needed for hunting.57 Also, while Johnson regarded his actions as an early triumph in an evolving strategy of “divide and conquer,” others realized the empowering effect of the separate military alliance he concluded with the Algonquians. According to trader James Kenny, Johnson’s actions actually removed the “Onondago yoke” from the westerners and established their independence from the Six Nations.58

Further to the east, the Ohio Valley tribes also pressed the British
to live up to promises of brotherly behavior. At the August 1761 Treaty of Easton, Delaware representatives grumbled about certain “Pennsylvanians” helping their adopted white prisoners to escape from them and asked “whether they could think that like Brotherly usage.”\textsuperscript{59} Also, in response to Delaware complaints of white settlers encroaching on their lands, Colonel Henry Bouquet issued a proclamation at Fort Pitt on 30 October 1761, which reiterated the terms of the 1758 and 1761 Treaties of Easton concerning the reservation for the Indians of all lands west of the Allegheny Mountains within the boundaries of the colony of Pennsylvania.\textsuperscript{60} Such words of assurance, however, surely meant little to Indian brethren who witnessed a party of thirty-six men leaving Fort Pitt with orders from Bouquet “to construct a Palisaded blockhouse” at Sandusky (previously an unfortified trading post)\textsuperscript{61} or to those who watched Lieutenant Edward Jenkins’s detachment of twenty-two men leave Detroit on 6 November 1761 to take possession of the distant post of Ouiatanon.\textsuperscript{62} Slowly but steadily, the British reneged on their promises to live as good brethren and to remain out of the Indians’ hunting grounds. While the western tribes reminded British Army garrison detachments reoccupying Forts La Baye and Michilimackinac in late 1761 of their entitlement to be treated as brethren, and not as “dogs or slaves,”\textsuperscript{63} they faced increasing economic duress throughout the winter of 1761–62 and had to choose between acts of “social banditry” and continuing demands for assistance from their new brethren in order to survive.\textsuperscript{64}

Affairs took a definite turn for the worse in the summer of 1762. Violations of the settlement boundary line in Pennsylvania continued relatively unchecked, and local Indians threatened the commanders of Sandusky and Venango with the burning of their forts.\textsuperscript{65} Perhaps not coincidentally, Detroit trader James Sterling received orders from the local Indians for “Three Thousand Weight of the best & hardest Corn’d Powder” and “all the Scalping knives” that Sterling’s associates could find in the summer of 1762. Despite Sterling’s frequent impassioned requests, however, the merchandise never arrived.\textsuperscript{66} In July, intelligence of “Canadians” in the Illinois country “advising the Indians to murder us all in these posts” surfaced at Ouiatanon, and other news of French intrigues and reconnaissance activities greatly alarmed British officials.\textsuperscript{67} Yet the British, despite having only 247 men spread over nine posts in the midst of an estimated 4,360 Indian warriors in the Great Lakes and upper Ohio Valley region at that time, continued to behave in unbrotherly ways.\textsuperscript{68} A poorly timed attempt to reoccupy a long-deserted French post at “St. Mary’s” (modern Sault Ste. Marie) continued the trend of broken postwar territorial promises.\textsuperscript{69} Insufficient hospitality shown to a group of Ohio Valley Seneca who “had
not Eate anything for three Days" elicited a stinging critique of their "Wel-
they" British brother at Fort Pitt, "who gave the Indians butt Little out of
all you have taken from yr Enemys this Warr." 70

The western Indians rejected another French-Seneca war belt in early
1763 in hopes of inducing the British to live up to their brotherly prom-
ises. 71 News of the formal conclusion of hostilities between France and
England, which included the cession of Canada to Great Britain, however,
weakened the position of any remaining accommodationists within the
western tribes. Throughout the pays d'en haut, disaffection with the terms
of peace prevailed, since the Indians, as Croghan learned, "always ex-
pected Canada would be given back to the French on a peace, they say the
French had no right to give up their Country to the English." 72 Convinc-
at last of the bad faith of the British, the western Indians looked beyond
their new brotherly alliance for solutions to their problems in April 1763.

The Decision to Go to War

The nativistic message of Neolin, "the Delaware Prophet," began to take
hold among his own and other Algonquian-speaking peoples in late 1762.
According to Neolin's vision, the wholesale acceptance of white goods and
ways had offended the Indians' Great Spirit. Only by learning to live with-
out any trade or connection to the Europeans and returning to their old
practices of hunting and supporting themselves from the land could the
Delaware and others re-create their traditional culture and thereby regain
access to an Indian heaven. 73 Pontiac heard Neolin's message, took it seri-
ously, and seized the opportunity to amalgamate disaffection toward the
British with building pro-French sentiment among the western tribes. 74 In
April 1763, he laid war belts from the Delaware before the "Three Fires"
(Ottawa, Ojibwa, and Potawatomi) tribes at Detroit and urged the war-
riors to take up the hatchet and drive the "dogs clothed in red" off their
lands. This, Pontiac argued, would effect Onontio's return. 75

After two failed attempts to surprise the garrison at Fort Detroit,
Pontiac's War commenced in earnest on 9 May 1763 with the killing of six
men, two women, and two children who tended the "King's cattle" near
Detroit. 76 After sending this message of their outrage against the infringe-
ments of British settlers in their territory, local Indians commenced firing
on the fort itself, beginning what would become a six-month siege. 77 From
the initial spark at Detroit, the "war called Pontiac's" spread into a fiery
blaze across the western country. Although war belts and messages left
Detroit immediately after the commencement of hostilities for the Saginaw
Ojibwa, Sandusky Wyandot, and Michilimackinac Ottawa, Pontiac did
not orchestrate the war single-handedly. Lack of unity in timing and an emphasis on local tribal objectives proved the rule in the western Indians’ attacks on the British in the western country during the summer of 1763, but this did not compromise their effectiveness. Well-conceived ruses and deceptions, gunfire from entrenched positions, and flaming arrows from the Indians sufficed to eliminate or force the abandonment of nine interior forts. Hostilities lasted over fifteen months and cost the lives of an estimated two thousand Anglo-American settlers and four hundred British soldiers.

As news of the wave of successful attacks in the western country reached British Army headquarters in New York City by late June 1763, the commander in chief grew increasingly enraged. Ignoring Major Henry Gladwin’s rational advice to concentrate military efforts on wasting the Indians’ food base, Amherst assembled expeditionary forces for the express purpose of “bringing Ample Vengeance on the Treacherous and Bloody Villains, who have so Perfidiously Attacked their Benefactors.” Amherst sanctioned the use of any and all methods to exterminate Indians, “their Extirpation being the only Security for our future Safety.” This included germ warfare, as Amherst sanctioned Fort Pitt commander Lieutenant Simeon Ecuyer’s arranging to give a Delaware Indian (parleying for peace at the fort on 24 June 1763) “two Blankets and an Handkerchief from the Small Pox Hospital,” as a token “of our Regard for them.”

Despite Amherst’s efforts, the remainder of the summer of 1763 became a military stalemate. Detroit Indians ambushed British troops who ventured out from the fort at the Battle of Bloody Run on 31 July. Bouquet had more success with his fortuitous victory over a force of Ohio Indians at Bushy Run on 5 August, but the impending winter hunting season, ammunition shortages which the French refused to replenish, the arrival of more British reinforcements and supplies at Detroit on 3 October, and a raging “epidemical disorder” (quite possibly smallpox) among the western tribes tempered their resolve. When a French cadet from Fort Chartres arrived at Detroit on 28 October with a message desiring the Indians to “make peace with their Brothers the English,” Pontiac decided to cut his losses and raised his siege two days later. Gladwin made no promise of peace but pledged to inform Amherst of Pontiac’s cessation of hostilities. Later, Gladwin admitted that only the arrival of the supplies and the French peace message prevented the beleaguered garrison from surrendering to the Indians.

Neither the western Indians nor the British believed that this truce would translate into a lasting peace. Indeed, the French message seemed to further confuse the Detroit tribes as to which European power held sway
in the pays d’en haut. An Ottawa chief complained at Detroit in early December 1763 that he “did not know what Dominion he was under.”\textsuperscript{91} Shortly after the outbreak of war in May 1763, Pontiac sent emissaries to the Illinois country explaining the reasons for their actions and requesting assistance from their French father. The message also indicated the Indians’ anger at the deceptions of the British, a people “whom we were willing to adopt for Brethren.”\textsuperscript{92} But after learning of the 1763 Treaty of Paris between France and England, Commander Neyon de Villiers at Fort Chartres refused to give the Indians any assistance, despite their persistent applications.\textsuperscript{93} De Villiers’s October message to Detroit, however, contained an invitation for the Indians to come to the Illinois, “where they would be furnished with everything they wanted.”\textsuperscript{94} In the new year, some Detroit Indians would accept this invitation and explore the possibilities of French aid.

The Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763 seemed to offer some hope for a resolution of the Anglo-Indian conflict, as it built on earlier imperial legislation.\textsuperscript{95} The proclamation established the Allegheny Mountains as a formal boundary line between American colonial settlements and the western Indians’ hunting grounds and forbade all future private purchases of land from the Indians, reserving that privilege to the Crown. In the planning stages prior to the outbreak of Pontiac’s War, the proclamation intended to conciliate Indians who might take offense at the “Vast Cessions made by the Peace [of Paris, 10 February 1763] to Great Britain.” The hostilities of the summer of 1763 accelerated the pace of the proclamation through Parliament, and it reached the new commander in chief, General Thomas Gage, in New York City on 30 November 1763.\textsuperscript{96} Remarking ruefully that the Indians “never knew the Value of Lands, ’till we taught it to them, by our own Purchases,” Gage hoped that the proclamation would address their territorial grievances.\textsuperscript{97} But news of the proclamation arrived too late to alter Amherst’s orders for retaliatory attacks against the Indians in 1764,\textsuperscript{98} and serious problems existed with the boundary line itself, as no effective legal mechanisms on the frontier existed to enforce it and as some settlers west of the mountains already held legal title to their lands.\textsuperscript{99}

The Algonquians Elude Sir William Johnson

Aware that the “line in the sand” represented by the proclamation of 1763 would have little immediate effect, Gage and Johnson considered the best manner of concluding a peace with the Indians after the 1764 campaign.\textsuperscript{100} Continuing his efforts to divide the Indian brethren of the Covenant Chain against one another, Johnson commenced a campaign to
secure Six Nations warriors to accompany two expeditionary parties to the western country. Such a show of force ought to precede any treaty, since it would, according to Johnson, “produce some concessions not otherwise to be brought about.” As for the form of the negotiations themselves, Johnson advocated a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with each of the major Indian confederacies, structured in a way to set them against one another. Born at Detroit in 1761, the idea to divide (and later to conquer) the Indian constituents of the tripartite brotherly alliance became official British diplomatic policy after 1764.

The Six Nations, who rarely missed an opportunity to claim control over the tribes in the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes region in the presence of Johnson, agreed in December 1763 to assist in efforts to chastise their “perfidious Dependents,” who disrupted the peace earlier in the year. Iroquois raiding parties struck the Delaware and Ohio Seneca in late February 1764. They killed one and captured forty-one other Delawares. These attacks left lingering bad feelings toward the Six Nations among their “subjects,” who sought refuge westward to the Scioto Plains and Muskingum River regions. Despite Johnson’s initial pleasure with the apparent results of these campaigns, their long-term impact remained questionable. A report from the Sandusky Wyandot, which circulated back to Detroit via the local Catholic Huron chief Teata, claimed “that the Onondagoes that Sir William sent against the Shawanies came to one of their villages, where they were ask’d what they came for, they said we come to scalp you, then one Kayoughshoutong said here take these giving them two old scalps that he had newly painted, go home and tell Sir William you have scalp’d some Shawanies. Upon which they return’d.” Also, a report of a conference between Ojibwa and Six Nations representatives at Niagara in May 1764 indicated that peaceful, brotherly relations continued between certain members of the two Indian confederacies enshrined in the tripartite Covenant Chain forged at Detroit in 1761. Johnson’s persistent efforts to “manage” the western Indians and Six Nations by attempting to pit them against one another did not succeed on all fronts, and the Indians themselves explored other diplomatic options in 1764.

After receiving official notice of the Peace of Paris in October 1763, Commandant de Villiers worked to promote peaceful sentiments toward the British among the Illinois and other western Indians. He refused to support a war message (attributed to the Six Nations) received by the Ouiatnon and Piankashaw tribes in early 1764, forcing the disgusted Indian emissaries to leave the two accompanying scalps in his hallway. The arrival of Pontiac at Fort Chartres in April 1764, however, “destroyed in one night” the French commandant’s diplomatic efforts of the past eight
months. Pontiac exhorted both the French and the Illinois tribes to join his cause, despite de Villiers’s disapproval, and continued until the enraged officer drop-kicked the Ottawa’s belt back at him. Undeterred, Pontiac retired to an Illinois village and continued his recruiting efforts.

According to fellow Detroit Ottawa chief Manitou, Pontiac returned from the Illinois country to the Ottawa encampment on the Miami River in the spring of 1764. Before leaving Fort Chartres, Pontiac delivered a stirring speech before de Villiers, warning the French that he would continue the war on behalf of the Master of Life, whether or not the French helped. Yet, despite his brave resolve and evident conviction, Pontiac “was no more heard by anybody in the Nation.” Manitou represented the peaceful faction then in apparent ascendancy in Ottawa society, and he arrived at Detroit in July 1764 to reestablish the reciprocal, brotherly alliance of 1761. Disavowing the substance of Neolin’s nativistic message, Manitou claimed that God told him that “He had made this Earth for us to live quietly together” and expressed his belief that those who did not “follow the Advice and obey the will of their Brother” would burn in hell. The Ottawa speaker returned three prisoners of war, promised that his people would remain at peace, and hoped that Gladwin “wou’d have pity upon them.” Yet Gladwin responded to these overtures (as he had to many others from the Detroit tribes earlier in the year) with reproaches for the Indians’ past conduct, distrust of their motives, and demands for the delivery of not only all of their prisoners but also any French inhabitants who participated in the war. While the Indians talked of peace, the British, despite their professed interest in the same goal, prepared retaliatory expeditions. In late March and early April 1764, General Gage issued his orders to Colonels Bradstreet and Bouquet for offensive operations against the western Indians, reoccupation of the lost forts, and the removal of all “hostile” French inhabitants.

In the meantime, Johnson invited the western Indians to a peace conference to be held at Niagara in late June. Lacking confidence that many of the Indians would respond to his overtures, Johnson spread rumors of smallpox in other regions to encourage attendance at Niagara. This tactic, combined with lavish promises of presents, inspired unprecedented numbers of “far Indians” to attend Johnson’s conference of 9–14 July 1764. Unfortunately for the superintendent, the delegates from the Great Lakes region all claimed to be noncombatants in the late war and came only to enter into or to renew their engagements with their British brother. To begin formal treaty negotiations with Johnson would have amounted to an admission of alliance with Pontiac, something very few of these nations desired at that time. Without the presence of any of the major combat-
ant tribes, much less Pontiac himself, Johnson could make no legitimate 
peace. After extracting some land cessions from the Chenussio Seneca, 
the exasperated superintendent attempted to recruit warriors from these 
peaceful groups to form an “Indian Battalion” to accompany Bradstreet’s 
expeditionary army. This ploy backfired when all but ten of the ninety-six 
recruits deserted immediately after receiving their ammunition and sup-
plies. Even fur trader Alexander Henry, a survivor of the 1763 attack at 
Michilimackinac, commented on the ill-advised nature of such efforts to 
set the western tribes “against their own friends and kinsmen.”116 Despite 
issuing a large Covenant Chain belt (consisting of twenty-three rows of 
wampum with “1764” woven in) at the conclusion of the conference, the 
debabel at Niagara clearly illustrated Johnson’s lack of influence over his 
western Indian brethren, as well as their continued refusal to accept the 
status quo and sue for peace. Pontiac and his allies remained at large in 
the pays d’en haut, a significant menace to British plans to reestablish the 
“security” of the colonial frontier.

Two Armies Sent to the Western Country:
The Bradstreet and Bouquet Expeditions

Gage held firm to Amherst’s orders to send two armies to the western 
country in the summer of 1764. Indeed, the Indians’ recent defiant behav-
or, to the general’s mind, seemed to warrant these punitive attacks all 
the more.117 The Chenussio Seneca, immediately after treating for peace at 
the conclusion of the Niagara conference, sent war belts to the Ohio and 
Illinois tribes.118 Gage also blamed the “black Gentry” of Detroit (French-
supplied warriors under Pontiac) for the 27 February attack that turned 
back Major Arthur Loftus’s expedition moving up the Mississippi River 
from New Orleans to take possession of the Illinois country.119 Finally, after 
a party of Delaware and Shawnee warriors laid siege to Fort Dinwiddie in 
western Virginia for six hours in mid-June 1764, it became clear that the 
Indians still possessed (or could obtain) significant quantities of ammuni-
tion.120 Confronted with these events, as well as continued Indian attacks 
on the frontier settlements of Virginia and Pennsylvania, Gage agreed with 
Bradstreet that no lasting peace would exist until “Mr. Pondiac’s Friends” 
all received a decisive blow:121

Bradstreet’s contingent departed from Niagara on 6 August 1764, 
accompanied by a battalion of French Canadian volunteers raised in Mon-
treal in an effort contrived by Gage to convince the western tribes of 
the futility of their hopes for assistance from France.122 Six days later, 
Bradstreet landed at L’Ance aux Feuilles, near the former site of French
Fort Presqu’Isle, and received a surprise visit from a party of Shawnee, Delaware, Wyandot, and Ohio Seneca deputies. Ignoring his orders to refer the Indians to Johnson for a formal treaty, and dismissing the opinion of the Iroquois warriors accompanying him that the Ohio emissaries lacked proper diplomatic credentials, Bradstreet granted the Ohio tribes preliminary peace terms. In exchange for the delivery of all prisoners, the renunciation of all claims to lands surrounding the western forts, and a pledge to allow the British to build all the forts they deemed necessary to preserve the peace, Bradstreet promised to call off Bouquet’s march into the southern Ohio Valley.123 The colonel then sent Captain Thomas Morris off to acquaint the Great Lakes tribes of the peace and proceeded to Detroit himself for the formal ratification of his terms, still lacking the approval of either Johnson or Gage.124 On 9 September, in an explosion of bombast, Bradstreet demanded that the western Indians accept status as “Subjects and Children” of George III. Completely ignorant of, or willfully subverting normal Indian council protocol, Bradstreet also permitted his Iroquois companions to chop up a peace belt sent by Pontiac (then in the vicinity of Detroit) to the conference and to throw the fragments into the river.125 Yet in the political upheaval then current in the Indian community at Detroit, where a populous faction (led by Ojibwa chief Wasson) had recently broken from their “old chiefs” and desired reconciliation with the British, Bradstreet found significant numbers of Indians from combatant tribes willing to agree to peace. Pontiac, however, was not among them.126

Far beyond the reach of timely communications, Bradstreet proceeded with his reckless diplomacy without knowledge of the uproar it created in official circles. Bouquet, appalled that another officer would dare to assume control over the fate of his own expedition and infuriated at Bradstreet’s failure to effect retribution for what he regarded as the Indians’ particularly brutal raids into western Pennsylvania in late July 1764, ignored Bradstreet’s actions and proceeded with his own mission.127 Gage criticized Bradstreet’s dictated terms in the strongest possible language, and Johnson interpreted the Ohio Indians’ diplomacy as a ploy to stall the British military expeditions until winter rendered them ineffective.128 When Johnson received a copy of the terms of Bradstreet’s Detroit treaty, he doubted the legitimacy of its wording, claiming that the western tribes lacked words in their language for “subjection” and “dominion.” The “very Idea of subjection,” Johnson believed, “would fill them with horror.”129

Bradstreet’s actions created significant difficulties and confusion in the pays d’en haut for the remainder of 1764. Moving to Sandusky to await the promised delivery of Indian prisoners after concluding affairs at Detroit, Bradstreet offered the local Wyandot similar terms, which they
accepted. Iroquois representatives exploited this opportunity to place the Wyandot in a subservient position, stating that “as they were now the King of England’s children, they should study to deserve their father’s favour & protection.” The Iroquois made no mention of accepting the same status of “children” for themselves, thus upsetting the diplomatic balance established in the 1761 Covenant Chain alliance. Additionally, the treaty played havoc with Bouquet’s expedition, prompting desertions of his provincial troops and forcing him to explain to Indians on numerous occasions (at least once to some who produced an original written copy of the agreement signed with Bradstreet) how he could continue with his march after Bradstreet had kindled a council fire at Sandusky and taken those Indians “by the hand.”

Bouquet left Fort Pitt on 3 October with a force of fifteen hundred regulars and provincials under strict orders to treat the western Indians as enemies until they had submitted to terms. Even speaking or shaking hands with any Indian was forbidden. When the Delaware and Ohio Seneca approached him for peace on 16 October 1764, Bouquet insisted on hearing each tribe separately in order to ascertain the legitimacy of their overtures. Four days later, at Tuscarawas, Bouquet called all the Ohio Indian representatives together, blasted them verbally for their treachery, threatened them with retribution from the Six Nations, and vowed to remain in their country until they complied with all of his preliminary terms for a peace to be concluded by Johnson at a later date. To force the Indians’ hand, Bouquet moved his army westward to the forks of the Muskingum River to await the delivery of captives from the Ohio tribes. Faced with the evident resolve of Bouquet, ammunition shortages, diplomatic isolation from other allied Indians (owing to the Great Lakes tribes’ negotiations with Bradstreet), and the fear of intruding on other tribes’ hunting grounds as they retreated even further westward, the Ohio tribes commenced the delivery of captives. By 9 November, the Indians had returned over two hundred men, women, and children to Bouquet. Securing hostages to ensure that delegates would fulfill promises to formally conclude affairs with Johnson during the next spring, Bouquet broke camp at Muskingum on 18 November and returned in triumph to Fort Pitt ten days later.

Peace remained a relative concept, however, connoting quite different things to the British than it did to the western Indians. At the conclusion of Bouquet’s 9 November conference with the Ohio tribes at Wacatomica, the Indians expressed hopes for a return to the Covenant Chain alliance, upheld at either end by Indians and British, so that each party might “always be able to discover anything that may happen to disturb our friendship.” Almost immediately after news of Bouquet’s successful truce, however,
different theories developed among imperial officials as to the best means of exploiting the new diplomatic situation. In Johnson’s ideal state of affairs, the western Indians, “a people who judge only by exterior actions and appearances,” should now receive enough presents from the British to minimize the likelihood of destructive warfare in the future and to “conquer the fears and Jealousys, and to gain the Esteem and friendship of the Indians by which we may be enabled peaceably and quietly to Settle and Enlarge our Frontier and in time become an over Match for them in the interior part of the country.”

Johnson had lobbied long and hard for such a policy since the conquest of Canada. Finally, in the wake of Pontiac’s War, the Board of Trade formulated an extensive “Plan for the Future Management of Indian Affairs” on 10 July 1764, which contained nearly all of Johnson’s recommendations. Two Indian superintendents were to have supreme authority over Indian affairs (previously the prerogative of the army and, on occasion, colonial governments), the trade would be confined to licensed traders at the interior posts, who would operate from a schedule of fixed, fair prices, and the custom of giving regular presents to the Indians would be renewed. Armed with this apparent political coup, Johnson redoubled his efforts to bring about his vision of peace to the western country after the 1764 campaign.

Restructuring the Terms of Alliance and Peace

Taking possession of the Illinois country became the top British priority for 1765. A small detachment of French troops still remained at Fort Chartres, and Pontiac, who retreated to the region rather than acquiesce to the terms of Bradstreet’s Detroit treaty, continued to importune the officers for assistance and to cite the French military presence as proof that Onontio had not yet abandoned the Indians. Anxious to break the resistance of Pontiac, Gage ordered a peace belt sent to the Ottawa chief. Then he issued orders for George Croghan and Lieutenant Alexander Fraser to proceed to Fort Chartres via Fort Pitt in the spring of 1765 to perform the diplomatic spadework necessary to permit the safe passage of an occupying army under Major Robert Farmar from Mobile.

The western Indians trickled in very slowly to Fort Pitt for Croghan’s conference, prompting him to send Fraser off for the Illinois country on 22 March. When the Indians finally did arrive, they appeared to Croghan “very Sulky on account of their not being suffered to Trade.” The first conference of note did not occur until 29 April, when Neolin delivered a long speech renouncing his prior nativistic stance and expressed his desire
to “be as one people” with the English.\textsuperscript{140} Croghan noted that the speech caused two Delaware war chiefs to stab each other in a council two days later, and he intervened with belts of wampum in order to reconcile the two Delaware factions. Only after this gesture did Croghan commence dealing with the Ohio Indians (on 9 May 1765).\textsuperscript{141} To the surprise of contemporary observers, the Shawnee speaker Lawoughwa altered the form of kinship address the next day, claiming to be “Children of the King of England,” a role that convinced the Shawnee “that your intentions toward us are upright, as we know a Father will be tender to his Children, and they the more ready to obey him, than a Brother; therefore, we hope our Father will now take better care of his Children than heretofore has been done.”\textsuperscript{142} Recalling their French father, who did not take their lands, the Shawnee placed new role obligations on a bewildered Croghan and became the first of the western tribes to revise the brotherly alliance and create their own version of a new British father during and after 1765.

This diplomatic process repeated itself at Johnson Hall during 4–14 July 1765, as the Ohio delegates secured by Bouquet’s expedition arrived for their peace conference. The Shawnee and Delaware requested and received status as English “children” on 13 July, “deeming themselves closer linked to the British Crown to whom they will pay all due submission and subjection as far as the same be Consistent with their Native rights.” The Delaware and Shawnee also accepted a provision (which they would come to regret in 1768 that allowed a boundary line to be fixed for their territory by negotiations between the British and the Six Nations. The Ohio Seneca delegates promised to abide by the terms of the peace but remained “brethren.” Well versed in the semantic nuances of Indian negotiations, Johnson articulated a conclusion rhetorically palatable to the Indians and still came away with a piece of paper documenting the “subjection” of a significant portion of the combatant tribes of 1763. Eager to extend his new fatherly influence westward, Johnson closed the conference with a request that his new, “dutiful” Indian children retrieve their war belts from the pays d’en haut.\textsuperscript{143} When news of the Delaware and Shawnee preliminary peace treaties reached the Illinois country later that summer, Pontiac, claiming these Ohio peoples as his inspiration for the war, promised to make peace as soon as they withdrew their war belts from his camp.\textsuperscript{144}

British Indian Department officials worked to eliminate the enmity of the western tribes with diplomatic efforts in 1765, even beginning to accept status as “fathers” to Indians who requested this shift in form of kin-based alliance. It would be inaccurate, however, to assume that the developing British father represented merely a renewal of the earlier French figure of Onontio. The situation proved much more variant and complex, as offi-
cials had to learn the specific expectations with regard to this position. For their part, the western Indians pressed increasingly for the British to abandon the diplomatic stance of the distant “brother.” As the summer of 1765 progressed, different western tribes tried to reshape the diplomatic role of the British from an ineffective elder brother to a new father figure in the hopes of forcing the British to live up to their economic and territorial promises of 1758 to 1761.145

The final pieces of the diplomatic puzzle fell into place, quite by accident, when a mixed party of Kickapoo and Mascouten warriors from the Wabash River region murdered two Shawnees accompanying George Croghan to the Illinois country, forcing the agent into a mediating role between the two Indian groups.146 Confronted with the threat of war with the Ohio tribes, The Wolf, a Kickapoo speaker, asked Croghan on 13 July 1765 to intercede on the Wabash tribes’ behalf: “Our father the French has always succeeded when he undertook to Settle any Differences between the Nations, and we know you have as much power as they, and beg you to have pity on us, our Women, and Children.”147

Croghan’s speech offered preliminary condolences for the Shawnee murders and included a small but crucial rhetorical alteration that sealed the deal. Instead of requesting permission to take possession of the entire Illinois “country,” which had earlier met with a “flat denial” from the Illinois and Wabash tribes, Croghan asked only for “the Posts that had been given up to them by the French.” The Indians, in light of the current political turmoil created by the murders, found this solution acceptable but insisted “that they never sold any part of their Country to the French, & hopes their Brethren the English will not look upon their taking possession of the posts the French formerly possessed as giving them a title to their Country.”148 They then referred Croghan to copies of treaties between themselves and the French deposited in Fort Chartres to prove the limits of their land sales.149 Meeting with Croghan on his way to Ouiatamon on 18 July, Pontiac learned of the recent conference. He expressed his approval of the outcome and repeated the territorial caveat to his “Father the King of England.”150 Pontiac and Croghan then returned to Detroit for the conclusion of formal preliminaries of peace.

Addressing “all the Nations under Pontiac” as “Children” of the king of England, Croghan proclaimed a general peace, to be ratified later by Johnson. Pontiac, having initiated this alteration in status, promised “never to listen any more to bad Counsel,” and then he exploited the opportunity to secure concessions from his new British father. Citing the impending hunting season, Pontiac requested advance credit for much-needed gunpowder, “as our former Father did,” and then acknowledged “that their
country was very large, and that they were willing to give up such a part of it, as was necessary for their Fathers the English, to carry on trade at, provided they were paid for it, and a sufficient part of their Country left them to hunt on.” Instead of the benevolent gift giving, mutual assistance, and relatively harmonious cohabitation of Onontio’s time, Pontiac indicated his peoples’ desire for formal land sales and clear definitions of each group’s respective property. In this way, he articulated the terms for intergroup sharing of the land and its resources, a long-standing practice in the pays d’en haut.\(^{151}\) The ties of fictive kinship established with the British a reciprocal relationship that permitted them a usufruct right to some Indian lands but removed the stigma of land alienation from the agreement.\(^{152}\) Since this request did not seem at odds with the underlying premise of the Proclamation of 1763, the British delegates entered it into the agreement. Pontiac maintained that the western Indians never sold lands to the French, and the efforts of an official British inquiry into his claim substantiated his statement.\(^{153}\) The British took possession of Fort Chartres on 9 October 1765, thus ending the military stalemate they could not break by force alone.\(^{154}\)

Most of the western Indians “represented” by Pontiac, however, considered the peace of 1765 a good one. It secured a formal (albeit difficult to enforce) boundary line between Indian hunting grounds and Anglo-American settlements. Presents would return to the trade, and more metal-smiths and interpreters would be sent to the western forts. Most important, the peace recognized the western Indians’ expressed notion of their own territorial integrity and thus their independent status in the Covenant Chain.

Oswego, 1766: The Covenant Chain Redefined

Pontiac proceeded to Oswego for the final conclusion of hostilities in July 1766, reportedly proclaiming that “the Great God had Ordain’d that we [the British] should be the fathers, and that they [the Indians] would be our Children.”\(^{155}\) Formal proceedings took place during 23–31 July, and Johnson spared no rhetoric to promise his new Algonquian children security in their lands and a fair trade; he also recommended a return to their “former” hunting lifestyle. Six Nations and Algonquian war chiefs withdrew war belts from one another and made peace. Pontiac took his British father by the hand on 25 July and laid a belt over Johnson’s to strengthen his end of the renewed Anglo-Indian Chain of Friendship. Five days later, on behalf of all his Indian brethren present (including Six Nations delegates), Pontiac delivered the final speech of the conference. He thanked
Johnson for his good words, shook the superintendent’s hand to seal the Chain of Friendship, and departed with his presents. Peace between the western tribes and the British broke out at last.\textsuperscript{156}

Some historians have interpreted the presence of the Six Nations at the Oswego conference of July 1766 as the reimposition of the “Onondaga yoke” over the western tribes, on the grounds that the Iroquois retained their status as brethren to the British, while the Algonquians became children.\textsuperscript{157} Yet whatever airs the Six Nations put on at the conference, they neither possessed nor were granted any authority over the Great Lakes peoples. Johnson treated the Algonquians and the Iroquoians as equal partners at Oswego in 1766, as Pontiac’s concluding remarks demonstrate. Writing in 1783, ex-Superintendent of Indian Affairs Guy Johnson recalled that Pontiac forced the Seneca to acknowledge their culpability in sending him “bad belts” in amounts “greater than a man can carry” at the 1766 Oswego conference. The site chosen for the treaty also reflected the degree of British recognition of the western tribes’ independence from the council fire at Onondaga. Long a center for trade and communication between the British and Great Lakes peoples, Oswego did not represent an area in which the Iroquois held undisputed influence.\textsuperscript{158} Furthermore, as “children” to the English and “brethren” to the Six Nations, the western Algonquians won on both fronts. They now had significant claims on Johnson as a “father,” and they reasserted themselves as equal partners in the tripartite Covenant Chain with the Iroquois. The British, as historian Jay Gitlin notes, ended up the guardians of an imperial system very similar to the one they defeated in 1760.\textsuperscript{159}

Rather than a submission or an acknowledgment of defeat, the Treaty of Oswego represented empowerment and recognition for the western tribes. Their military resistance and skillful diplomacy secured a new alliance with two rival powers on terms more familiar and favorable to them than before. The Algonquian peoples of the Great Lakes and upper Ohio Valley, as equal partners in the tripartite Covenant Chain, remained powerful, unconquered peoples in their own territory. Throughout the period known as Pontiac’s War, the Indians behaved autonomously and exercised their military and diplomatic power to adjust to the challenges and opportunities posed by a rapidly changing political environment.

Notes

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15 A French term denoting the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley region; means “the upper country.” See White, The Middle Ground, x–xi.


Anglo-Iroquois Covenant Chain, 1758–1766


34 Ibid., 746–49; Auth, *Ten Years’ War*, 143–46. At other times, the Great Lakes Algonquians had made similar efforts to join the Covenant Chain in order to share hunting territories with the Iroquois. See J. A. Brandão and William A. Starna, “The Treaties of 1701: A Triumph of Iroquois Diplomacy,” *Ethnohistory* 43 (1996): 217–18.


40 “Indian Intelligence from Croghan at Detroit,” enclosed in Johnson to Amherst, 12 February 1761, PRO, WO 34/39.


James Kenny to Humphrey Marshall, 6 December 1761, Humphrey Marshall Papers, WLCL.

“Return of the Detachment at Detroit and Dependent Forts, 18 September 1761,” enclosed in D. Campbell to Amherst, 18 September 1761, wo 34/49.


“Copy of an Indian Council,” enclosed in D. Campbell to Amherst, 17 June 1761, PRO, wo 34/49. Also see D. Campbell to Bouquet, 21 June 1761, “Aspinall Papers,” 427–29. Francis Jennings, in Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years’ War in North America (New York, 1988), 440, locates the origins of the 1761 war belt in the Iroquois Council at Onondaga. The evidence fails to substantiate his claim of official sanction from the Iroquois League. Interviewed by Croghan on 27 July 1761, the two Senecas testified that the plan was entirely their own, and they made no mention of consultation with league chiefs. See Wainwright, “Croghan’s Journal,” 410–11; White, The Middle Ground, 272; and McConnell, A Country Between, 171. Croghan later determined that the Onondaga Council had no hand at all in the 1761 Seneca belts. See George Croghan to Robert Monckton, 3 October 1761, Cadwalader Family Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Box 5, folder 12.

“At a Council at the Wiandot Town near Fort Detroit, 3 July 1761...,” enclosed in D. Campbell to Amherst, 8 July 1761, PRO, wo 34/49; James Sterling to John Duncan, 8 July 1761, James Sterling Letterbook, WLCL.


“Council with Onondaga at Oswego, 21 July 1761,” wjp, 3:444.


55 Johnson to Gage, 12 January 1764, GP, WLCL. On the importance of private conferences as part of Johnson’s negotiating style, see Johnson to Sir Frederick Haldimand, 25 November 1773, BL Add. Mss. 21760, f. 95; and Druke, “Iroquois Treaties: Common Forms, Varying Interpretations,” in Jennings et al., *History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy*, 87–88.

56 See, for example, John Bartram, *Travels in Pensilvania and Canada* (1751; rpt. Ann Arbor, MI, 1966), 50, 54. See also generally Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, chap. 19.


59 [Unknown Quaker Woman] Journal, Easton, PA, 4–12 August 1761, “Some Account of a Visit divers Friends made to the Indians at the time of the Treaty of Easton...”, 12, Quaker Collection, WLCL.

60 Bouquet to James Livingston, 31 October 1761, BL Add. Mss. 21653: f. 91.


62 D. Campbell to Amherst, 8 November 1761, PRO, WO 34/49.


65 Bouquet to Fauquier, 8 February 1762, *Papers of Bouquet*, vol. 6 (Harrisburg, PA, 1994), 44; Ensign Christopher Pauli to Bouquet, 19 February 1762; Stevens et al., ibid., 46; Bouquet to Amherst, 1 April 1762, ibid., 72; Francis Gordon to Bouquet, 10 September 1762, ibid., 112.

66 Sterling to James Syme, 8 June 1762 (quote); same to same, 17 June 1762 (quote); Sterling to John Sterling, 26 August 1762; same to same, 2 October 1762; Sterling to John Duncan, 25 October 1762; Sterling to Capt. Walter Rutherford, 27 November 1762, Sterling Letterbook, WLCL.

Anglo-Iroquois Covenant Chain, 1758–1766


71 Ensign Robert Holmes to Gladwin, 30 March 1763, enclosed in Gladwin to Amherst, 20 April 1763, PRO, WO 34/49.

72 Gladwin to Amherst, 21 February 1763, PRO, WO 34/49; Croghan to Johnson, 24 April 1763, *WJP* 10:659–60.


76 Gladwin to Amherst, 14 May 1763, Sir Jeffery Amherst Papers, WLCL (quote); Burton, *Pontiac’s Journal*, 44–66.

77 The best narrative accounts of the siege of Detroit appear in Burton, *Pon-
Jon William Parmenter

tiac's Journal, 54–242, and Peckham, Pontiac, 116–236. Some evidence of the rapidity of the spread of news about the attacks appears in Ecuver to Bouquet, 29 May 1763, in Stevens et al., Papers of Bouquet, 6:193; Ecuver mentions Delawares and Mingoes coming into Fort Pitt on 27 May 1763 and selling three hundred pounds sterling worth of furs “very hastily with which they bought as much powder and lead as they could get.”

78 Burton, Pontiac's Journal, 40; Parkman, Conspiracy of Pontiac, 1:217, refers to Pontiac as the principal conspirator, “the Satan of this forest paradise.” Peckham, Pontiac, 107–11, challenges the conspiracy thesis.


80 For casualty estimates see Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 446.


82 Amherst to Gladwin, 22 June 1763, Amherst Papers, WLCL.

83 Ibid., (quote); Amherst to Johnson, 7 July 1763, WJP, 10:733.


85 Lieutenant James MacDonald to Horatio Gates, 8 August 1763, Michigan Collection, WLCL; Sterling to John Sterling, 7 August 1763; Sterling to William MacAdam, 7 August 1763, Sterling Letterbook, WLCL.


90 Gladwin to Gage, 9 January 1764, GP, WLCL.

91 7 December 1763 entry, Jehu Hay, MS “Diary of the Siege of Detroit, 1763–1765,” WLCL.

92 “Copy of the Embassy, sent to the Illinois by the Indians at Detroit . . . ,”
enclosed in Gladwin to Gage, 24 March 1764, GP, WLCL. See also Peckham, *Pontiac*, 147–49.

93 Ohio Iroquois, Delaware, and Shawnee delegates offered their French father twenty British scalps taken near Fort Pitt at Fort de Chartres, which were returned. See “Paroles des iroquoise, Loups, Chaouanons, Fort de Chartres, 2 novembre 1763,” AC, CIIA, 103: ff. 410–412v; Villiers to d’Abbadie, 1 December 1763, *Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library* (hereinafter *IHC*), vol. 10 (Springfield, IL, 1915), 49–57.


97 Gage to Johnson, 12 January 1764 (quote); same to same, 6 February 1764, GP, WLCL.

98 Amherst to Gage, 17 November 1763, GP, WLCL; Joseph Shippen to James Burd, 3 January 1764, Native American History Collection, WLCL.

99 Egremont to Gage, 13 August 1763; Johnson to Gage, 14 February 1765 (Private), GP, WLCL. As late as May 1765, Johnson and Gage awaited clear orders on how to implement the 1763 boundary line, while reports of Maryland and Virginia inhabitants “removing fast over the Allegheny Mountains, in order to settle and live there,” came into headquarters. See Bouquet to Gage, 19 May 1765 (quote), GP, WLCL. For more on the response of American colonists to the proclamation of 1763, see Woody Holton, “The Ohio Indians and the Coming of the Revolution in Virginia,” *Journal of Southern History* 60 (1994): 453–78. Indeed, one of the unintended and ironic results of the proclamation of 1763 was the *acceleration* of speculators’ activities in the Indian-claimed western lands, since they hoped to preempt any future Crown attempts contrary to their interests. See Robert A. Williams Jr., *The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest* (New York, 1990), 255–56. See also Canada, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, Claims and Historical Research Directorate, “The Application in British North America of the Royal Proclamation, 1763–1774,” typescript, Dept. of Indian and Northern Affairs, Hull, Ottawa, ON, 1971, 10–11; Robert J. Surtees, “Land Cessions, 1763–1830,” in *Aboriginal Ontario: Historical Perspectives on the First Nations*, ed. Edward S. Rogers and Donald B. Smith (Toronto, 1994), 92–94.

100 Gage to Johnson, 26 December 1763, GP, WLCL.

Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs Daniel Claus described the custom of returning successful war parties giving outgoing war parties a token gift of a scalp or prisoner, so that “should they be unsuccessful they might still have some spoil to show on the way home.” See Claus to Haldimand, 3 May 1779, BL Add. Mss. 21774, f. 41.

“Council of Three Jebbeways—Niagara, 26 May 1764,” enclosed in Capt. William Browning to Gage, 1 June 1764, GP, WLCL. Johnson to Lord Hillsborough, 20 July 1768, PRO CO5/69, f. 233; Johnson to Secretary of State, 26 December 1772, PRO CO5/228, f. 115. Ojibwa peoples in the Niagara region, though often referred to as Mississauga, were part of the self-described Anishnabeg linguistic family, encompassing tribes from modern Quebec to North Dakota. See Donald B. Smith, “Who Are the Mississauga?” *Ontario History* 67 (1975): 211-22; Peter S. Schmalz, *The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario* (Toronto, 1991), 3-5.


“Copie d’une lettre de M. de Neyon à M. D’Abbadie, 20 avril 1764,” ibid., f. 93.

“Copy of an Indian Council held at Ft. Chartres, 15 & 17 April 1764,” enclosed in Major Robert Farman to Gage, 21 December 1764, GP, WLCL.

31 December 1763, 14 February 1764, 20 February 1764, 14 March 1764, 18 March 1764, 28 April 1764, 2 June 1764, and 3 June 1764 entries, Hay Diary, WLCL.

29 July 1764 entry, Hay Diary, WLCL.

“Instructions to Colonel Bouquet, March [?] 1764”; “Instructions for Colonel Bradstreet,” enclosed in Gage to Bradstreet, 2 April 1764, GP, WLCL. See also Gage to Gladwin, 25 April 1764, GP, WLCL, for orders that any French inhabitants “proved highly culpable” in assisting and abetting the Indians’ uprising “shou’d be tried and punished on the spot.”
114 1 and 4 July 1764 entries, Hay Diary, WLCL. For Indian oral tradition about the destructive effects of smallpox, see Andrew J. Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa Indians of Michigan (1887; rpt. Petoskey, MI, 1977), 9–10.


120 Gage to Bradstreet, 25 June 1764, GP, WLCL. See also McConnell, A Country Between, 197.

121 Bradstreet to Gage, 5 August 1764 (quote); Gage to Johnson, 15 August 1764, GP, WLCL. For continued frontier attacks, see Pennsylvania Gazette, nos. 1849 (31 May 1764), 1850 (7 June 1764), 1851 (14 June 1764 [siege of Ft. Dinwiddie]), and 1853 (28 June 1764).


123 “Articles of Peace, Camp at L’Ance aux Feuilles, 12 August 1764,” enclosed in Bradstreet to Gage, 14 August 1764, GP, WLCL.

Morris got only as far as the Miamis’ town before being turned back by hostile Indians. See White, *The Middle Ground*, 298–99.


Bouquet to Bradstreet, 5 September 1764, enclosed in Bouquet to Gage, 12 September 1764, GP, WCL. For details of the frontier incidents, see *Pennsylvania Gazette*, nos. 1858 (9 August 1764) and 1862 (30 August 1764). See also Cyrus Cort, ed., *Memorial of Enoch Brown and Eleven Scholars Who Were Massacred in Antrim Township, Franklin County, PA, by the Indians during the Pontiac War, July 26, 1764* (Lancaster, PA, 1886).

Gage to Johnson, 2 September 1764; Johnson to Gage, 11 September 1764, GP, WCL. Bouquet agreed with Johnson’s assessment of the military motives behind the L’Ance aux Feuilles peace message. See Bouquet to Gage, 16 September 1764, GP, WCL.

Johnson to Gage, 31 October 1764 (Private), GP, WCL. Later, Johnson expressed his tacit approval of the destruction of Pontiac’s belt, criticizing only Bradstreet’s failure to fulfill the action signified by that gesture (i.e., the execution of Pontiac). See Johnson to Gage, 6 July 1765, GP, WCL.

“At a Meeting with the Wyandots of Sandusky, Sept. 29th, 1764,” enclosed in Bradstreet to Gage, 29 September 1764, GP, WCL.

Bouquet to Gage, 12 September 1764; same to same, 26 September 1764; same to same, 2 October 1764 (quote); same to same, 21 October 1764; Gage to Bouquet, 25 September 1764, GP, WCL. See also 22 October 1764 entry, Hay Diary, WCL.


Bouquet to Gage, 15 November 1764, GP, WCL, contains enclosures of all councils held with the Ohio tribes and Bouquet’s journal of the entire expedition. Also see council proceedings in BL Add. Mss. 21655: ff. 235–45.

See 9 November 1764 entry in Bouquet’s Journal of Occurrences, enclosed in Bouquet to Gage, 15 November 1764, GP, WCL.

Johnson to Lords of Trade, 20 August 1762, WJP, 3:868 (quote); Johnson to Earl of Egremont, May [? ] 1762, WJP, 10:464 (quote).

“Plan for the Future Management of Indian Affairs,” enclosed in Lords of Trade to Johnson, 10 July 1764, *NYCD*, 7:637–41. Unfortunately for Johnson, the board could not even submit the plan to Parliament without the guarantee of an American revenue, and the plan ultimately foundered on the 1766 repeal of the 1765 Stamp Act. See Gage to Johnson, 2 September 1765, GP, WCL; Marjorie G. Reid, “The Quebec Fur Traders and Western Policy, 1763–1774,” *Canadian Historical Review* 6 (1925): 20–

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137 Johnson to Gage, 18 December 1764, GP, WLCL; Captain Louis St. Ange de Belrive to Governor Jean-Jacques Blaise d’Abbadie, 9 September 1764, NYC, 10:1137–58; Governor Charles Philippe Aubry to Minister Dubuq, 4 February 1765, IHC, 10:429–31; Aubry to Minister, 12 February 1765, AC, CI3A, 45: ff. 38–40.

138 Gage to Lieutenant-Colonel John Campbell, 18 January 1765 (quote); Gage to Croghan, 30 December 1764; Gage to Lieutenant Alexander Fraser, 30 December 1764, GP, WLCL.

139 Fraser to Gage, 21 March 1765; Croghan to Gage, 22 March 1765, GP, WLCL.

140 Croghan’s Journal, 28 February–11 May 1765, PRO CO5/66, f. 91.


143 “Conference with the Deputies from the Ohio, 4–14 July 1765,” NYC, 7:750–58 (quotes 753, 755; emphasis added); McConnell, A Country Between, 205–6.

144 Fraser to Gage, June 1765, GP, WLCL.


147 “Meeting with Chiefs of Ouitonons, Kecopees, Mascoutens, and Ottawas, Ft. Ouiatanon, 13 July 1765,” enclosed in Gage to Johnson, 13 July 1765 (actually enclosed in Gage to Johnson, 18 August 1765—see note on MS folder), GP, WLCL; “Croghan’s Journal,” PRO CO5/66, f. 102.

148 Croghan to Gage, 17 August 1765, GP, WLCL. The Creek expressed similar notions of territorial sovereignty when Lieutenant-Colonel Augustine Prevost arrived to take “possession” of West Florida in late summer 1763, advising the English “that they had only the Land lying under the guns of Pensacola, since that was all they had ceded to the Spanish.” See Milo B. Howard Jr., trans., and Robert R. Rea, ed., The Memoire Justificatif of the Chevalier Montault de Monberaut: Indian Diplomacy in British West Florida, 1763–1765 (University, AL, 1965), 10–11.

149 Croghan to Gage, 16 January 1767, Shelburne Mss. 48: 12, WLCL.


Captain Thos. Sterling to Gage, 15 December 1765, GP, WLCL.

Capt. Thos. Sterling to Gage, 18 October 1765; Gage to Johnson, 30 December 1765 (quote), GP, WLCL.


