The MSU Undergraduate Historian

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LETTER FROM THE EDITORS

It with great pleasure and a small measure of relief that we present to you The 2007 MSU Undergraduate Historian. Now in its third edition, The MSU Undergraduate Historian represents a continuing tradition of showcasing the best undergraduate scholarship at Michigan State University. This year’s journal includes nine essays on a variety of historical topics, from Atlantic history and African history, to collective memory and gender history.

The 2007 Historian represents the culmination of six months of hard work and dedication on the part of the Historian staff and those who have aided and abetted us. This publication would not have been possible without the commitment and enthusiasm of the MSU undergraduate community, from which we draw both our staff and our submission base. The Historian staff worked tirelessly to promote the journal, read submissions, edit the selections, and otherwise bring this journal into being. Their determination and their love of history are truly the heart and soul of this project. Equally important to our efforts this year have been those students who submitted their work for consideration. We received nearly one hundred submissions, and it proved quite difficult to choose from among them. Our thanks also go to those historians whose work is showcased in this journal. They have worked diligently with our board of editors to prepare their articles for publication.

Another cohort that deserves our profuse thanks is the faculty, staff, and graduate students of the MSU Department of History. Without their support and encouragement, this endeavor would not be possible. In particular we would like to thank Dr. Keely Stauter-Halsted, Associate Chair of the Department of History. Dr. Stauter-Halsted has contributed to the success of this journal in many ways, from securing funding for the Historian to giving advice and reviewing essays. Our gratitude also goes to Dr. Emily Tabuteau, Associate Chair for Undergraduate Education, who has also contributed to this achievement in a number of ways. Dr. Tabuteau enthusiastically promoted the Historian, garnering us essay submissions from undergraduates and recognition from other quarters, and reviewed several essays under consideration. Special thanks go to Karina Hernandez in the
Department office, who has helped us over the years to increase the level of professionalism of our small publication. Although space will not permit us mention by name all of those who have helped us along the way, we would like to express our gratitude to all of the professors and graduate students who assisted us by reviewing essays in their areas of expertise. Your willingness to share your knowledge continues to raise the scholarly quality of our journal.

Last, but by no means least, I would like to thank Dr. Mark Kornbluh, Department Chair, and Dr. Christine Daniels, faculty advisor to the History Association of Michigan State and by extension The MSU Undergraduate Historian. It is only with their continued support and encouragement that this publication is possible.

Erin K. Biebuyck        Dimity Palazzola
Editor-in-Chief        Managing Editor
A Note on our Review Process

All essays submitted to The MSU Undergraduate Historian for consideration are reviewed anonymously, identified only by the author’s student identification number. Each essay is read and reviewed by one member of the editorial board and three to four readers. Essays that stand out among our collection of submissions are identified and sent to MSU professors and graduate students for review. Professors and upper level graduate students review essays within the area of their specialization in order to ensure the factual accuracy of the information presented and originality of the argument. Throughout this process the author’s identity remains unknown to those reviewing the essay in order to ensure the impartiality of our selection process.
In October 1751, James Conyers of Black River, South Carolina described his African slave in a runaway slave advertisement as a “Gambia new negro fellow,” who had been “marked on the forehead with a cross, and had three perpendicular stokes on each cheek.”\(^1\) Conyers specifically referenced his slave’s pattern of scarification in his advertisement, as those scars provided a clear-cut method of identifying the runaway slave. Moreover, the marks described by Conyers embodied a recurring symbol of African ethnic identity — the scarification of the body and the face.

In 1913, historian E. Torday organized African scarification into three groups: (1) scars made by cutting knobs above the surface of the skin which appear darker than the surrounding skin; (2) scars made by cutting small, yet faint cuts which appear lighter than the surrounding skin; and (3) scars formed by scoring or burning lines in the skin which do not project above the surface of the skin.\(^2\) Scarification can be broadly defined as a permanent alteration or marking of the body.

While the historical classification of scars developed by E. Torday is useful, for the purpose of this paper scarification will be divided into two broad categories: (1) ritual scarification and (2) forced scarification. Ritual scarification is defined to include scars made for the purpose of signifying titled members of society and ethnic identification, scars made to demonstrate a rite of passage, and scars made for the purpose of ornamentation. Forced scarification is defined to include scars made for the purpose of denoting slave status or as a sign of punishment.

In 1990, West African historian Jean-Loup Amselle argued that pre-colonial African ethnic identities had never been fixed, being defined by fluid boundaries.\(^3\) This argument, however, has been contradicted and refined by several historians, as posited by historian Walter Hawthorne in his 2004 article entitled *History and Identity in Senegambia and on the Upper Guinea Coast*. Historian Peter Mark
demonstrated that the “boundaries of one West African coastal identity [Luso-Africans] became fixed and rigid before the onset of nineteenth-century European colonial rule.” Historian Joshua Forrest added that pre-colonial ethnic identities had been “territorial specific.” Hawthorne noted that, in Forrest’s thinking, “ethnicity was important because the members of groups had the right to rule specific land areas.”

Amselle’s theory is contradicted in part by the use of ritual scarification in Africa to permanently mark the individual as a member of a group or to identify certain rituals which the individual had undergone. Additionally, forced scarification imposed a rigid identification on captured African slaves and created new groupings and social identities tied to their captors, owners, and others. This paper will explore the ways in which both ritual and forced scarifications marked slaves with a permanent symbol and tie to their African ethnic identity and their slavery during the era of the Atlantic Slave Trade.

**Ritual Scarification**

Anthropologist Christiana Knudsen observed that scarification, particularly among African nations, “has been made more conspicuous by *cicatrisation,*” a form of scarring which entails either the gashing of the body or face with a sharp instrument or the application of plant juices to skin in order to cause irritation of the skin. Because of their dark pigmentation, Africans rubbed charcoal, gunpowder or sand into their wounds in order to give emphasis to their scarring patterns. These scarring patterns were often used for “ritual scarification.” Scars of the “ritual” classification fall into three categories: scars that distinguished ethnic and social identities, scars made to demonstrate a rite of passage, and scars of ornamentation.

African ethnic identities during the era of the Atlantic Slave trade were enormously complex and could be focused on a village, village group, town, or state and could also be family or kin-based. Indeed, this variety is reflected in the historical record. However, African ethnic identity had been often recorded and reflected in the scarification of the body and face.

In his 1823 *Remarks on the Country Extending from Cape Palmas to the River Congo*, Captain John Adams encountered
numerous African groups and nations during his expedition to find a location in Africa suitable for establishing a colony for African slaves captured aboard illegal slave vessels. Adams writes of the Fante and Ashante people, describing their “national mark” as “three small perpendicular incisions on each temple, and on the nape of the neck.” Adams described several other ethnic scarification patterns, including the “tattoo, or national mark” of the Chamba people, who live in the country lying to the north of the Fante and the Ashante, “consist[ing] of three strong lines drawn from the temple over each cheek to the chin, and taking the form of the longitudinal lines upon a globe.”

Regarding the Hausa people, Adams described that their “country mark consists of very small lines cut longitudinally upon each cheek from the temples to the chin.” Adams offered a number of very detailed descriptions of African scarring patterns, but more importantly, he designated each as “national marks” or “country marks” of the respective African ethnic groups or nation. In his writings, Adams makes no other mention of the significance of these scars, only referencing them when distinguishing between the many different groups and nations with whom he came into contact during his expedition.

In addition to the detailed descriptions of the ritual scars used by the Fante, Ashante, Chamba and Hausa people as set forth by Adams, the Yoruba people also were scarred for the purpose of ethnic identification. In his 1921 *The History of the Yorubas*, Samuel Johnson, a Yoruba himself, provides a detailed history of the Yoruba people. An ordained Anglican priest, Samuel Johnson examined the intricacies of Yoruba facial scars, which served “the purpose of distinguishing [among] the various Yoruba families.” Johnson described in great detail the facial scars of the principle Yoruba families, noting the corresponding differences in social standing. Members of the Oyo Royal Family of the Yoruba had sets of four parallel lines marked on each cheek, separating them from other noble families who added perpendicular lines to the design. In addition to facial scarification, Johnson noted that those of Yoruba royal blood also had broad ribbon marks, termed Eyo, drawn along the whole length of the arms and legs.
Yoruba people, who were not royalty or part of a noble family, had a varied number and extent of their facial scars. Johnson notes that “homeborn slaves” closely related to Royalty had “facial marks distinct of the house to which they belong.” Much the same as any other property, these slaves were scarred with the family’s facial scars to identify their owners. Muslim members of the Yoruba were distinguished from other Yoruba with *Pele* scars—three short perpendicular lines over the cheek bone. Facial scars were also used to identify those who had become naturalized into the Yoruba community.

In addition to identifying royalty, nobility, slave status, and religion, the length and type of facial scarification could also be used to determine age amongst the Yoruba. Among younger generations, Johnson notes that they “have their lines rather faint or of shorter lengths” which is “undistinguishable from the *Pele*.” Johnson argues that a generational change occurred in regards to the continued use of facial markings amongst the Yoruba, as his writing indicated the possibility that facial scars were being phased-out with younger generations.

Additionally, among the Ijebu people of Nigeria, scarification had been performed in the nineteenth century. In his 1967 *Africa Remembered*, while discussing the Ijebu people, Phillip D. Curtin describes “scarification [as] a kind of insignia, a national badge, uniform for all individuals of the same group and different from one people to another so as to give each one a distinctive characteristic.” There were two scarification operations exclusive to the Ijebu people performed on the Ijebu at the age of six or seven. The first operation, termed *ella*, is common to both males and females. The second operation, *oufon*, is for males only. Each of these operations is performed for a fee by an artist of the professional group called the *alakila*.

In his 1789 *The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano*, Olaudah Equiano describes that titled members of the West African Igbo nation received scars to denote their social status. An educated ex-African slave, Equiano is thought to have been born around 1745 in Guinea. Equiano’s father was a village chief, as his face had been “styled Embrenché [Mbreechi]; a term…importing the
highest distinction” in society, and “signifying in our language [Igbo] a mark of grandeur.”\textsuperscript{17} The mark of the Embrenché, or “chief men,” had been conferred on those privileged members by cutting across the skin at the top of the forehead and down to the eye-brows. In addition to village chiefs, elders, judges and senators were also marked in the same way. The men who received the Embrenché mark were men of status who settled disputes and punished crimes in their communities. The Embrenché mark had been generally bestowed upon an individual by their parent. One of Equiano’s brothers had received the mark, and Equiano writes that he too “was destined to receive it by my parents,”\textsuperscript{18} but that his subsequent enslavement ended his position in society.

Scarification had been also used in Africa to illustrate different rites of passage. For example, the \textit{Poro} of Sierra Leone, an age-graded society organized with “degrees of descending status and authority aggregated at the upper strata of society,” used scarification in their initiation process. Historian Michael Gomez noted that at the beginning of the initiation process to the \textit{Poro}, candidates “were scarified” and “underwent a symbolic death to their prior lives.”\textsuperscript{19} At the end of this initiation scarification, initiates received new names. Scarification had been a necessary prerequisite to membership in the \textit{Poro}, and membership in the \textit{Poro} was essential for the passage of men and women to the upper echelons of society. \textit{Poro} membership was mandatory for all males, who had been initiated at puberty with circumcision. Women could also become members of the \textit{Poro} in three ways: (1) if she had been a political ruler; (2) if she had been barren and unable to have children; or (3) if she learned \textit{Poro} secrets from a male member.\textsuperscript{20}

In addition to scars of identification and rites of passage, scarification had been also used for body ornamentation. In his 1615 \textit{Ethiopia Minor}, Manuel Alvares provides detailed descriptions of the people he came into contact with and noted that in Sierra Leone, people had been marked “with a thousand pictures of snakes, lizards, monkeys, [and] birds” on their “trunk, face and limbs.”\textsuperscript{21} Although Alvares was an outsider in Sierra Leone, it had been his understanding that these body markings had been done solely for the purpose of ornamentation like jewelry—not for ritualistic or identification purposes. The markings to which Alvares referred to covered the entire body of these
people, signifying the ritual scarification of the body. Anthropologist Christiana Knudsen noted that, “Europeans became aware of the elaborate body art of the peoples of Africa...in the late fifteenth century,” just a little over one century before Alvares’s exploration of the West African coast.

More historical examples directly from the era of the Atlantic Slave Trade also describe ornamentation of the body and face on captured African slaves. A letter sent August 13, 1838, from Captain Wauchope of the Royal Navy to Thomas Buxton, which described the seizure of 590 African slaves aboard the *Felix*, an illegal Portuguese slave vessel, reflected Wauchope’s surprise and observation that a number of slaves had been marked and tattooed. He remarked that, “much pains must have been taken by their miserable parents to ornament and beautify them.”

First hand accounts by former slaves also detailed scarification for purposes of ornamentation. Traveling from the interior to the coast of Africa, Olaudah Equiano, a captured slave, came into contact with a multitude of different African nations and peoples and noted that “[i]n some of those places the people ornamented themselves with scars, and likewise filed their teeth very sharp.” Moreover, Equiano believed that “[t]hey wanted sometimes to ornament me in the same manner,” but he did not want to “be among a people who did not thus disfigure themselves, as I thought they did.” Equiano was the son of an Igbo village chief who had been scarred for social identification. Accordingly, Equiano distinguished his experience with scars of identification from the scars of ornamentation that he observed in other people and groups in Africa. While ornamental scarification does not appear to have the same importance of scars of identification and rites of passage, all of these marks served as a permanent physical reminder of African ethnic identity.

**Forced Scarification**

Distinct from scars of identification, scars of rites of passage and scars of ornamentation, Africans captured and sold during the era of Atlantic Slave Trade were often subject to “forced scarification.” Indeed, it had been a fairly common practice prior to departure to the Americas that African slaves were branded by slave traders, and later
by owners. These brands were “forced scarification.” In her 2000 The Patterned Skin, Ethnic Scarification in Developing Ghana, Knudsen explains that branding is the process of “making permanent marks on both human beings and animals.” She notes that humans and animals can be branded in two ways: first, by the application of glowing hot irons or stone to the skin - known as cautery; second, by the application of extremely cold irons to the skin. Slave traders during the era of the Atlantic Slave Trade generally used the former method to brand African slaves before their arrival in the Americas as a way of marking African captives as slaves as well as to establish ownership.

Branding of slaves was not a new practice established during the era of the Atlantic Slave Trade and can be traced back to the early sixteenth-century in Portugal, where the first known law mentioning branding had been enacted by King Dom Miguel in 1519. He ordered that slaves leaving the island of São Tomé must be branded, remarking that “You will make a mark on our slaves who come from those rivers [coastal rivers], and it will be with a hot iron on the right arm, with a cross.” It was not until 1813 that branding of Portuguese slaves had been made illegal in Portugal, with the justification that: “Being ultimately repugnant to the feelings of humanity that permit brands made by a hot iron, it is determined that this barbarous practice will no longer be practiced.” However, after 1818 slave brands had been again made legal, substituting for “a bracelet or collar, on which is engraved the mark that has been abusive.”

In his 1839 study of the Atlantic Slave Trade entitled The African Slave Trade and Its Remedy, British Member of Parliament and abolitionist Thomas Fowell Buxton estimated that the average loss of life of African slaves during the Middle Passage had been “nearly one-third” of all those who taken out of Africa. In Travels in Western Africa in 1845 & 1846, John Duncan further explains that, “[e]ach slave-dealer uses his own mark, so that when the vessel arrives at her destination, it is easily ascertained to whom those who died belonged.” As a result of the numbers of deaths which occurred during the Middle Passage, Duncan argued that it was necessary to brand African slaves as a means of identifying the owner of each deceased African slave, so that purchasing receipts could be verified.
In addition to forced scarification by branding at the time of capture for the purposes of their seller, African slaves were also branded by their owners and could be branded a number of times. In a description of the Portuguese Atlantic slave trade by Luiz Antonio de Oliveira Mendes, a Portuguese medical doctor, the order and importance of brands are explained. He noted that when they are first traded, “they are made to bear the brand mark of the backlander who enslaved them, so that they can be recognized in case they run away.” He then noted that when slave reach their port of embarkation, they are then branded on the right chest with the coat of arms of a king or nation after the king’s duties are paid. Finally, slaves were branded by their private master, “put either on the left breast or on the arm...so that they may be recognized if they should run away.”

Given the prevalence of branding, which had been practiced by several slave trading nations including France, Portugal, and Spain, the Middle Passage undoubtedly left a physical mark on most African slaves who survived the journey.

African slaves aboard the *Diligent*, a French slave vessel, were branded as described above. First Lieutenant Robert Durand carried a branding iron which bore the mark of the *Diligent*, which had been heated with burning charcoal until red-hot and then applied to the slave’s flesh. Their flesh then swelled “in the form of the owner’s mark” and while “the burn slowly healed in the ensuing days, the mark remained.” The location of the branding marks varied among individual slave traders as well as rival slave-trading nations, such as France, Portugal, and Spain. Indeed, while most French slave traders “generally branded their captives on the fleshy part of the arm or the stomach,” Durand branded African slaves captured by the *Diligent* on the right shoulder. In contrast, African slaves aboard the *Emilia*, a Portuguese slave vessel, were branded in several different locations to indicate who owned which slaves. Walter Hawthorne noted that 341 slaves aboard the *Emilia* were branded on the right chest, while others were “branded on the left chest, left arm, and right arm, and still others on their thighs, lower legs, backs and stomachs.” Because of the brands on their bodies, the African slaves forced onto the *Diligent* and the *Emilia* all left with a shared and permanent symbol of their original enslavement. Despite the commonness of branding as a mark of enslavement and ownership, not all slaves bound for sale in the
Americas were branded. For example, of the 259 slaves aboard the slave vessel Espéculado, 35 were “sem marca” or “without mark.”

Thus upon their arrival in the Americas, approximately fourteen percent of the African slaves on the Espéculado were not branded as slaves.

First hand accounts of former slaves have also detailed the practice and extent of slave branding. In his 1854 An Interesting Narrative, Biography of Mahommah G. Baquaqua, Mahommah Baquaqua described his branding experience while awaiting embarkation to the Americas aboard his slave vessel, near the coastal city of Ouidah in modern-day Benin. He explained that he and the other slaves were collected together in a pen, and ordered to stand with their backs to a fire. He recollected that to insure their strict obedience, one slave-trader stood in front of the slaves with a whip while another man “went round with a hot iron, and branded us the same as they would the heads of barrels or any other inanimate goods or merchandize.”

Additionally, Olaudah Equiano noted that it had been “very common in several of the islands [of the West Indies], particularly in St. Kitts, for the slaves to be branded with the initial letters of their master’s name, and a load of heavy iron hooks hung around their necks.”

Given the prevalence of branding, it was not uncommon for African slaves to have numerous brands placed on their bodies by their captors and owners. Accordingly, each time a slave had been sold the new master could and often did brand his initials or mark into their new slave. Runaway slave advertisements from the era have described slaves with multiple brands, one on top of another. According to one seventeenth-century priest, one slave “who had been sold and resold several times was in the end as covered with characters as an Egyptian obelisk.” Thus each brand had been an attempt by a captor or owner to permanently identify a slave as his property. This stands in stark contrast to ritual scarification used to self identify social status or rites of passage.

In addition to reflecting ownership, scars branded upon African slaves imported into Brazil from Angola also had religious significance. Brazilian law stipulated that all slaves in Brazil follow the religion of their masters (Roman Catholicism), thus slaves were
baptized prior to their arrival in Brazilian port cities. A British resident of Pernambuco noted that slaves bore “the mark of the royal crown upon their breasts, which denotes that they have undergone the ceremony of baptism, and likewise that the king’s duty has been paid upon them.” Although signifying a rite of passage, these scars indicate forced scarification as both a brand and a religion had been forced upon slaves prior to their arrival in the Americas.

Scarification was also used as a form of punishment during the era of the Atlantic Slave Trade. If an African slave refused to take their daily allowance of food and water, crew members aboard slave vessels placed “coals of fire, glowing hot” so near to the lips of the slaves that it would “scorn and burn them.” Of the French colonies in the West Indies, such as Saint-Domingue, the Code Noir of 1685 outlawed slaves of different masters to assemble together. The stipulated punishment for this violation had been “whipping and branding with an iron shaped as a fleur-de-lis, the symbol of the French crown.” The Code Noir also relegated this punishment to runaway slaves, as any “slave who had been away from the plantation for more than a month was to have one of his ears cut off and a fleur-de-lis branded on his shoulder.” Regardless of their infraction, it had been commonplace for African slaves to be punished by some kind of beating or scarring. In a 1752 letter from the governor of Grão Pará, Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado, to the Portuguese King José I, slave punishments are set forth in great detail. Any slaves found in quilombos (runaway-slave settlements) were branded with the letter “F” on the shoulder, signifying Fugido or runaway slave status. In the event of a slave running away for a second time, one ear was cut off.

A major source of information about runaways can be found in the multitude of advertisements published in newspapers throughout the Americas during the era of the Atlantic Slave Trade. In one such advertisement published on March, 24, 1872 in the Diario do Rio De Janeiro, a reward is offered for a runaway slave who had “lettering on his forehead and on the palms of his hand which says: ‘Slave of Dona Fortunata,’ always wearing on his head a cap or handkerchief to hide the letters on his forehead.” In another advertisement from Brazil, a reward was offered for a runaway slave who bore “On his left breast…a brand mark in the shape of an ‘S’ set in the middle of a
Moving north into America, newspapers ran a multitude of slave advertisements. On December 2, 1775, the Virginia Gazette published the notice of William Tabb, who reported his slave “Charles” to be missing, noticeable by the brand left behind “by his late Master (Robert Temple) with the letters R and T, one on each Cheek.” In another advertisement from Virginia, a reward was offered for a runaway slave who had been “branded with the Initials of his Master’s Name [Samuel Dameron].” These notices identified Africans by their branding mark, illustrating that scars on Africans were a clear-cut indication of slave status in the Americas.

Michael A. Gomez argues in Exchanging Our Country Marks that slaveholders in the American south were very conscientious to the scarification patterns of Igbo slaves (the same ethnic group as Equiano) when placing runaway slave advertisements in local newspapers. Slaveholder Peter Roberts of Santee, South Carolina described in his June 1735 runaway slave advertisement an “[Igbo] Negro Man” having “Scars on each side of his Stomach down his Belly.” In a runaway slave advertisement from July 1804, slaveholder B. Casey of Charleston, South Carolina described his runaway slave as belonging to “the [Igbo] nation, and had his country marks at the corner of his right and left eyes and another mark just below the pit of his stomach or thereabouts.” Regarding the Igbo as a whole, Gomez discovered 96 advertisements in newspapers in which Igbo persons are distinctly identified. The ritualistic scars conferred upon Igbo persons in Africa proved to be detrimental to the efforts of slaves who attempted to run away.

Moving across the Atlantic Ocean from Africa to the Americas, scarification had been adopted in new slave populations. Referencing the facial markings of his missing slave, slaveholder Robert Johnston of Charleston, South Carolina described in an advertisement a mulatto named “Will, about 22 years of age, with a very bushy head of hair, and a remarkable scar on each cheek and in his forehead.” Johnston’s slave, who had one African and one white parent, had been scarred with “an apparent reference to country marks.” The facial scars found on this mulatto slave born in America appear to mimic those generally found on slaves born in Africa for identification or ritual purposes. Thus, it is of note that instead of an ownership brand being
described in the runaway slave advertisement, the traditional ethnic marks were used as the sole identifier of the owner’s slave property.

**Conclusion**

This paper sets forth the historical record of both ritual and forced scarification during the era of the Atlantic Slave Trade, and examined a variety of self-selected and forced African ethnic identities through scarification. Ritual scarification was defined as all marks made for the purposes of identifying royalty, nobility and other social status or ethnic identification in Africa. Additionally, ritual scarification had been used by Africans to demonstrate rites of passage as well as to serve the purpose of body ornamentation. More importantly, ritual scarification in Africa had been used as a permanent way to mark an individual as member of a group or to reflect that an individual had undergone certain rituals or rites of passage. In contrast, forced scarification was defined as those scars made for the purpose of denoting slave status or as a sign of punishment. During the era of the Atlantic Slave Trade, slave traders and owners marked or branded their slaves through forced scarification for the purpose of identification or ownership. In addition to marks of forced scarification, owners often co-opted marks of ritual scarification as way to further describe their slave property in runaway slave advertisements. Forced scarification had been used by slave owners in an attempt to impose a new, rigid identification on captured African slaves and created new generic groupings and social identities to their captors, owners, and others. Therefore, instead of providing a physical mark of ethnicity or social status, forced scarification left African slaves with a permanent physical mark of their enslavement and status as property. However, forced scarification created broader groupings of Africans enslaved in the Americas, and these broader groupings assumed a more unifying importance and relevance to the enslaved Africans than the earlier ritual scarifications reflecting social status, nobility, and rites of passage. On the whole, both ritual and forced scarification had a different and distinct ethnological importance to Africans who lived during the era of the Atlantic Slave Trade. However, slaves marked with forced scarification were unified because of their condition of
enslavement and a single people were formed who shared a unique slave identity.
Appendix A

Figure 1. Metal Branding Irons with Owner’s Initials.

Figure 2. A crew-member of the Emilia drawing of the brands burned onto the bodies of his captives.
Appendix B

Figure 3: Leaflet Advertising a Runaway Slave.
Notes

2 E. Torday, Note on Unusual Form of Tatu. Man (Vol.13, 1913), 3.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 The Atlantic Slave Trade (also known as the Triangular Trade) was the forced migration of enslaved Africans from Africa to the Americas, beginning in the late fifteenth century and ending in the late nineteenth century. Nwando Achebe, Professor of history at Michigan State University, notes that the first African captives to be taken across the Atlantic ocean and sold into slavery were transported in 1532.
9 Ibid., 44-45.
10 Ibid., 94-95. Additional scars are detailed in this work, specifically the “Heebos” (Ibo or Igbo people) on page 116.
12 Ibid., 106.
13 Johnson, 107.
14 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Olaudah Equiano, The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano (London, 1789), 70.
18 Ibid., 71.
20 Gomez, 97-98.
21 Manuel Alvares, Ethiopia Minor and a geographical account of the Province of Sierra Leone (ca. 1615), 4: 4.
22 Ibid., 15.
24 Equiano, 5.
25 Ibid.
26 Knudsen, 24.
28 Ibid., 24.
29 Ibid.
30 Buxton, 174.
31 John Duncan, Travels in Western Africa in 1845 & 1846 (London: Richard Bentley, 1847), 143.
32 The “Middle Passage” is a term which describes the embarkation of African slaves on slave vessels and their subsequent voyage from coastal ports in Africa to America.
Ibid., 22.

35 An image of metal branding irons can be found in the Appendix A, Figure 1.


37 Ibid.

38 Walter Hawthorne, “Being now, as it were, one family”: Shipmate bonding on the slave vessel Emilia, in *Rio de Janeiro and throughout the Atlantic World*. The brands are depicted in Arquivo Histórico do Itamarati (AHI), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Coleções Especiais, Lata 13, Maço 1.

39 A drawing of the brands burned into the slaves aboard the *Emilia* can be found in the Appendix A, Figure 2.


42 Ibid., 150.

43 Equiano, 107.


45 Conrad, 186.

46 Buxton, 125.

47 Dubois, 49.

48 Ibid., 53.

49 Conrad, 289.

50 Ibid., 365.

51 Ibid., 115.

52 Thomas Costa. *Virginia Runaways: Runaway Slave advertisements from 18th-century Virginia newspapers*, (University of Virginia's College at Wise), *Virginia Gazette* (Dixon & Hunter), Williamsburg, December 2, 1775.

53 Ibid., August 24, 1776.

54 A copy of an 1854 runaway slave advertisement can be found in the Appendix B, Figure 3.

55 Gomez, 123.

56 Gomez, 123.

57 Ibid., 238.

58 Ibid.
“We are ashamed of what our brothers or our friends do; of what strangers do we might disapprove, but we do not feel ashamed.”
Isaiah Berlin

When we look at manifestations of collective memory of troubling political events, for example chattel slavery in the United States or the Holocaust in Europe, there is a tendency to demand an admission of guilt and of responsibility on the part of the nation or nations involved. If this admission is not explicit, it is not sufficient, and the accused nation is seen as repressing memories of its past rather than dealing with them outright. In *Communities of Memory: On Witness, Identity, and Justice*, W. James Booth presents an alternative to this view. Booth distinguishes between guilt, which involves an explicit ownership of one’s actions, and shame, which “can be present even where there is no direct, causal responsibility for the deed.” In this paper I plan to examine memories of native fascism in Hungary both before and after the fall of communism using Booth’s concept of shame as a function of collective memory. In order to do this, I will look at *The Revolt of Job*, a 1983 film about the deportation of Hungarian Jews, *Sunshine*, a 1999 film about a Hungarian Jewish family throughout the twentieth century, and materials from the Terror Háza (House of Terror) in Budapest, a new museum dedicated to the legacy of Hungarian fascism and communism. These sources provide examples of how Hungary has dealt with its fascist past since World War Two, and how those reckonings have changed since the fall of communism. Although *The Revolt of Job*, *Sunshine*, and the Terror Háza do not admit explicit guilt on the part of Hungary in the Holocaust, they do acknowledge Hungary’s fascist past and express shame regarding the actions of the Arrow Cross Party. However, in
Sunshine and the Terror Háza, both of which are products of the post-communist era, depictions of the misdeeds of the Hungarian Communist Party overshadow the shame expressed in regards to those of Arrow Cross Party.

Background

In order to evaluate the accuracy and ultimately the value of Hungarian memories of fascism, one must have a general understanding of the history of fascism and anti-Semitism in Hungary. Although both memory and history are representations of the past, and as such are not infallible, historians are called upon to be dispassionate in their recounting of the past to an extent that films and similar manifestations of memory are not. Therefore, I turn to historians Nicholas Nagy-Talavera and István Deák to give a brief overview of the history of Hungarian fascism and of Hungary’s experience during World War Two. The complexity of that history makes it understandable that memories of native fascism appearing decades later are somewhat less than straightforward.

Both Nagy-Talavera’s The Green Shirts and the Others: A history of fascism in Hungary and Romania and Deák’s chapter on Hungary in The European Right assert that prior to 1918, anti-Semitism was not a problem in Hungary. Although Hungary had a large Jewish population, the government was very permissive of Jewish immigration, and in response “the Jews showed their gratitude by eager assimilation, ardent patriotism, and financial support of the government.” As a result of their willingness to assimilate and their nationalism, “Jews were counted as Magyars [ethnic Hungarians].” According to both Nagy-Talavera and Deák, virulent anti-Semitism was absent from Hungarian society prior to 1918. Even the Catholic Church in Hungary, which was suspicious of Jewish assimilation, was forced to accept converts “in 1896, [when] a liberal law on marriages obliterated the last traces of religious discrimination.” This period of good will towards Jews in Hungary was brought to an abrupt end in the years immediately following World War One, when Béla Kun’s communist government came to power. Although Kun’s government was only in power from March to August of 1919, it had a great impact on Hungarian politics, as its “doctrinal experiments, including the
nationalization of the large estates—but not their distribution among the peasants—and its terrorist detachments... provided backing for the ensuing counterrevolution.” Kun’s regime created opposition among Hungary’s historical ruling classes, who felt that communists had humiliated them. This opposition led to increased anti-Semitism, because the historic classes saw it as “inconceivable that the peasants and workers—true Hungarians—could have been responsible for these revolutions.” Therefore, the Jews became a convenient scapegoat for Kun’s communist regime.

In response to Kun’s government, counterrevolutionary groups began to organize in Vienna and in Szeged in southeastern Hungary, which was under French occupation, and therefore outside of Kun’s control. Nagy-Talavera identifies the meetings at Szeged as the beginning of the Hungarian radical Right. The individuals who comprised the Szeged committee were “the lower echelons of the Hungarian nation” and officers of the Imperial and Royal Army. Both of these groups opposed communism for the aforementioned reasons and opposed democracy because, according to Nagy-Talavera, the lower classes had a monopoly on administrative posts in the monarchy, which they would lose if Hungary became democratic, and because the privileges of officers in the Imperial Army “would be out of place in a Hungarian democratic republic.”

Although those who met at Szeged had similar goals, their efforts resulted in two distinct Rightist movements. As Deák points out, the Hungarian Right was divided between Admiral Horthy’s nationalist party and the National Socialist movement.

In November of 1919, Admiral Miklós Horthy “marched into the city [Budapest] at the head of his small national army” and took power. During the early days of Horthy’s rule, which have come to be known as the White Terror, “Communists were hanged and hundreds of Jews were killed, the latter regardless of complicity.” By March 1920, the counterrevolutionaries had established a new government to replace Kun’s ousted communist regime. The Kingdom of Hungary was created with Admiral Horthy at its head as regent, popularly known as “the ‘kingdom without a king and the admiral without a fleet.’” Later in 1920, the Trianon Treaty was signed, depriving Hungary of 72 percent of its prewar territory and 64 percent of its population. As a
result of this dismemberment, which went against the Allied Powers’ self-professed ideal of national self-determination, the Hungarian people looked to Horthy’s government to regain the country’s lost territory. This popular irredentism along with the feelings of anti-Semitism and anti-communism inspired by Béla Kun’s brief reign led to a rise in fascist sentiment in Hungary.

Several different fascist parties came and went in interwar Hungary without gaining enough popular support to have any real power, including Szeged delegate (and later Prime Minister) Gyula Gömbös’s Association of Hungarian National Defense and Zoltán Böszörmény’s Scythe Cross Party. In 1932, Zoltán Meskó announced the formation of the Arrow Cross Party, a “‘Hungarian Hitlerite movement,’” which became popular under the leadership of “the Prophet, Ferenc Szálasi.” Throughout most of World War Two, Admiral Horthy’s government remained in power and, in spite of its anti-Semitism, “almost succeeded in saving the lives of the country’s considerable Jewish population.” When Horthy surrendered on October 15, 1944, Szálasi’s Arrow Cross Party took power with Germany’s help. In the words of István Deák, “Szálasi’s reign was a sad epilogue to a tragic story.” With the Arrow Cross Party in power, over 50,000 Hungarian Jews died working to build war fortifications on the Austrian border and others were forced into ghettos or deported to Nazi death camps. Considering the fact that Hungarians acted as perpetrators, victims, and heroes during World War Two, it is unsurprising that representations of Hungarian fascism do not contain any clear admissions of guilt or claims of innocence.

Memories of Fascism

Memories of native fascism in Hungary, and their manifestations in film and text, are a function of national identity. As we have seen in the above examination of Hungarian fascism, only a particular segment of the Hungarian population (namely Arrow Cross Party and those who actively or passively supported it) can be implicated in the persecution, deportation, and murder of Hungarian Jews. Therefore, although the Hungarian people as a whole may not feel guilt, which is “closely tied to the authorial/ownership standard of identity,” in regards to the fate of Hungary’s Jewish population, they may feel shame. According to
Booth, shame, unlike guilt, does not imply responsibility but is “rooted in a wider, enduring kind of memory-identity.”¹⁹ The origin of this shame is in the imagined community of the nation.²⁰ Because we share a sense of community with our fellow citizens, we feel some sense of ownership for their actions. Because of our membership in the nation

We understand ourselves to be a part of their [our fellow citizens’] projects, even though we may have had nothing directly to do with their design or execution. Identity here is the broad “mineness” of membership in the political communities of which we are a part. I feel myself implicated in their agency, in their past and future.²¹

In the sources that I examine in this paper, I will look for manifestations of this ownership of Hungarian fascism and the actions of the Arrow Cross Party and for the expression of shame regarding them. But what, one might ask, is the purpose of holding a nation accountable for remembering the actions of some of its members?

In his book, The Ethics of Memory, Avishai Margalit addresses this question. Using the example of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee in South Africa, Margalit discusses the widely held view that revealing the truth about the more nefarious events of the past will bring about a kind of “social catharsis,” a reconciliation.²² While reconciliation is a noble aim, I agree with Margalit that “the idea that truth by itself will bring about reconciliation is a doubtful empirical assumption.”²³ However, although reconciliation will not automatically be a result of exposing the truth, Margalit uses the example of repressed memories of the Vichy period in France to demonstrate the “healing power of knowing the truth in the case of communal memories.” By removing memories of Vichy from the public space, the French people allowed these repressed memories to play “subversive tricks on the French people, thereby helping to create the neurotic behavior of France after the war.”²⁴ Thus, although truth in national memory will not inevitably bring about healing, it does have value in itself and can allow a nation to move towards reconciliation.
**The Revolt of Job**

The story of *The Revolt of Job*, a Hungarian film from 1983, revolves around an older, childless Jewish couple that adopts a Christian boy, Lacko, during the Second World War. The couple Jób and Róza, have had several children who did not survive childhood, and they choose to adopt a child in order to pass on their legacy. The situation is complicated by the fact that Jób and Róza are well aware that if Hungary surrenders to the Nazis that they are likely to be deported. In order to ensure that their newly adopted son does not meet the same fate, they choose to adopt a Christian boy, and initially, they refuse to introduce him to Judaism. Because it was made in 1983, *The Revolt of Job* is a good example of depictions of Hungarian fascism under communist rule. This film is interesting in that it perpetuates common stereotypes of Jews, but at the same time, it depicts Jób, Róza, and their Jewish friends and neighbors as very sympathetic characters. Similarly, the film vacillates between placing the blame on the Nazis and admitting Hungarian responsibility.

The audience first encounters Jób and Róza at an orphanage, where they are choosing a child to adopt. They give the orphanage two calves in exchange for Lacko because the adoption papers must be backdated in order to circumvent laws prohibiting Jews from adopting Christian children. In a scene eerily reminiscent of tales of Jews kidnapping Christian children in order to use their blood in religious rituals, the old couple, dressed all in black, selects a strong, healthy boy from the throng of orphans. Explaining their desire to adopt, Jób says “I want a Christian child I can leave everything to.” Throughout the early scenes of the film, Jób and especially Róza are depicted as being motivated primarily by material concerns. On the way home from the orphanage, Róza complains that they spent too much in order to adopt Lacko. Later, when Lacko is lost in a marsh near the family’s home, she complains that if he dies in the marsh, they will have wasted the livestock that they exchanged for Lacko, saying to Jób “You squander our money, you stupid peasant!”

However, as the film progresses, Jób and Róza gradually appear more sympathetic. As they get to know Lacko, they obviously develop a close bond, and the three of them become a family. The most striking transformation is in Róza’s attitude toward Lacko. Near the end of the
film, he becomes sick with diphtheria. Róza is visibly affected by his illness, and her behavior demonstrates that she has come to love Lacko as her own son. She worries about him and cares for him devotedly, calling him “my one and only” and “my treasure.” The development of the familial relationship between Jób, Róza, and Lacko makes the end of the film, when Lacko is forced to watch his adoptive parents driven out of the village wearing the Star of David with the rest of the local Jewish community, all the more poignant.

The majority of references to fascism or to a threat to the Jews in the film refer to Hitler or to the Germans rather than to Hungarian fascists. For example, while at the market with Róza, Jób speculates with other Jewish men that “Hitler will bring [them] more danger than Daniel ever faced.” Later in the film, Jób and Lacko visit the market again, and we see Hungarian peasants singing an anti-Semitic song and praising Hitler and Ferenc Szálsí. The Hungarian Peasants sing “Let’s club the Jews like we club the bulls!/ One rabbi, two rabbis, the chief rabbi croaked!/ Long live Hitler and Szálsí! Let’s club the Jews!” This is the only mention of Szálsí and the only reference, albeit an indirect one, to an organized Hungarian fascist movement in the entire film. By focusing on the Nazis and Hitler, the film obscures the fact that without the complicity of the Szálsí government, the Jews of Hungary might not have been forced into ghettos or killed. Yet, the film depicts nameless, faceless Hungarians singing a virulently anti-Semitic song and harassing Jews at the market. This suggests that anti-Semitism was not limited to members of the Arrow Cross Party or to Nazis, but was espoused by ordinary Hungarians.

Conversely, the Hungarian Christians who are named in the film appear very sympathetic to the plight of the Jews. For example, a Franciscan friar banters amiably with Jób and agrees to teach Lacko about Christianity. In the end, Jób and Róza instruct Lacko in their own religion, but this does not detract from the spirit of the friar’s offer. The film’s final scene completes it non-committal portrayal of Hungarian fascism. As Jób and Róza are driven out of the village with the rest of the Jews, the pastor of a local church and a group of Hungarian Christians try to interfere with the deportation and play music to show their solidarity with the Jews. At the same time, the soldiers enforcing the deportation also appear to be Hungarian, although they do not wear
the insignia of the Arrow Cross. As Lacko watches his parents being carted away, he calls out for the messiah, for whom Jób told him to wait. *The Revolt of Job* ends with an epilogue, a written statement on the screen, informing the audience of the fate of the Hungarian Jews; “Between May and October 1944, more than 600,000 Jews were deported from Hungary. 500,000 never returned.” This statement is interesting because it is in the passive voice. It says that Jews were deported from Hungary, but it does not assign blame or take responsibility for the deportation. It is also interesting because I was unable to find any sources that placed the number of Hungarian Jews deported during that Arrow Cross’s rule so high.

**Sunshine**

*Sunshine*, an international film by Hungarian director István Szabo from 1999, follows the story of a Hungarian Jewish family, the Sonnenscheins, through three generations. Because it covers such a large time period—the film encompasses more than a century of Hungarian history—*Sunshine* depicts a broad historical range of Jewish experience in Hungary. Released ten years after the fall of communism in Hungary, this film, and the museum, which will be discussed below, allows us to see how representations of Hungarian fascism have changed since the fall of communism. *Sunshine* presents its audience with a sympathetic portrayal of Jews, but without the confusion and continued deployment of stereotypes that we saw in *The Revolt of Job*. There is also no confusion in *Sunshine* as to who was responsible for the deportation and death of Hungarian Jews, yet the vilification of Hungarian fascists is largely overshadowed by the blame that is placed on the Hungarian Communist Party.

Early in the film, the voluntary assimilation on the part of Hungarian Jews, cited by István Deák and Nicholas Nagy-Talavara, is a major force in the lives of the main characters. The central characters, Ignatz, Valerie, and Gustav consider themselves Hungarian and are visibly patriotic. Ignatz in particular is dedicated to Emperor Franz Joseph of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; at one point, Ignatz praises his ability to be “able to keep the peace among many different kinds of people.” When Ignatz, a successful young judge, is offered a position
on the central court, the head of the court tells him, “It is not possible for the central court to have a presiding judge with a name like Sonnenschein. We’d like to promote you. We trust you. We need you. But you’d have to change your name to something more Hungarian.” Ignatz, Valerie, and Gustav change their name to the more Hungarian ‘Sors,’ and Ignatz is appointed to the court. In response to his parent’s protests, Gustav reassures them that Jews are not the only minorities in Austria-Hungary expected to assimilate. He says “Not just Jews, father, but Slovaks, Serbs.” Later in the film, the family assimilates further when Ingatz’s son, Adam Sors, a fencing champion, is asked to convert to Catholicism in order to join the fencing club of the Hungarian Army. Adam’s Italian fencing coach tells him “No Jews can be in the Officers’ Club” and reassures him “Si, si, junior. Jesus himself converted.” As he and his brother István discuss conversion, Adam says “I want to be Hungarian.” Adam and István become Catholic, and Adam excels as a member of the Army Officers’ Fencing Club. The coach of his new club tells him “You made the right choice. Assimilation is the only possible way.”

In spite of their willingness to assimilate, the Sonnenschein/Sors family faces some measure of anti-Semitism, especially after the fall of Béla Kun’s government, which is referred to only in passing. Adam is harassed by a young man at school who holds a saber to his neck and says “Is that the Jew boy who’s always smiling? Wipe that smile off your face. I thought the Synagogue stink left town with the communists, but I can still smell it.” In response to the departure of a team member, who left Hungary because he feared for the lives of his Jewish wife and children, the fencing coach says “Anti-Semitism is the creed of resentful and unsuccessful people. It is a shared madness that the Baron couldn’t accept, but we have.” The Sors family observes the rise of Hitler in Germany and the passage of anti-Jewish laws in Hungary. After Admiral Horthy’s surrender, the family tries to leave Hungary. Adam goes to his old fencing coach for help, and he agrees to try, taking back what he said earlier about assimilation being the right choice. Rather than focusing on the complicity of the Hungarian government, and the guilt of the Arrow Cross Party, the narrator of the film says the “German Army occupied Hungary” as an explanation for the segregation and deportation of Hungarian Jews. In spite of the fact
that they are now Roman Catholic and have a Hungarian surname, Adam and his son Ivan are sent to a labor camp where Adam is killed.

After the war, Ivan returns home to Budapest and joins the Communist Party. Here the film no longer obscures who is to blame for the suffering and death of the Hungarian Jews. As a Communist apparatchik, Ivan is expected to find and prosecute Hungarian fascists. He is told by his supervisor in the party (who happens to be his father’s old fencing coach)

We’re going to get every one of those fascist bastards. There can be no forgiveness for what happened here. And it can’t be fobbed off on the Germans. It was organized by Hungarian authorities. It was carried out by Hungarian civil servants…Nice, ordinary Hungarian people did the dirty work.

This admission of Hungarian responsibility for the fate of its Jewish population is much more explicit than any we saw in The Revolt of Job. This clearly shows Hungarian ownership of the actions of the Arrow Cross Party and shame in regards to those actions. However, the value of efforts to deal with fascism and collaboration are overshadowed in the film by the depiction of the Communist Party. Ivan and his fellow Party members appear frighteningly over-zealous in their hunt for fascists and for traitors to the Party. This portrayal of Hungarian Communists clearly shows that Hungarians feel shame not only for its fascist past, but for Hungary’s communist past as well. The film ends with Ivan, released from imprisonment by the communists, questioning why Hungary ever became communist. He changes his name from Sors back to Sonnenschein after the fall of communism. In his reflections he calls communism “the third tragic misadventure of the twentieth century” (he later identifies the monarchy and fascist rule as the first two). The preoccupation with the evils of communism throughout the later half of the film upstages the shame that is expressed in regards to Hungarian complicity and guilt in the Holocaust. As we will see in the discussion of the Terror Háza below, this is typical in post-communist manifestations of memories of native fascism.
The Terror Háza (House of Terror) museum in Budapest, built in 2002, focuses on the latter two ‘misadventures’ of twentieth century Hungary. Inside the museum the captions, text, and audio recordings are in Magyar, but visitors have the option of reading supplementary materials in English or German, which are provided in each room of the museum. Although the predominance of Magyar reveals that the intended audience is primarily Hungarian, the availability of foreign language materials makes the museum accessible to an international audience as well. The museum is meant to commemorate “the victims of terror, but [because of its location] it is also a memento, reminding us of the dreadful acts of terrorist dictatorships.”

The museum is located at 60 Andrássy Boulevard, in a building which previously housed the headquarters or “House of Loyalty” of the Arrow Cross Party and later the office of the Communist Party’s Department for Political Police and State Security Authority. Because of the arrests, interrogations, and torture that occurred at 60 Andrássy Boulevard under both the fascist and communist governments, the building is seen as “itself the statue of terror, a monument to the victims.” As is evident from the museum’s facade (Figure 1), the museum places Hungarian fascism alongside communism. It deals with both as “shameful and tragic periods in Hungary’s 20th century history.”

Figure 1: Facade of the Terror Haza at 60 Andrássy Boulevard. The symbols of the Arrow Cross Party and the Communist Party are prominently displayed.
The use of the word shameful to refer to Hungarian fascism and communism reveals that the Hungarian nation feels some ownership in the actions of its fascist and communist leaders. In addition, the spirit of the museum itself, which is best expressed in a quote from Hungarian poet Attila József that appears in the museum’s brochure, “The past must be acknowledged,” speaks to the idea that exposing the truth brings with it a possibility for healing. The museum acts as an acknowledgement and a reminder of the more tragic aspects of Hungary’s national past. According to the Terror Háza brochure, the museum “commemorates the victims of terror, but it is also a memento, reminding us of the dreadful acts of terrorist dictatorships.”

In spite of the fact that the museum’s exterior and its promotional materials focus equally on Hungarian fascism and communism, the majority of the material within the museum itself focuses on the Hungarian Communist Party. Of the museum’s twenty-two main exhibit rooms, four focus on the Arrow Cross party, while twelve are dedicated to memories of communism. The remaining six rooms deal with more general topics relating to the terror of both the fascist and communist regimes, such as resistance and the relationship of the Catholic Church to the fascists and the communists. The basement of the museum (which is not included in the count of exhibit rooms) displays representations of the common tactics of torture and terror used by the Arrow Cross Party and the Communists’ State Security Authority. Although the fact that the number of exhibits concerning communism is three times the number of exhibits on fascism may appear to place undue influence on communism, I would argue that this imbalance is justified. In spite of its numerous crimes, the Arrow Cross Party only had power in Hungary for a matter of months in 1944 and 1945. The Hungarian Communist Party, on the other hand, ruled the country for over 40 years—from 1945 to 1989. In light of the comparison between the length of the fascist and communist periods in Hungary, it even seems that an undue focus is placed on the history of Hungarian fascism in the Terror Háza.

What is, in my opinion, more interesting than the distribution of the rooms in the museum, is the way in which Hungarian Fascists and Communists are portrayed. Although the text in the museum accepts the members of the Arrow Cross Party and the Hungarian Communist
Party as Hungarians, it simultaneously “others” them by emphasizing their respective Nazi and Soviet alliances. The members of the Arrow Cross Party are often referred to as “Hungarian Nazis,” and the English supplementary materials contain conflicting statements about the domestic popularity of the Arrow Cross Party. For example, the narrative concedes that the Arrow Cross “grown into a significant political force” because of “its social program, anti-Semitic and nationalist demagoguery, as well as its radicalism.” But at the same time it insists that without “German help and support…it never could have become a potential governing factor.” Although it is true that the German Army helped the Ferenc Szálasi to take power in Hungary, this claim downplays the popular support for the Arrow Cross Party, as well as its ideological similarities to Admiral Horthy’s Regime. In doing so, it distances the majority of the Hungarian nation from these Germanized, criminal Hungarians.

A similar maneuvering takes place in the representation of Hungarian Communist Party. The museum emphasizes the influence of Soviet advisors and distances Hungarian Communists from the general population by identifying them with the Soviet Union. Thus, they are depicted as national traitors rather than true Hungarians. In the depiction of the revolution of 1956, the museum valorizes Prime Minister Imre Nagy, himself a communist, and contrasts Nagy and his supporters with the Soviet advisors. The discussion of the revolution concludes with the statement that although they were ultimately removed from power, the “Hungarian freedom fighters inflicted a mortal wound on the great Soviet empire.” The exhibit identifies Nagy and other communists who opposed the one-party system as true Hungarians, while “othering” more doctrinaire communists.

**Conclusion**

As we have seen, memories of native fascism in Hungary have shifted since the fall of communism to include an indictment of Hungarian communism in addition to fascism. Although the shame expressed over the actions of the Arrow Cross Party in post-communist manifestations of collective memory is often overshadowed by memories of communism, this can be seen as a positive shift from the inconsistent and confused assignment of blame in *The Revolt of Job*.
from the communist era. It appears that since the fall of communism, Hungary has become more conscientious about the truthfulness of its national memory. However, the Terror Háza reveals that national memory is often complex and multi-faceted. Even in the case of this museum, which aims to commemorate the less palatable aspects of Hungary’s past displaces the blame, if not onto someone else entirely, to “other” Hungarians. Thus, William James Booth’s formulation of shame is very apt in this instance. While the Hungarian nation does not accept responsibility for the actions of Hungarian fascists and communists, it finds itself “implicated in their agency, in their past and future.”

Films:

_The Revolt of Job_, dir. Imre Gyöngyössy and Barna Kabay, _Magyar Filmgy_, 1983.


Additional Primary Source-

English Language material from the Terror Haza Museum, Budapest Hungary.
Notes

2 Booth, Communities of memory, 40.
3 909,500 Jews in Hungary (5.0% of the population), and over 200,000 Jews in Budapest (over 20% of the city’s population) in 1910, according to István Déák, “Hungary,” The European Right, (University of California Press: Berkley, CA) 1965, 367.
5 Déák, 368.
6 Ibid. 370.
7 Ibid.
9 Ibid., 78.
10 Déák, 371.
11 Ibid., 373.
12 Ibid.
13 Nagy-Talavera, 77.
14 Déák, 384.
15 Ibid., 388.
16 Ibid., 365.
17 Ibid., 403.
18 Booth, 40.
19 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 41.
23 Ibid., 6
24 For an insightful and in depth exploration of memories of the Vichy period and attempts by the French people to come to terms with this part of their national past, see Henry Rousso, The Vichy syndrome: history and memory in France since 1944, trans. by Arthur Goldhammer, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Booth, 41.
THE BACKBENCH REBELLION:
PARLIAMENTARY LABOUR PARTY DIVISION
ON THE EVE OF THE IRAQ WAR

Ryan Etzcorn

On March 25, 2002, as Tony Blair was readying himself for a visit to Bush’s Crawford Ranch in Texas to discuss Britain’s future support of regime change in Iraq, he received a portentous memo from Foreign Secretary Jack Straw that would later be leaked as part of the famous “Downing Street Memo” series. Its contents aimed to warn the Prime Minister that “the risks are high, both for you and for the Government. I judge that there is at present no majority inside the [Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP)] for any military action against Iraq, (alongside a greater readiness in the PLP to surface their concerns).”¹ These lingual storm clouds failed to warn Blair or other members of the Labour Party’s hierarchy of the rebellion to come.

Theoretically a party with pacifist inclinations, British Labour was confronted on the eve of the Iraq War with a situation that was unique to past military conflicts. Nearly one full and tumultuous year after Blair’s Crawford visit, March 18ᵗʰ of 2003 presented Parliament with the first opportunity in all of British history to offer a significant vote of confidence before the outbreak of conflict. Confidence in Blair’s actions among the people’s representation in Parliament had plummeted to such historic lows that, for a brief moment, it held all considerations of executive accountability in its palm. On the outcome of a defeat of confidence in parliament, British troops would have been withdrawn and leaders would have resigned. The entire structure of British government was vulnerable, but with the help of what Bush has called “the best [whips] in the world,” the struggle for control of the PLP was eventually won by the government.

The events leading up to the deciding vote can be chronicled as a battle that pitted Labour’s leaders against its own political kin. Labour MPs began to voice significant doubts about the case for war founded on the need for the upkeep of international multilateralism, distrust of an increasingly hawk-like Bush administration, and questions of the
consequences that would follow in the wake of war. Tony Blair, Jack Straw, Gordon Brown, John Reid and other prominent Labour politicians allied with party whips to begin the frantic conquest for the minds of Labour’s moderates with anti-French propaganda and the potential resignation of Blair himself. Rumors began to circulate that the pressure of significant ministerial resignations in the days before the vote had led Blair to write his own resignation letter in advance just in case he lost. With such whisperings of the prospective demise of the most decorated and respected party leader in decades, Labour MPs found themselves confronted by party whips with the question: “Do you support regime change in Baghdad or Downing Street?” Nearly one year after Straw’s initial Crawford Memo warning, March 18 of 2003 witnessed record-breaking defiance of party leadership. A staggering 139 Labour MPs participated in “the largest backbencher rebellion since the beginning of modern British party politics.”

The tragedy of 9/11 was a watershed in administrative policy from the U.S. and Blair’s views reflected it. He later explained that “It’s all very well being a pacifist…But to be a pacifist after September 11, that’s something different. It’s all new now: terrible threat, terrorist weapons, terrorist states. That is what people here have to understand.” In the months following the fall of the twin towers, Blair’s cabinet focused on the threat of al-Qaeda, yet talk of Iraq was completely omitted. Blair even agreed with Chirac himself that augmentation of the war on terror to Iraq was unnecessary. A shift in policy formed, however, and hostility towards Iraq, once a “gleam in the eye” of Washington neo-cons, had rapidly morphed into the forefront as “a settled program by the summer of 2002.”

Tell-tale signs of U.S. intentions precipitated further after Bush’s “axis of evil” speech in January 2002 and Labour MPs across the big pond were starting to get squeamish. The day before Blair departed for Bush’s Crawford Ranch on May 25th 2002, Chris Smith (a close friend of the Prime Minister’s and a Labour MP) voiced the concerns of many Labour party members. He assessed that many in the PLP “would be worried if there were something being contemplated which was all-out invasion of Iraq, simply going on the coat-tails of an American unilateral decision.” Taking notice of this, Blair announced at the end of his Crawford Ranch visit: “The moment for decision on how to act is
not yet with us…But to allow WMD to be developed by a state like Iraq without let or hindrance would be grossly to ignore the lessons of 11 September and we will not do it.”

The Crawford meeting wielded an enforced relationship between President Bush and the Prime Minister. Although American Democrats displayed puzzlement over the paradox of Blair’s close ties with the Bush administration in light of his close ties with the politically opposite Clinton administration in the past, Leader of the House Robin Cook later rationalized the pairing by combining the issues of congruent backgrounds with “the real mortar in the relationship [being] power.”

The crescendo of Blair’s emphasis on the importance of transatlantic ties risked further and further alienation from other European nations and his own people. Cook further commented that it seemed easier for Blair to “resist the public opinion of Britain than the request of the U.S. President.” Cabinet meetings took on a new Q & A style that triggered complaints from ministers, who tagged the changes as “a complete breakdown of the normal arrangements for the British government system.”

The convictions of Labour MPs emerged about as soon as they were presented with the first briefing on March 5, 2002. UN ambassador Michael Williams constructed a report that labeled Saddam’s regime as “a demonstrable threat to the stability of the region.” The response from MPs was a flustered assault of questions and doubts. MP Alice Mahon cited in a March Parliamentary EDM (early day motion) a “deep unease…at the prospect that Her Majesty’s Government might Support United States military action against Iraq.” The EDM went on to be signed by 133 Labour MPs – the same amount of Labour MPs that had rebelled against the party in all sectors of debate during the entirety of Parliamentary deliberations in 1997.

Talk of War with Iraq intensified throughout 2002 and an “overwhelming majority” of MPs – many from the Labour party included – began to feel pressured to debate the growing crisis during Parliament’s break in the summer of that year. Ex-party whip and Labour party backbencher Graham Allen decided that something needed to be done. When his request to rent out The House of Commons of Westminster was denied, Graham began arranging an
alternative ‘House of Commons’ meeting solely to discuss the issue of Iraq. “This isn't Afghanistan,” he stated in an interview with the BBC, “There is unease. People are not yet convinced.”

His well-organized plans to rent out Church House for the interim debate persuaded the government to relent, and recall Parliament. Robin Cook phoned Graham and notified him of the decision less than 36 hours before the meeting in Church House was scheduled to occur – and the debate began.

The central discussion around the September 24<sup>th</sup> debate was a carefully constructed intelligence dossier that had been ready some months before, but was only published hours before Parliament reconvened. It claimed that Iraq’s possession of WMD had been “established beyond doubt,” and that they “could be activated in 45 minutes.”

During its construction, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw had been critical of the dossier, insisting that it needed a “killer paragraph” on Iraqi defiance of the UN, and Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon complained that one draft was “insufficiently dramatic to make our case as strongly as I would have liked.” Whatever pains the tight circle of editorial executives spent on the document, many MPs still felt that details were lacking. Labour MP John McDonnell asked of the Prime Minister after his opening speech on the dossier’s claims, “should not our intelligence be more accurate than in this report?”

The debate was largely dominated by similar inquisitions from PLP members, first to Tony Blair, and then later to Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. The dossier (in its final, polished form) was the first move from the governmental executive, and the power of action (or reaction) now rested on the shoulders of those appointed to represent the British people. The rarity of such opportunities gripped Parliament tightly under pressure.

The day of the dossier’s publication was followed by several significant speeches from the likes of Alice Mahon, George Galloway, Peter Coyban, Tam Dalyell, Tony Banks, and many others. A large number were senior members of the PLP and ex-ministers. Even Robin Cook’s behavior offered a telling glimpse into his future attitudes for many that were present, as he reportedly zoned-out on the ceiling while Blair was presenting the dossier. By the time the efforts of Blair and Straw were exhausted, there was still no specific motion in the
parliamentary debate for the MPs to vote on. Instead, 56 Labour MPs defied their whips on the motion to adjourn for the purpose of registering their protest. The prominent standpoint was not one of absolute resistance to war, but to U.S. unilateralism. Labour MP and close friend of the Prime Minister Chris Smith pleaded, "If [it] comes down, as it may well, to a choice between a United Nations-led, UN-decided process, and ...a decision to employ force inspired by the US president alone, our path must surely lie with the international community and the UN."

Such cries for the upkeep of a healthy international order were the most public and officially trumpeted forces behind the propulsion of Parliamentary unrest. Mark Durkan of the Social Democratic Labour Party of Northern Ireland expressed the attitudes of many in the PLP when he warned Blair in October of 2002 that “We should not go to the UN just as a badge of legitimacy.” The weapons inspection ultimatum that had been so carefully crafted throughout the fall of 2002 was visibly unstable and gave little feeling of security in a multilateralist solution to many MPs. Secretary of Defense Geoff Hoon remarked behind closed doors that “[Saddam] will be forced either to demonstrate that he is a liar, or expose himself as a threat.” For some, Blair’s own statements on the necessity of UN involvement with the decision to go to war hosted tiny volatile suggestions of a government bent on conflict. He frequently made such statements as, “The UN has to be the way of dealing with the issue – and not the way of avoiding dealing with it.” Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that Blair’s government was banking on a second UN resolution to ease parliamentary disquiet. They had so heavily leaned on such hopes that Jack Straw found himself agreeing with Robin Cook that he was “thoroughly impaled on the UN route,” and one Labour whip later admitted that the eventual absence of a second resolution “totally fucked us up.” By the end of 2002, Labour rebels gladly applauded Liberal Democrat leader David Kennedy when he roared, “For those of us who have never subscribed to British unilateralism, we are not about to sign up to American unilateralism now either.” By the eventual eve of a final vote in Parliament, MPs still believed that “all other options [besides war] have self-evidently not been exhausted.”
PLP distrust of the hawk-like Bush administration added to the inflammation of rebellion. In one instance, Labour MP Linda Perham maintained in Parliament that “George Bush worries and frightens me. I fear we are on the brink of another era of uncertainty and danger to the future of the world.” Others like Labour MP Clive Soley made even more candid remarks outside of Westminster, referring to Bush and Rumsfeld as a “bunch of idiots…If you’d designed an issue to alienate everyone to the left of Ken Clarke, this was the way to do it.” Labour MP Chris Mullin confronted Blair directly: “No one outside Texas has confidence in Bush. I will understand if I have to wait until your memoirs to find out if you agree.”

The third bastion of hesitation and rebellion amongst the PLP resided in questions of the impact and aftermath of such a war. Some established fears that military action in Iraq would help foster a more dangerous world. Labour MPs Mohammad Sarwar and Jon Owen Jones plead that military action would likely destabilize the Middle East, and cited the exemplary mistake of Bush backing Ariel Sharon as a proponent of peace. Jones pointed out that the dossier made no mention of what would happen after the regime of Saddam Hussein was overthrown, and asked “what threats would ensue?” Others seemed confused over the sudden policy reversal, with Labour MP Paul Flynn mentioning that “containment has kept the peace for 11 years.”

As parliamentary defiance and unease surged to all-time highs, clashes rang out over the prospect of the need for a Parliamentary vote of confidence before any troops were to be committed. The original idea was that if a Parliamentary vote of confidence was necessary, it might be best to wait until British forces were already deployed and MPs had no choice but to support their troops already in combat. Deputy Leader of the House of Commons Ben Bradshaw stated in July of 2002 that “No Prime Minister in British history has ever allowed their hands to be tied [by a parliamentary vote] and none would.” The events revolving around the eve of war in Iraq, however, were much different. As Robin Cook once noticed, “No government could survive if it took the nation to war against a majority view of the Commons.” The ensuing loss of any hope for a second UN resolution elevated issues of the war’s legality, which brought the threat of parliamentary rebellion beyond the means of government evasion.
Jack Straw later conceded that “It would have been ludicrous to make a speech saying, ‘We are facing the biggest crisis in 20 years and I now do beg the house to adjourn.’”

Downing Street and Westminster Palace experienced a momentary lull throughout the winter months as Hans Blix and his team of UN inspectors poked and prodded the weapons programs of a ‘defiant’ Saddam. As troops gathered along the Kuwaiti borders, the Bush and Blair administrations mobilized for the political fight to come in London with measures such as the production of a “road map” to Middle East peace, which sought to convey an executive concern for regional stability and UN diplomacy.

After months of probing, however, Blix was not discovering the weapons or predicted defiance that the Bush and Blair administrations had hoped for, and conflict arose again in Parliament on February 26. 122 Labour MPs defied a three-line whip and signed a rebel amendment crafted by the likes of Labour MPs Chris Smith, Peter Kilfoyle, and Conservative MP Douglas Hogg. The wording was careful to win as much cross-party support as possible, strongly emphasizing the need for UN multilateralism and citing the case for war as “yet unproven.” Rebels were energized by the clash. Chris Smith expressed hopes that the vote would give Blair “a little bit of a ballast” when dealing with Bush, but his hopes were in vain as Washington grew more and more impatient with the UN process and intensified its pressure on Blair to hurry or be left behind in a cloud of sand.

The two administrations finally received the boost that they needed to escape the UN process when Chirac came forth with claims that France would veto a second UN resolution “whatever the circumstances.” Immediately, the British government deployed a flurry of anti-French propaganda that chastised France for being “difficult” and sought to “pin the blame” on its old rival for “poisoning” UN diplomacy and multilateralism. The fact that Chirac had only meant his threat as a statement of what his government’s reaction would be at the present time was ignored, and emphasis was put on France being stubborn to the end. Political Director of the Foreign Office marked Chirac’s statement as an unexpected “gift.”
After the lesson of February 26th, the whips office began to flood itself with political and moral arguments aimed at weakening a prospective rebellion. Whips estimated that around 50 “wobbler” Labour MPs were identified and numerous methods were quickly unleashed upon their wavering minds. One member of the government observed that “the arm twisting was phenomenal.” Ministers and loyalist MPs were each assigned a handful of such “wobblers” to directly persuade. Their reasons for uncertainty (religious, diplomatic, moral) were isolated and catered to by assigned loyalist peers they shared common interests with in the appropriate areas. The technique was dubbed by one official as “á la carte reassurance.” “For the first time,” one whip remarked, “we were seeking to identify who their friends were…. Rebel Labour MPs known to be firm in their convictions went completely ignored. As the final hours before the vote dwindled, Blair himself invited a stream of MPs in small groups to the Commons tea room to seek their votes. He coolly expounded a myriad of pleas such as: “if you only knew what I knew,” and, “do you really think we can pull the troops out now?” The Prime Minister even confronted some with the sober insistence that this could end his leadership. He wasn’t fooling around. Conversations had already taken place with his family about his potential resignations and he asked his Cabinet Secretary to have the papers ready; “If this goes horribly wrong then we are all finished.” Many Labour MPs feared the repercussions of losing Blair, and the whips office seized on this. Labour MP Austin Mitchell later recalled being escorted “warmly by the throat” into a whip’s private office where he was asked if he wanted “to be personally responsible for bringing down the most successful election winner Labour had ever had.” Other PLP members actively called for the abdication of Blair with assertions such as “Tony Blair is past his sell-by date and frankly I think we need a change of direction in the party.” Threats of resignation worked both for, and against the government. Directly preceding the vote, Leader of the House Robin Cook was joined by Health Minister Lord Hunt, Home Office Minister John Denham, and four junior ministerial aides in resigning from their posts in protest of the dawning war. By far the most significant,
Cook’s decision had come weeks before his actual resignation on March 17th and he had been ardently pressed not to do so. He joked with the Prime Minister: “I’m getting so many regular checks from colleagues that I’m beginning to think I’m on suicide watch.” His resignation speech stated that he was unable to support a war with “neither international agreement nor domestic support.” “The European Union is divided; the Security Council is in stalemate. Those are heavy casualties of a war in which a shot has yet to be fired.” His closing words (“I intend to join those tomorrow night who will vote against military action now…”) were greeted by thunderous applause. Cook’s resignation was first and foremost, an important message to Labour MPs. He first made a point to credit Blair with fine leadership, distancing himself from the far left. His reasons for departure were also eloquent and detailed, reinforcing the armory of arguments against the war for rebels and strengthening their will.

The outset of final debate the next day was Tony Blair’s turn for eloquence. Both his supporters and political enemies saw a different Tony Blair that day: a man with words indicating a “powerful private conviction.” Another described the speech as “One thunderous performance, passionate yet coherent, furious while icily controlled.” He began by bashing the French, maintaining that France was “utterly opposed to anything which lays down an ultimatum authorizing action in the event of non-compliance by Saddam.” Blair then voiced his belief that if Britain backed down now, it would provide a weak example of the consequences of tyranny and terrorism.

This is the time for this house, not just this government or indeed this Prime Minister, but for this house to give a lead, to show that we will stand up for what we know to be right, to show that we will confront the tyrannies and dictatorships and terrorists who put our way of life at risk…. To retreat now, I believe would put at hazard all that we hold dearest, turn the United Nations back into a talking shop, stifle the first steps of progress in the Middle East, leave the Iraqi people to the mercy of events on which we would have relinquished all power to influence for the better.
The debate following his stinging speech was noticeably different. Rebel arguments seemed weaker than usual, and it was observed that their attacks “pinged off him like airgun pellets on a suit of armor.”\textsuperscript{74}

At 10pm March 18\textsuperscript{th} 2003, the single most dramatic and important House of Commons vote in decades was finished. The rebel amendment was firmly defeated by a 396 to 217 majority. A total of 138 PLP members had revolted against their government. 15 Conservatives, 53 Liberal Democrats, and 11 others added to the weight of doubt looming over the ‘unproven’ causes of war.\textsuperscript{75} Defeat had been a calculated possibility despite the ultimate scope of the victory: rumors prior to the vote that there could be anywhere up to 200 Labour rebels cast the future of Blair’s government in serious doubt.\textsuperscript{76} As soon as the votes were in, Chief Whip Hillary Armstrong whispered the result into Tony Blair’s ear and he visibly breathed a sigh of relief and congratulated her with a smile.\textsuperscript{77} Labour rebels were devastated by the call for a second motion on the support for British troops. “What about people in my constituency?” said one Labour MP, “will they think I’m letting their sons and daughters down?”\textsuperscript{78} The rebels had been defeated – but the significance of the political tensions of the period cannot be underrated as they mark the first of their kind in the history of British politics. The Whips had effectively used “the anti-French card” of Chirac’s guaranteed defiance and the leering potential resignation of Labour’s most shining star to beat down the moderates to either comply with the government or abstain.\textsuperscript{79} Graham Allen later remarked that potential rebels waned under two weeks of this intense pressure, and that the rebel camp lacked the incentives that the government won the day with. “We couldn’t offer jobs or threats of sacking. All we could offer was members of parliament having the opportunity to exercise their conscience.”\textsuperscript{80}
APPENDIX A

COMMONS DIVISIONS ON IRAQ: FEBRUARY 26 AND MARCH 18, 2003
(2/26/2007)

Division 96: Amendment

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<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Aye</th>
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<th>DNV</th>
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<th>No Teller</th>
<th>Aye</th>
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<td>64</td>
<td>393</td>
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Source: HC Deb 26 Feb 2003 c363-367

Secondary source:

(3/18/2007)

Division 117: Amendment

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<th>Aye</th>
<th>DNV</th>
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<td>Conservative</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td></td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>34%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>60%</td>
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Source: HC Deb 18 Mar 2003 c902-907

Secondary source:
APPENDIX B

LABOUR MPs WHO DEFIED THE PARTY WHIP FOR THE FIRST TIME OVER IRAQ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MPs who did not go on to rebel over other issues</th>
<th>MPs who went on to rebel over other issues (including dissenting votes on other topics)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anne Begg</td>
<td>John Battle (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Blizzard</td>
<td>Anne Campbell (3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Keith Bradley</td>
<td>Helen Clark (7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kevin Brennan</td>
<td>Robin Cook (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Denham</td>
<td>Tom Cox (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parmjit Dhanda</td>
<td>Jim Cunningham (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Doran</td>
<td>Huw Edwards (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hywel Francis</td>
<td>Jeff Ennis (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stephen Hepburn</td>
<td>Paul Farrelly (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helen Jackson</td>
<td>Roger Godsiff (9)</td>
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<td>Mark Lazarowicz</td>
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<td>Khalid Mahmood</td>
<td>David Heyes (4)</td>
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<td>Ann McKechin</td>
<td>Joan Humble (2)</td>
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<td>Chris Mole</td>
<td>Martyn Jones (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Graham Stringer</td>
<td>Ian Lucas (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alan Whitehead</td>
<td>John Lyons (5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Wright</td>
<td>Eddie O’Hara (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Albert Owen (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peter Pike (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ken Purchase (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>John Robertson (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joan Ruddock (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohammad Sarwar (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malcolm Savidge (3)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Paul Stinchcombe (3)</td>
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<td>Paul Truswell (1)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bill Tynan (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brian White (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes


3 Ibid., 106.

4 Ibid.

5 Peter Stothard, 30 Days: a Month at the Heart of Blair’s War (London: HarperCollins, 2003), 7.


7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., 162.


12 Ibid.


14 Kampfner, 165.

15 Cowley, 107.

16 Ibid.


18 Ibid.

19 Cook, 202-203

20 Kettell, 75.

21 Ibid., 72.

22 Theyworkforyou.com

23 Cowley, 108


26 Christopher Adams, “Blair Hit by Big Revolt as Labour MPs Line Up to Oppose War in the House.” Financial Times. 25 September 2002.

27 Cook, 225.

28 Ibid., 246.

29 Kapfner, 196.


31 Cook, 214; Cowley, 110.

32 Adams, Financial Times.


36 Cook, 214.


38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 One of the earliest calls for such actions stemmed from a motion from the Liberal Democrats “opposing war unless it was sanctioned explicitly by both the United Nations and Parliament,” as soon as November 2002. See Kettell, 85.

41 Ibid.

42 “Blair against Commons vote on Iraq Intervention: official,” Agence France Presse. 28 July 2002.

43 Cook, 188.

44 Stothard, 23.
Ramesh, 47.
Stothard, 46.
Cowley, 114; See Appendix A
Ibid. The words “yet unproven” was a tactical choice of a Scottish legal term that appealed to the Scottish speaker of the house at the time with the power to call the amendment.
Kampfner, 287.
Kampfner, 37; Kettell, 101; Cowley, 127. “pin the blame” quoted from Tony Blair. “poisoning” quoted from Jack Straw.
Ramesh, 40.
Kettell, 101.
Stothard, 88.
Kettell, 105.
Ramesh, 47; Kampfner, 306-307.
Cowley, 120.
Ibid., 119.
Ibid. One rebel Labour MP reportedly received a “two word answer” when he asked why he was being ignored in the persuasion process, see Ibid.
Ramesh, 43; Stothard, 55, 86.
One MP reportedly whispered his fears that the Iraq War could be Blair’s “LBJ moment,” see Ramesh, 54.
Cowley, 125-126.
“Get rid of Blair, says Mersey MP; war may mean challenge for leader,” The Liverpool Daily Post.
Ramesh, 49-50; Cowley, 122; Kampfner, 298-299.
Cook, 320.
Ibid., 365.
Ibid., 362.
Ibid., 365.
Stothard, 93.
Ramesh, 52.
Kettell, 106.
Kettell, 107;
Ramesh, 52.
Ramesh, 54; see Appendix A and Appendix B
Kampfner, 307.
Stothard, 96; Ramesh, 42.
Cowley, 123.
Stothard, 28.
During World War II, the deployment of African American soldiers overseas allowed them to experience freedoms that were denied to them in the United States. Black GIs who were stationed in European countries such as France, post-war Germany and Great Britain found themselves in lands that were less oppressive and more tolerant of racial diversity than the United States. This paper will look at the development of interracial relationships during and after World War II in the formerly occupied nations of France and Germany, as well as interracial relationships that arose in Great Britain. It will explore the role that American bigotry played in European acceptance of racial discrimination. Finally, this paper will argue that the expression of opposition to interracial relationships was widespread throughout Europe, and did not solely correlate to countries that were under Nazi occupation during the war.

One African American general stated “Germany was a breath of freedom- they [black GIs] could go where they wanted, eat where they wanted and date who they wanted.”¹ In *Paris Noir*, Tyler Stovall wrote about the lives of African Americans in the French capital during the twentieth century. Stovall wrote, “In Europe, the willingness of white women to associate with African American men represented the absence of the ultimate racial barrier.”² To black GIs during and after World War II, Europe symbolized an escape from American bigotry and a place where interracial relationships could be accepted. Juxtaposed to this racial tolerance, there was also unease and resentment over the presence of black GIs in Europe. Opposition to interaction between African American GIs and European white women ranged from mild objection to institutionalized segregation and even violence.

A considerable number of African Americans had been living in European cities such as London and Paris prior to the arrival of black GIs during World War II. Many of them had “left the United States to
escape the burdens of discrimination and came to [cities such as] Paris as self-conscious refugees of racism.”³ They found that whites treated them with affection and that it was possible to forge interracial relationships with white women. This “color-blind” European society also had racist views towards African Americans before the war as well, but white Americans fueled the fires of discrimination towards black Americans before, during and after World War II in Europe. English film critic Peter Noble stated, “It is more likely that the average Englishman might have certain qualms about allowing a colored man to marry into his family, and this attitude has been engendered to a great extent by the films he goes to see. And because more than 80 per cent of these films are of Hollywood origin, it may be generally agreed that his prejudices are a result of the anti-Negro bias reflected in American movies.”⁴ Also in London, a 1930 interracial kiss shared by Paul Robeson and Peggy Ashcroft in the play Othello resulted in hysterical outcries from white Americans in the audience.⁵ This racism by white Americans towards their black countrymen was shocking to Britons, but over time, it was seen as an acceptable way to deal with African Americans. In pre-war Paris, a cartoon running in the Chicago Defender portrayed the life of an African American by the name of Bungleton Green and his run-ins with white southerners. In the cartoon, Frenchmen were fond of Mr. Green while a white American by the name of “Meester Redneck” was not accepting of interracial relationships.⁶ One white American living in Paris claimed, “Where I come from, white women ain’t [supposed to be] seen with niggers.”⁷ Rejection of interracial relationships between African Americans and white Europeans was present prior to World War II in Europe, however, American racist attitudes helped in fostering these attitudes among the European population.

As German troops were advancing into Western Europe in October 1939, the American embassy in Paris ordered “all America citizens to leave the country.”⁸ This policy effectively put an end to the African American presence in Europe because blacks did not want to remain in France and risk internment at the hands of the Nazis. Because there was a small African American presence in France until 1944, little was written about interracial relationships that occurred prior to the Allied landing at Normandy on June 6th. During the war
itself, France and Germany had been occupied by the Third Reich, an ideologically racist regime. One would assume that once black GIs entered into these countries that they would face racism because they encountered people who had previously lived under the Third Reich. While there were several attempts by German conservatives to propagandize blacks as inferior, discriminatory views of “black rapists defiling German womanhood and thus German honor” had a limited effect. The reliance upon Nazi propaganda initially failed in Germany because of how well the black GIs treated Germans during the post war years. Germans saw first hand that not all black GIs were barbarians and savage as had previously been propagated to them by the Nazis during World War II. Maria Hohn wrote, “Whenever black soldiers experienced racism in Germany in the immediate postwar years, it was generally marked, ‘made in the United States’.”

Prior to their arrival in Britain during the war, black GIs fared similar fates to those that were stationed in Germany. Initially they were met with harsh criticism by a few conservative British officials, but the British population as a whole did not have to “confront questions of racial attitudes” until the US troops arrived in 1942. The main concern of these conservative Britons was that black GIs would have sexual relationships with white women. The leader of the House of Commons, Anthony Eden, wanted “to try to stop the black soldiers coming in” by arguing that “They will consort with white girls and there will be a number of half-caste babies about when they have gone…It will upset the local populations when this occurs.” Other Britons suggested relocating these black troops to urban port cities like Liverpool because “rural populations, particularly the girls, do not know how to take [handle] the Negroes and are very much attracted by them.” Explicit policy to keep black GIs out of England during World War II was discussed and the growing concern in Britain during and after the war was the issue of interracial relationships. In order to separate black Americans from white Britons, English officials relied upon the United States model of segregation to stop possible interracial relationships.

There did not seem to be any difference between the reaction to interracial relationships in formerly occupied countries such as France and Germany and countries that were not occupied by Nazi Germany
such as Great Britain. The main factor in creating racial discrimination against black GIs and white women was the United States. During the war in Nazi-occupied France and Germany, blacks were not “worthy of living, diseased in body and mind, sterilized by the Nazis, locked up in work camps and murdered in death camps. Because we [blacks] were not Aryan”. Following the Allied victory, it was not difficult for post-war Germans to identify with African American discrimination, because they had been living under a racist state since the 1930s. “These scenes [of racial discrimination and violence towards black GIs by white soldiers] may have been ugly reminders of the sort of humiliation Germans had inflicted on the Jews during the Third Reich.”

This acceptance of American racist ideals that crossed the Atlantic was also seen Great Britain. British Minister of Information, Brendan Bracken issued in a letter to the War Cabinet that read, “The American policy of segregation is the best practical contribution to the avoidance of trouble, but Americans must not expect our authorities civil or military to assist them in enforcing the policy.”

This led to an English stance of de facto segregation during and after World War II. While there was no legal discrimination, it was written in an Army Bureau of Current Affairs pamphlet entitled Notes on Relations with Coloured Troops, “British soldiers should try to avoid unpleasantness by not inviting white and coloured [sic] guests together.”

In both occupied and non-occupied countries, it seemed that the main concern of Europeans was sexual interactions between black GIs and white women which were perceived as crossing the line of decency.

By late summer 1942, about 12,000 black GIs had arrived in Britain and were assigned to segregated units, which was United States Army policy. This segregation of troops in Britain during the war succeeded in limiting interaction between white British women and black GIs. To keep black and white soldiers separate, “a system of ‘rotating passes’ was introduced by the Army whereby blacks were allowed to go into the local town on one night and whites on another. This system was commonly referred to as “Black Wednesdays and White Thursdays.”

Institutionalized segregation was seen in the formation of all white and all black nightclubs as well. The movie Yanks (1979) featured a scene in which a fight broke out when a black GI was dancing with a British woman. An American GI stated that this
dance was not between a man and a lady, rather, he saw “a whore dancing with a nigger.” The idea of segregation was seen as acceptable to the white American soldiers when Ruffelo stated, “some places you can’t just do that” and another soldier said “Learn you niggers to keep your place” during the ensuing fight. With the arrival of American soldiers into Europe, came ideas of racial segregation and discrimination. The 1948 novel, Last of the Conquerors emphasized American racism in Europe when a white MP told a German woman in the presence of a black GI that “an American white woman could never go out with one [a black man] because the colored man is dirty and very poor and with much sickness.” Racism towards black GIs became commonplace in Europe due to American influence.

General Dwight Eisenhower stated, “The British population lacks racial consciousness which is so strong in the United States. The small-town British girl would go to a movie with a Negro quite as readily as she would go with anyone else, a practice that our white soldiers could not understand.” Violence often broke out between white and black GIs, as shown in the nightclub scene from Yanks, but there were also rumors that black soldiers had been castrated or stabbed for dancing with white girls throughout Europe. European women were classified as prostitutes and criticized by white American soldiers whenever they were seen with black GIs. In Germany, Ika Hugel-Marshall recalled when her German mother was called a “nigger-whore” because she had sex with a black GI. In Paris, white MPs and other soldiers frequently harassed black soldiers, recalling their racial attitudes that were prevalent in the States. Widespread bigotry was projected by American GIs, and the institutionalization of segregation among troops, whorehouses and nightclubs led many Europeans to believe that since Americans were doing it to their own countrymen, discrimination would be fine.

Despite segregation, and widespread bigotry, there is evidence that interracial relationships did survive during and after World War II. There are countless examples that European women were drawn to black GIs rather than their white counterparts. For black GIs in Paris, “the willingness of white women to consider them as sexual partners was the clearest possible marker of the difference between American and French attitudes.” In Germany, “women did not hide the fact that
they preferred GIs to German men, saying they found black Americans ‘more manly[sic] and sexually attractive’.”26 Finally this preference for black GIs was illustrated in Britain when one black stationed there wrote “the white girls all over Europe have fallen in love with the black soldier. I have known the girls to follow them from town to town as far as they could go.”27

Terms such as “Veronika”, “Nigger Lover”, “Negernutte” and “gold diggers” were pejorative names granted to European women who associated with African American GIs prior to World War II.28 These terms may have originated from American GIs’ jealousy that women chose blacks over them, but they resounded throughout Europe and became a part of the lexicon of interracial discrimination. During the war era, women were also banned from nightclubs if they were seen with African American GIs. Often prostitutes who had fornicated with blacks were not allowed into white nightclubs because white soldiers “kept a list at the camp of these girls and passed it to the new troops coming in.”29 Also, because many of the women who were seen with black GIs were professional prostitutes, other women who were not prostitutes but did associate with blacks were seen as immoral women. The “most crafty [sic] prostitutes”, categorized by the term *haustig weschelnder Geschlechtsverkehr* (HWG), were those women who had multiple sexual partners and “created a public ‘annoyance’ and thus presented a great source of disorder in Germany.”30 In the movie *The Story of a Three Day Pass* (1967) the Parisian Miriam was depicted as a prostitute who was only attracted to Turner [a black GI] because she got sex, a meal and a vacation.31 In the German film, *The Marriage of Maria Braun* (1979), Maria Braun “allowed herself to be kept with him [a black GI] while her husband was a Russian prisoner of war. She, for low egotistical reasons, started an affair with a man who could pay for her [sexual] favors with chocolate and silk stockings.”32 At the end of the movie, Maria committed suicide, an act that punished her for her immoral lifestyle. These two films, made by a French and German director respectively, depicted the negative reactions among European civilians to interracial dating. The pejorative views of HWG women who consorted with black GIs had infiltrated European society after the war and films depicting interracial relationships present them in a negative light because they were met with such adversity.
Throughout Europe, there was opposition to interracial marriage, miscegenation, which occurred during and after World War II. Under the Nazi regime, miscegenation with Jews (termed *Rassenchande*) had been considered one of the worst offenses committed against the *Volk*. During Allied occupation, “it was the women in the company of black GIs who appeared to many German observers as the worst offenders.”33 It was easy for Germans to apply Nazi ideas regarding miscegenation to the American model of rejecting it, because there were ideological similarities. It was very difficult for American GIs to obtain marriage licenses while in Europe, and because miscegenation laws existed in the United States, “many U.S. Army commanders were reluctant to grant wedding permits for black GIs and German women. In 1952, of 552 women who had children with black GIs, only four had been granted permits.”34 In many instances it was American policy to ship GIs back to the United States before marriage could take place. This was the case for Ika Hugel-Marshall when “in November, 1946, after he [her father] recovered from an illness, the army sent him back to the U.S. even though it was known that my mother was pregnant.”35 In Britain, “journalist Ormus Davenport contended in 1947 that not one GI bride ‘going back to the US under the US government scheme is the wife of a Negro’.”36 As a result of this, many occupation babies were left behind with their mothers, and most of the mixed-race children not only had to cope with their illegitimacy but also racial prejudice.

For Ika Hugel-Marshall, growing up in Germany was a very difficult experience because she was black. She was sent to a boarding school because of her skin, and was told that “when she’s older, she may become emotionally unstable and she’ll certainly be considered free game for the men. She’ll end up having children out of wedlock, become an alcoholic and God knows what else.”37 There was discrimination towards “half-caste” children and their mothers throughout all of Europe and this grew out of the disdain that people had for interracial relationships. “Brown babies”, as they were pejoratively called, were the lasting evidence that white women did have sexual relations with black GIs, and this legacy was seen as a disgrace for Europeans. In England, there were “probably somewhere between 700 and 1,000 children of black American troops”, and they were “the offspring of the scum of the British Isles.”38 Children of
interracial relationships were often ostracized because of the color of their skin and were often unwanted by their community. Racism experienced by black children in Europe came out of the hatred that Europeans had for interracial relationships during the war. Brown babies became proof that their white mothers were immoral women who consorted with black GIs during the war.

The presence of African American GIs in Europe during the years surrounding World War II initially exposed them to a racial tolerance that was not offered to them in the United States. However, along with the arrival of troops, American ideas of segregation and discrimination soon followed. Because the United States Army was segregated, so too were nightclubs, brothels and whorehouses frequented by American soldiers. Regardless, of location, black GIs faced discrimination from Europeans as well as white Americans because the racism was propagated by white Americans overseas. Europeans adopted the American model of discrimination because it seemed to be the best possible solution for the avoidance of interracial trouble. Also, discrimination against black GIs would essentially prevent them from interacting with white European women, a central issue concerning American occupation throughout Europe. Women were ostracized and blacklisted from the local community when they consorted with black GIs, and brown babies became proof that these women had slept with African Americans. European women were also depicted as being sexual deviants for having relationships in films such as *The Marriage of Maria Braun* and *The Story of a Three Day Pass*. It can be seen that the opposition to interracial relationships in formerly occupied countries such as France and Germany as well as Great Britain was propagated by racist ideals of the United States and disseminated throughout Europe during World War II.

**Films—**

*The Marriage of Maria Braun*, written, and dir. Rainer Werner Fassbinder, 120 min., 1979.

Notes

3 Stovall, xiii.
5 Ibid., 175.
7 Stovall, 140.
8 Ibid., 121.
9 Hohn, 90.
10 Ibid., 91.
13 Ibid., 190.
15 Hohn. 97.
18 Gardiner, 148-149.
19 Ibid., 149.
20 Yanks, written by Colin Welland, dir. John Schlesinger, 139 min., 1979, film.
22 Gardiner, 155.
23 Ibid.
25 Stovall, 211.
26 Hohn, 131.
27 Scobie, 189.
28 Hohn, 191.
29 Gardiner, 156.
30 Hohn, 147.
32 The Marriage of Maria Braun, written and dir. Rainer Werner Fassbinder, 120 min., 1979, film.
33 Hohn, 131.
34 Ibid., 106.
36 Graham Smith, 206.
38 Graham Smith, 211.
On June 16, 1976, students from schools all over Soweto converged on the streets to protest the imposition of Afrikaans as the medium of instruction in their schools. Determined to make their voices heard, they staged a march with the hope that the government would finally listen to their complaints. The march, however, spiraled out of control when police opened fire on the students, and June 16 turned from a peaceful march into a violent riot. It sparked many other protests in the days and months that followed, and marks a major turning point in South African history. This paper is an attempt to identify and explore the political underpinnings of the uprising to gain a better understanding of why it happened and why it was so powerful. What sparked the fervent protest seen on June 16? When and how had the students become politicized, and what ideas spurred them when they decided to march? Where did they get these ideas? When one traces these political undercurrents, they show that the uprisings relied on many political influences, both direct and indirect. Yet it becomes clear that the most potent political influences of June 16 were not formally organized or formally taught, but rather indirect influences that led to a more organic, grassroots uprising organized and executed by students alone.

When speaking of “political,” some attention needs to be paid to the various nuances of the word. On the surface, “political” means pertaining to the government. The dictionary definition illustrates this denotation: “political: adj. 1. Of or relating to the affairs of government, politics, or the state. 2. Characteristic of politics, parties, or politicians.” Whether it signifies political parties, discussions, protests, or opinions, “political” simply denotes anything commenting on governmental practices and structures. Yet there is also a deeper meaning of the word “political” that goes beyond the formal structures and suggests a less formal, somehow less tangible sense of the word.
This less formal definition denotes the politics of power inherent to government structures. A government is a structure put in place to rule the people, and even if it is liberal or democratic—and therefore not specifically “ruling” the people—the government still holds power over the lives of those under it. Thus there can be myriad reactions to the government that stem less from the formal policies passed and more from the covert power struggles inherent in the structure. The institution of government, because mere humans run it, is steeped in the politics of power. Therefore, “political” in this sense can denote anything related to the power relations (or struggles) between the government and the people, including the fairness of the power relations, who is involved in the power relations, and the consequences of the relations. Thus “political” need not signify any specific party, theory, or bias, but rather the deeper power struggles between the government and its citizens or between the citizens as represented by the government. It can, furthermore, take many different forms and functions. A protest may not be politically structured (in terms of the surface dictionary definition) but be politically motivated (pertaining to the second, deeper definition). In fact it is often the case that while actions involving the first meaning usually rely on the deeper second meaning, the second definition need not find its voice through the formal structures of the first definition. One will also find that when the definition of “political” is expanded to include all power relations as such, practically everything becomes political. For example, a woman in the early 1900s refusing to wear a corset is not making a political statement when viewing the first definition, but in light of the second it becomes an action that is highly—and powerfully—political, by protesting the power over women’s bodies that the corset symbolizes. One also finds that this second definition of “political” is often more potent and dangerous than the first definition, and that, as suggested before, there are political motives behind nearly every action.

**History of Discrimination**

To understand the Soweto uprising one must be aware of the context it took place in, and determine what conditions might have led to it. To examine the political roots of the uprising one must therefore examine the social (closely tied in with the economic) roots as well.
One might be tempted to start with the imposition of Afrikaans or even the Bantu Education Act. Indeed, both are central in determining why the students revolted, but instead one must go back farther and see the broader arc of South African history and inequalities that plagued it. There had been clear inequalities between Africans and European colonizers since 1652, but when these became government policy they became more firmly entrenched, not only along lines of color but also of class. These inequalities arose most notably through government policy, both before and during the Apartheid government era.

In the early decades of the 20th century, African families traditionally relied on subsistence farming to meet some of their needs. The returns produced, however, barely met their needs, and because the government didn’t pay welfare (reasoning that because they farmed they could provide their own food, regardless of the actual returns from farming) they therefore relied heavily on wages from urban employers to get by. When the government severely restricted African access to land with the passage of the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts, many African families became totally dependent on wages earned. Other government policies determined where Africans could earn these wages, and because of these policies the jobs Africans could get consisted mainly of being cheap labor on farms or in the mines, which resulted in low wages and unsteady work. These jobs paid little, had no room for advancement, were dangerous, and tore apart the African familial structure. Because of a lack of education and government discrimination, Africans couldn’t get a better job, were sentenced to poverty, and the cycle repeated itself. The government also helped this developmental path along by investing heavily in white education and providing comprehensive welfare programs for whites, which ensured that whites would have the skills necessary to maintain jobs with higher wages, would be provided for if they didn’t have high-paying jobs, and could change their opportunities by sending their children to well-funded schools.

As more Africans left the rural areas to find work during the first half of the 20th century, the black population in the cities grew. This increase in the number of the African urban working class marks a turning point in the political and economic trends of the time. The
Apartheid government had accepted that there was a force of African workers who were going to be staying in the cities, and to prevent it from growing passed “influx-control” laws. These laws sharply divided the opportunities of a rural or urban person by allowing some to stay in the city and find steady work while rejecting others. This led to inequalities among the African population as well as between the white and black population. However, as the government increased funding for African schools and enrollment skyrocketed in the cities, a new “urban school-based culture and consciousness” arose, which led to increasing politicization of the urban residents, particularly the youth. The inequalities they had faced (and their parents, as well as their grandparents and their great-grandparents) fueled bitter resentment and frustration, and provided the foundation upon which other complaints accumulated until they finally burst on June 16.

**The Bantu Education Act**

Having explored the road of inequalities that black students and their families had traveled, the Bantu Education Act deserves a place in explaining the surface reasons behind the uprising. Passed in 1953, the Act established state-run schools for blacks, separate from white schools, which were to be funded by black communities through taxation rather than financed through general state spending (which financed the white schools). This financing scheme ensured that the government would have to pay very little to start the schools or keep them up, but also meant that they would be, unlike the white schools, continually under-funded (due to the lack of appropriate wages that many in the black communities were earning). These inequalities weren’t new but merely institutionalized after the act was passed; as early as the 1800s Africans were viewed only as cheap labor and therefore little was invested in their education, in an effort to keep them from desiring social equality. Those who did provide education were the missionaries, and they had their own motives and desires as well as their own prejudices, which influenced what and how their pupils were taught. The segregated state-run schools largely replaced these mission schools that had provided schooling for black children previously. The system of segregated education also wasn’t original to the Bantu
Education Act, but again was institutionalized by the creation of the special Black Education Department under the Department of Native Affairs to manage the schools and establish a curriculum. The education of blacks was consequently further separated from the education of whites—not only were the schools separate and the funding separate, but the curriculums were also separate. Management of the school was left in the hands of the Department of Native Affairs. While parents were theoretically involved in these decisions by participation in school committees (which were directly responsible for a school), in reality the power lay in the hands of the school boards, on which sat members appointed by the Department.

Resistance to the Bantu Education Act was immediate and varied, but it was the imposition of the Afrikaans language as the medium of instruction in the classrooms that proved to be the spark to light the students on fire. The students were loathe to learn in Afrikaans because it was viewed as the "language of the oppressor" and neither teachers nor students had a proficient grasp of the language, which meant that learning and teaching were practically impossible. Passed to assert their Afrikaner nationalism (and a direct jab at the English-dominated business interests in government) the directive mandated that English and Afrikaans were to be used on a 50-50 basis in the classrooms of Standard 5, forms 1 through 5. In forms one and two, subjects such as "general science" were to be taught in English, while maths and social studies were to be taught in Afrikaans. The use of the student’s mother tongue was reserved for such subjects as “Religion Instruction, Music, [and] Physical Culture”. It was clear that the African languages—in the government’s eyes—were deemed inadequate, and held no place in the more rigorously academic subjects in school.

**Strategy and Complaints**

The above is but a bare outline of the events leading up to June 16, but provides some of the key events integral to understanding the uprising. Families were frustrated by the inequalities they had faced and still faced, and students chaffed under the controlling hand of the Bantu Education system before bursting when Afrikaans was forced on the classroom. Yet the question still remains before us: in what ways
was June 16 political? What political influences can be found, and how important were they to the overall uprising? Were political organizations integral to the uprising, or did they barely make a blip on the screen? As stated before, politics can take many different forms, and similarly the Soweto student uprising was political in many different ways. To start, the strategies used were political. The boycott was a tool first used by the increasingly militaristic younger leaders of the African National Congress (ANC) early in the 1940s, meant to illustrate how much power the black community had by way of numbers. Boycotts were a show of strength and it was through this channel that the students of the 1970s chose to voice their protest. However, to note that the boycott was used is not to say that the ANC was involved.

Furthermore, the students’ complaints—against the imposition of Afrikaans, against the Bantu Education Act, and against the pervasive inequalities—were political. It is clear that the inequalities in the society are political as well as the Bantu Education Act, yet how can a language policy be political? As suggested above by the different meanings of “political,” the choice to impose Afrikaans on students was political because of the power struggles behind it. The language policy, it can be argued, was not meant to be anything but another form of domination. This is seen by the exemption plan that the Apartheid government offered the schools. Listing a “lack of teachers with the necessary language proficiency to teach...through the medium of Afrikaans or English” or a lack of textbooks printed in the language as the only legitimate reasons a school could be exempted from the policy, it (purposely) failed to take into account the opinions of the parents, teachers, and students. Not only were parent and student opinions invalid reasons for exemptions, but student proficiency in the language (or lack thereof) also failed to exempt a school from following the policy. A section of the circular issued reads:

‘The inadequate knowledge, for example of Afrikaans on the part of the pupils, will not be accepted as an excuse. If there is on the staff a teacher who, for instance, can teach agriculture through the medium of Afrikaans, then it must be taught through Afrikaans irrespective of the pupils’
knowledge of this language.\textsuperscript{14}

Such a stance suggests that the government was little concerned with the educational value of their directive and more interested in the political—here referring to the deeper meaning—benefits of spreading their language. The justification for the policy given by the government in response to resistance further illustrates their political motives. The apartheid government argued that students would need a strong understanding of both English and Afrikaans to be successful in the business world, and thus implied that they were serving the best interests of the students by forcing them to learn it. What this really implies is that there is no place in the business world or classroom for African languages, thus indirectly invalidating their worth and replacing them with English or Afrikaans. Therefore, it can be argued that the only thing the government had in mind was the further subjugation of black students and the adults they would grow up to be.

The students responded to these deeper motives and hence their complaints were not only that they had to learn in a language they are not experienced in (leading to abysmal test scores), but also that the Apartheid government was attempting to gain more power and control over their lives. Both groups were aware—on whatever level—of the truth that “the domination of a people’s language by the languages of the colonizing nations [is] crucial to the domination of the mental universe of the colonized” and therefore crucial in keeping the blacks in a subjugated and powerless position.\textsuperscript{15} While the academic struggles that the students were facing through learning in Afrikaans deserve mention, this deeper issue of power and control is what gave strength and potency to June 16 and the riots that followed.

The Idea of Black Consciousness

Finally, but perhaps most importantly, the ideology that swirled around the uprising was also political. It was primarily the ideology of Black Consciousness, commonly attributed to Steve Biko but enjoying a relatively long history before him. Black Consciousness stressed (and does to this day) having pride in being black. Biko believed the deepest problem caused by apartheid was the loss of the black man’s (and
woman’s) soul. Writing under the pseudonym of “Frank Talk,” Biko wrote that “the black man has become a shell, a shadow of a man, completely defeated, drowning in his own misery, a slave, an ox bearing the yoke of oppression with sheepish timidity” due to the circumstances he was forced to live in, the education he received, and the treatment meted out to him by the white community under the apartheid government. Black Consciousness was an effort to reverse this regression, and bring pride, unity, and self-esteem back to the black man. Expanding the idea of being “black” beyond skin pigmentation and into a frame of mind, Black Consciousness sought

to make the black man come to himself; to pump back life into his empty shell; to infuse him with pride and dignity, to remind him of his complicity in the crime of allowing himself to be misused and therefore letting evil reign supreme in the country of his birth.

Black Consciousness also worked to “rewrite the history of the black man and to produce in it the heroes who form the core of the African background,” because Biko believed that “a people without a positive history is like a vehicle without an engine.” With this new sense of pride and a new view of their personal history, Black Consciousness would create “real black people who do not regard themselves as appendages to white society,” and would have their own goals, standards, and morals, as well as a healthy sense of self-worth and pride in their history.

Biko was also explicit that Black Consciousness was not reverse racism. Reflecting his own accepting nature and desire to move forward and progress towards tolerance and peace, Biko wrote that “[Black Consciousness] works on the knowledge that ‘white hatred’ is negative, though understandable, and leads to precipitate and shot-gun methods which may be disastrous for black and white alike.” While he is very clear that hatred towards whites is understandable, he is also equally clear when he says that it is not a valid basis for action. Thus, through Biko the ideas of Black Consciousness were eloquently woven together to create an idea that supports pride in one’s history, culture, and color.
that is also positive in its outlook and therefore sustainable, progressive, and very powerful for the generations he was speaking to as well as for future generations.

**Politicization at School**

The concepts of Black Consciousness were spreading rapidly among the youth of the 60s and 70s, but it is integral in understanding the uprising to note that these ideas were not being spread to the students in a “formal” or “organized” way. Not taught as formal Black Consciousness ideology at meetings, rallies, or marches, the ideas were instead taught on a more informal, indirect basis; they did not reach the younger students as political ideas, but rather as a more integrated consciousness that crept into their everyday thinking and was supported by their everyday activities. One of the important channels that these ideas passed through was a teacher. Because of various influences (including the expansion of the militaristic state, the slowing economy, and their generation having grown up in the age of Apartheid) “Black Consciousness views were prevalent at the time among younger teachers, especially those who had passed through the separate black universities established during the 60s.”

It also happened that college educated Africans were facing difficulties in finding jobs because “many prospective white employers viewed educated blacks with grave suspicion,” and black graduates found that “they could only find work as teachers, social workers, or government employees.” As a result, these recent college graduates who were already filled with Black Consciousness ideas were forced into the sector that happened to be most conducive to spreading it at an organic level: as teachers. These new teachers took the views they had learned in college and spread them among their students—perhaps most importantly by showing the students that “‘they were being given an inferior type of education’.”

These lessons were given in a way where they was not explicitly Black Consciousness ideology, but rather broader ideas unconnected to a formal movement being transmitted from one to another. The following example of a teacher attempting to re-write African history—as Black Consciousness urges—in a more positive and truthful tone while teaching it to his students illustrates this theory. Sibongile Mkhabela,
who attended Naledi High School, cites her history teacher as giving two types of history information during a lesson: “the first emphasis was on what was important to know in order to pass the examination and the other strove to promote thinking and help us to fully appreciate our identity as African children.” The first, one might assume, is the conception of history after 1652 told from the Dutch settler’s perspective, and the second is a history before that date, what Mkhabela calls “our genuine history.” Lessons such as these taught students to take pride in their culture and heritage, giving them confidence and a positive identity. They were not official lessons about Black Consciousness, given in a political setting by leaders or officers in the Black Consciousness Movement, but were Black Consciousness theories adapted to the classroom setting, and taught indirectly with more focus on the deeper ideas rather than the official names and terminology.

This is not to say that the Black Consciousness Movement wasn’t active in spreading their ideas and ideology. It is important to note that “from the inception of [The South African Student Organization] SASO at the university level, efforts were made to recruit support from younger students,” and that branches for high school students were formed in Pietermartizburg, Port Elizabeth, Umtata, Kimberly, Bloemfontein, Pretoria, and Springs. Furthermore, students formally affiliated with the Black Consciousness Movement would talk to the students in the high schools and give presentations, in order to further spread knowledge about Black Consciousness. But the key observation is that regardless of official organizations the ideology spread much further than their official efforts. Not only on high school students but also on younger students did the ideas have an impact, and the radius of impact was much broader than the above list and actions suggest. This, it could be argued, is largely due to the particular character of Black Consciousness and the way it was spread. Black Consciousness pivots on the ideas of confidence, pride, and cultural identity—things that every human strives for and feels most keenly when missing—and as a result, are not political ideas as such that need to be taught. They are present in everyone regardless of class, color, religion, or gender. As a result they don’t rely on political meetings or
rallies to be transmitted from one student to another—even if the student is unaware of a Black Consciousness Movement, he or she is aware of the ideas behind it because they are inherent to his or her identity.

**Politicization at Home**

Yet students were also receiving their own political education outside of any classroom in the everyday circumstances they and their families faced. It was hard, in fact, for a student *not* to be aware of their surroundings, which gave very personal lessons on discrimination and inequalities on an everyday basis. From their parents and their own experiences, black students were aware that they occupied a subservient and inferior position in South Africa. As Sifiso Ndlovu remembers, “being confined in a township due to apartheid architecture and special zoning provides enough evidence and conscientization [sic] that one is always conscious [of] grand apartheid policies, repressive laws, influx control and [the] economic realities during the 1970s.” As Nelson Mandela affirms, during the Apartheid Era

To be an African in South Africa means that one is politicized from the moment of one’s birth, whether one acknowledges it or not. An African child is born in an Africans Only hospital, taken home in an Africans Only bus, lives in an Africans Only area, and attends Africans Only schools, if he attends schools at all. When he grows up, he can hold Africans Only jobs, rent a house in Africans Only townships, ride Africans Only trains, and be stopped at any time of the day or night and be ordered to produce a pass...His life is circumscribed by racist laws and regulations that cripple his growth, dim his potential, and stunt his life.

Through Mandela’s statement one sees the depth of oppression black citizens faced from their birth onwards. The apartheid government controlled almost all aspects of their lives through various laws and measures, and black citizens were aware of this every day of their lives.
by the visible manifestations: separate areas, separate schools, separate transportation, and the hated pass laws. As stated before, black South Africans of all ages were acutely aware of their inferior position in the society whether they understood it or not, and such knowledge politicized them before they set foot in any school or political meeting.

Students’ were further politicized by their frustration and the frustrations of their parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents. In their homes they would listen “to how their parents [were] treated by their employers, and become aware that their parents [were] underpaid and therefore unable to afford the bare necessities that the children require[d].”30 Through their everyday experiences they would make the connection between their parents’ wages, their job, and the color of their skin, and would not only feel the frustration of their own experiences with discrimination, but also feel frustration for their parents—adults whom they looked up to and respected that were treated as inferior human beings. Mkhabela’s memoir provides an eloquent example of this vicarious frustration when she laments the discrimination her father faces in his job. Aware that he “was highly respected in the community” and “stood tall and dignified in his house,” Mkhabela was also aware that her father was treated as a boy at work and paid “a miserly R20 each week, to feed, clothe and educate a family of six,” which she knew was grossly inadequate for the family’s needs.31 Mkhabela was not only bitter that she faced discrimination herself, but was also frustrated that the white society didn’t give her father the respect he deserved. This knowledge politicized many students in a way more powerful than any formal political teaching could have done, and indeed took away the need for formal political education—even young students like Hector Peterson became aware of their inferior place in society and their desires for something better.

**As Students We Faced Our Problems**

Through these three categories—the students’ strategies, complaints, and the ideology—one can see that the political roots of the uprising vary. It would appear that they are mostly indirect, but one can’t discount the active politicizing that SASO was involved in. The ANC, as well as teachers’ unions and organizations, also contributed to the formal fight against the Bantu Education act; however, when
viewing June 16 it is clear that no formal organization can take credit for the shape the uprising took. While Black Consciousness may have been integral, it is important to note that its involvement was largely theoretical and barely official or organizational, either in organizing the march or even spreading ideology. Such observations support Sifiso Ndlovu’s statement that he does not “remember any liberation movement such as the Black Consciousness Movement or the South African Student Movement (SASM) contributing to [the school’s] daily meetings and discussions.”\textsuperscript{32} The movements did not contribute in an official capacity, but their ideas were nevertheless central in the uprisings in the more organic, grassroots, way illustrated.

Is this distinction an important one? It may seem to be splitting hairs to say that the official organization lacked a role in the uprisings, but their ideology was key. Is that not to say that the organization was crucially involved, just in an indirect role? To believe so would give too much credit to the organization, particularly in the instance of Black Consciousness. The Black Consciousness Movement did not have a monopoly on the thoughts that spread (with and without their help), nor can they rightfully call themselves the original nationalists. There is also a key difference between an organization and an ideology, best summed up by Ndlovu when he says that “as students we faced our destiny and problems,” not as members of an organization.\textsuperscript{33} As Antoinette Pieterson remembers, “most of the pupils were not politically motivated per se...each and every one simply just felt that it was not right for them to be forced to be taught in Afrikaans.”\textsuperscript{34} It is important to acknowledge that the students themselves are responsible for June 16, especially in light of multiple organizations that attempted to take credit for what happened. This distinction also suggests why the uprising was so powerful. The movement, because it wasn’t connected to any specific organization, mobilized students (parents and teachers) in a way that rivaled the best political recruitment. Those who participated in the riots on June 16 and after were participating not because an organization had told them to, but rather because they were infused with the political ideology behind such movements. This is not to say that those who were involved in an organization didn’t feel the same way (to assume so would be foolish) but rather asserts quite
simply that an organization wasn’t responsible for the events that took place—the students of Soweto were.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, there were many different “political” facets in the June 16 uprising, but the most prominent—the theories of Black Consciousness—were largely an indirect influence. Such ideas weren’t taught as formal Black Consciousness ideology, but rather traveled to the students through their everyday circumstances and as oblique lessons through their teachers. Yet despite this circuitous influence Black Consciousness was pivotal to the uprisings, unifying the students in their opinions and goals. While the Apartheid government was caught off balance by the uprising, if it had been paying attention to the deeper currents in the schools it would have seen the rumblings of the storm years in advance. The uprising was not a random or even spontaneous event, and the conditions that led up to the June 16 uprising, it could be argued, started well before the imposition of the Afrikaans language in schools. It is fortunate, however, that the Apartheid government wasn’t paying attention, but even their vigilance couldn’t have stopped the explosion on June 16 that changed the course of South African history. The June 16 uprising did not result in anti-apartheid legislation but breathed new life into the liberation movements for a time, adding to the often unsteady chain of events that eventually led to the dismantling of the Apartheid state. In the brutal and bloody history of revolt, the youths that organized and took part in the Soweto student uprising "showed an ingenuity that their parents had been unable to achieve," and they proved to "South Africa and the world that there was the will and determination to end the apartheid system."35 Such turning points are often deeply political, but some digging may, in fact, be necessary to unearth the more subtle political roots that provide their foundations.
Notes

1 The American Heritage Dictionary, 21st ed., s.v. “Political”.
2 The Black Land Act of 1913 and the Development Trust and Land Act of 1936 prohibited, among other things, Africans from owning land outside of restricted “black areas” and from purchasing or selling land to individuals who were not black. These two acts together “enforced territorial segregation in rural areas,” thus severely limiting the agricultural opportunities for African families. Festenstein, Melville and Claire Pickard-Cambridge, Land and Race: South Africa's Group Areas and Land Acts (South African Institute of Race Relations: South Africa, 1987), 4, 73.
3 Seekings, Jeremy and Nicoli Nattrass, Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 75-76.
4 Ibid., 75.
5 Ibid., 92.
6 Ibid., 104.
9 Hyslop, The Classroom Struggle, 158.
11 Created in 1912, the ANC was considered "the earliest major manifestation of African nationalism in South Africa," despite the fact that ANC leadership didn't wish to create their own nation. The ANC "sought…to win rights for Africans within the white state, along the lines promised—but forever left unfulfilled—by the proponents of trusteeship and liberalism." Gerhart, Gail M., Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 12.
12 Ibid., 89.
14 Ibid., 67.
17 Ibid., 31.
18 Ibid., 32.
19 Ibid., 55.
20 Ibid., 33.
23 Hyslop, The Classroom Struggle, 154.
28 Sifiso Ndlovu, e-mail message to author, July 21, 2006.
33 Ibid., 7. Emphasis added.
34 Hlongwane. *Soweto ’76*, 60.
FROM MYTH TO FACT: REEXAMINING DEPICTIONS OF THE MONGOL INVASIONS OF JAPAN

Jared Natzke

Accounts of the thirteenth-century Mongol invasions of Japan have been steeped in myth ever since they first sprung from the fanciful imaginations of medieval Japanese courtiers. Most students of Japanese history are familiar with the tale of the kamikaze, or “divine wind,” that is said to have destroyed both of Kubilai Khan’s vast invasion fleets in 1274 and 1281 and saved Japan from Mongol domination. Like many aspects of the Mongol invasions, the storms caused by the kamikaze have been presented as fact by numerous historians over the past hundred years. Other questionable aspects of the invasions, including the massive numbers of troops involved, the struggle Japanese warriors experienced in fighting off the fierce Mongol warriors, and the motives of the gokenin (samurai) for fighting in the war, have been acknowledged as facts, without close analysis, by countless writers. Another common trend has been to equate the Japanese defeat of the Mongols to the beginning of the Japanese nation state. It was believed that by banding together against a foreign invader, the Japanese people were united for the first time and started down a path of increased power and territorial expansion. By using the works of some prominent historians of medieval Japanese history, I will point out the inconstancies in their arguments and seek to shed light on the continuing debate over how the Mongol invasions of Japan are depicted.

Despite the seeming similarities of many of these histories, some of them do show significant variation. Thomas Conlan’s recent book In Little Need of Divine Intervention takes perhaps the most radical stance on the way the invasions have been depicted. He dismisses commonly accepted aspects of the invasions such as the role of Japanese nationalism, the huge amount of Mongol invaders, and even the legend of the kamikaze itself. As the title of his book clearly suggests, he
believes the Japanese defenders were quite capable of fending off the Mongols and did not need to be saved from destruction by the storms. While his work points out inaccuracies and raises important topics of debate, his viewpoint about the capability of Japan’s military is not entirely new or groundbreaking. It can be seen that other historians before him have given the defensive forces quite a bit of credit as well, even if their facts are somewhat questionable.

I will begin by examining Nakaba Yamada’s book, *Ghenko: The Mongol Invasion of Japan*. This work, published in 1916, is valuable as a source in that it was written by a Japanese scholar in English for a Western audience. This means that the work’s explicit purpose is to explain what the Japanese believed were the most important aspects of the invasions. He begins the book with a preface that conveys the factual nature of his book, saying that he chose to “write an authentic, straightforward history rather than use the medium of fiction.”\(^1\) Also, he explains that Japan’s defeat of the Mongols led to its rise as a world power and that the Japanese people were victorious because they “possess a superior spirit that has existed in the heart of the nation from earliest times.”\(^2\) Already, he is setting up the reader for one of his most important themes: the invasions’ role in uniting the Japanese people and creating the beginning of the Japanese nation state.

Yamada clearly believes that the leadership of Shikken Hojo Tokimune, Governor-General of the Kamakura *bakufu*, had an invaluable role in the unification of Japan in its efforts to fend off the invasions, (the *bakufu* was the warrior government that handled most of Japan’s administrative duties during its medieval period). He is depicted as a strong, courageous leader who fears no foreign power, not even the strongest in the world. He reportedly convinced the emperor not to yield to the demands of Kubilai Khan and to remain steadfast in the face of their threats. After the first invasion, he decides to execute the subsequent emissaries as a show of force to the Khan.\(^3\) Tokimune is able not only to fend off the Mongols but to also quell the internal troubles of the “nation,” such as quashing his brother Tokisuke’s rebellion against the Bakufu and calming the monk Nichiren’s radical religious movement.\(^4\) He also oversaw greater coordination of the defenses of the southern island of Kyushu and ensured that the fortifications around Hakata Bay were improved.\(^5\)
The actual depictions of the invasions in Yamada’s work convey their importance in terms of the great number of troops involved and the devastating nature of their failure for the Mongols. When the first invasion fleet, numbering some 40,000 troops, made its landing on the Chikuzen shore of Kyushu, the Japanese defenders supposedly faced overwhelming odds but were successful in holding the invaders at bay.\(^6\) As nightfall approached on the fourth day of the invasion, Yamada contends that the Mongol troops were shocked by the tenacious Japanese defense. One of their generals allegedly said, “The smart Japanese will surely come to-night [sic] to make a counter-attack,” expressing his fear that the Japanese would attempt to engage the tired Mongol troops in hand-to-hand combat that night.\(^7\) The Mongol invaders retreated to their ships and while they were being attacked by Japanese fireboats, the weather changed and a storm allegedly destroyed nearly all of their ships.\(^8\) Yamada seems to suggest that despite the defenders’ early success, the vast numbers of the Mongols threatened to soon overwhelm them. Nevertheless, the first invasion did fail and it was a disaster for Kubilai Khan.

The second invasion took place on an even grander scale, involving some 100,000 invaders according to Yamada’s accounts (it is unclear where he gets these numbers).\(^9\) This number, if accurate, would require an amazing feat of engineering to be successful. They were to be carried on 3,500 boats, divided into two fleets. One fleet would leave from Korea while the other would set sail from southern China and the two fleets were to rendezvous beyond Japanese borders before making the final push towards Kyushu. When the Mongol fleets finally converged on Kyushu, the Japanese defenders of the island were reportedly successful in destroying some of their vessels by burning and raiding them. Yamada depicts fierce and bold, yet dangerous, attacks against overwhelming numbers of Mongols by small Japanese boats. After only the second day of the battle along the Chikuzen coast, Yamada claims that a “divine tempest,” much more terrible than the first, rose up and wrecked havoc on the Mongol fleet. He says that the Mongol ships were “impaled on the rocks, dashed against cliffs, or tossed on land like corks from the spray.”\(^10\) Yamada illustrates the important role of this kamikaze by stating, “had they [the Japanese] not been able stubbornly to defy the enemy until Nature came to help them,
their honour and fame as an independent nation would have been
demolished by the brutal barbarians of the north…” He believes that
only with the help of fate or destiny did the brave Japanese defense
succeed.

After the final details about the invasions, Yamada makes an
attempt to offer some thoughtful analysis about the invasions’ role in
the rise of Japan as a world power. This proves to be the most
interesting, and flawed, segment of his book. He first attempts to
compare the similarities between the failure of the Mongol invasions to
that of the destruction of the Spanish Armada, meant to invade
England, some centuries later. Then he claims that the Mongol
Empire experienced a downfall similar to that of the Spaniards and that
Japan, like England, used the victory to begin its rise as a world
power. This seems to be a clear case of an historian’s view of the
present influencing his concept of the past. Yamada, with the
nationalist fervor of citizen whose country was a rising power at the
time, attempts to trace the beginning of that rise to a glorious victory
over the most powerful nation in the world. Also, Yamada again
strives to point out that the invasions were an example of a clash
between “civilization and barbarism.” He claims that “Japan in the
thirteenth century was very strong in national zeal, patriotic ardour
having been produced by her feudal system of government…” This
unity and patriotism, along with some help from Mother Nature, are
what Yamada believes allowed the civilized Japanese to defeat the
savage Mongol hordes. While these arguments are interesting, they
clearly show bias and a lack of sound reasoning.

Now I will examine another work from the same time period by
Vice Admiral G. A. Ballard. His book, *The Influence of the Sea on the
Political History of Japan*, published in 1921, is written from a very
different perspective than Yamada’s. Ballard, as an admiral in the
British Navy, was much more familiar with naval tactics and the
history of naval actions than Yamada. He also offers an early twentieth
century, Western perspective on the invasions. His book stresses the
Mongols’ inexperience in naval warfare as well as the skilled Japanese
defense as the major reasons for the failure of the invasions.
Surprisingly, Ballard has a more discerning opinion of some of the
accounts of the invasions than Yamada and he even downplays the role of the *kamikaze* in the Mongols’ defeat.

Ballard portrays the first invasion much the same as Yamada. The islands of Tsushima and Iki are first overrun and then the fleet makes for Kyushu. Ballard makes the interesting conjecture that the Mongols chose to land at Kyushu in order to get the sea journey over as quickly as possible.16 This again points to Ballard’s theory that the Mongols’ inexperience with naval warfare had a great effect on the invasions. The account of the landing on Kyushu reads nearly the same as Yamada’s in that the Mongols chose to retreat to their ships, fearing a night raid, and were then destroyed by a storm. However, he gives a bit more credit to the defenders, stating that, “the Mongols found their position very difficult.”17

In his version of the second invasion, Ballard gives far more credit to the strength of the Japanese troops who fought against the Mongols. His calculations actually exceed those of Yamada since he estimates about 150,000 Mongols were sent by Kubilai Khan this time, which attests his belief in the incredible strength of the Japanese.18 An allusion to the concept of the Japanese nation state also appears in his writing when he states that, “the Japanese were so deeply stirred by national pride, that they treated this mission even more summarily than its predecessors of six years ago.”19 This continues a theme raised by Yamada: the role of the invasions in uniting the Japanese nation. When the fleets finally made landfall, Ballard explains that the Mongols encountered stiff resistance and that their attacks were essentially failing.20 Then, unfortunately for the Mongols, Ballard once again depicts their utter destruction at the hands of the *kamikaze*.21

This catastrophic loss was unnecessary and tragic, says Ballard, because he believes that the invasion “was already on the road to failure,” and that “the forces of Nature merely hastened the discomfiture of the invaders which the Japanese had begun.”22 Ballard’s account differs from Yamada’s in important respects. While he does speak of the concept of Japanese nationalism, albeit not nearly as much as Yamada, he gives the defenders far more credit for defeating the Mongols than he gives the *kamikaze*. The *kamikaze*’s role is still important but it is depicted more as an unfortunate disaster for the Mongols rather than the event that saved Japan.
Some later authors, it would seem, tend to agree with Yamada’s depiction of the invasions while others agree with Ballard’s. The Japanese warriors continued to be written of as brave and stoic in defending their nation, but some saw them as ultimately doomed to assimilation at the hands of the Mongol hordes had nature not intervened. Also, it was still assumed that increased nationalism resulted from the invasions as well. Mikiso Hane’s *Japan: A Historical Survey*, published in 1972, offers a short description of the invasions. He says that the *kamikaze* were “interpreted as interventions by the gods” against the Mongols and he claims that “this grave threat to their independence aroused a greater sense of unity among the Japanese than the nation had ever before experienced.”

On the other hand, John Hall’s *Japan: From Prehistory to Modern Times*, published four years earlier, cites the Japanese defense as the reason for the Mongols’ eventual defeat. He states, “the fighting quality of the Japanese prevented the Mongols from penetrating inland,” and that “the Japanese accounted for one of the few defeats suffered by the Mongols.”

Also, he portrays Japan’s religious leaders as falsely claiming credit for the Mongols’ defeat while it was the warriors who actually did “the fighting and dying.”

A relatively modern work that dismisses the Japanese *gokenin’s* probability of defeating the Mongols is William Farris’s *Heavenly Warriors: The Evolution of Japan’s Military, 500-1300*. This book, published in 1992, seems to go out of its way to portray the overwhelming strength of the Mongols and the incredible luck Japan experienced in escaping inevitable conquest. He puts the numbers for the first invasion at 90,000, (more than previous sources) and the second at around 140,000 (which is about average). Also, he says that the Mongols possessed superior battle tactics and that the Shogunate had to scramble to bring more troops to the front to bolster its lagging defenses. Then, Farris assures the reader that, “even though the samurai fought bravely and prevented an immediate Mongol victory through their stout resistance, it seems likely that a well-coordinated Mongol attack would have succeeded had nature allowed it to proceed.”

“The Mongols had numbers and technology on their side,” he states, clearly unwilling to give the samurai’s defensive capability the benefit of the doubt.
Now that some of the generally accepted depictions of the invasions have been presented, let us examine a work that takes a comparatively extreme position on their history. Thomas Conlan’s *In Little Need of Divine Intervention* takes issue with the depiction of nearly every aspect of the invasions in earlier historical accounts. These include the *kamikaze*, the precarious situation of the samurai defenders, the colossal numbers of the invading armies, and the extent to which the *gokenin* felt a sense of nationalism for Japan. Firstly, he contends that the legend of the “divine wind” may be just that, a mere legend. Using numerous documents from the period that he has translated into English, he points out the simple fact that the storms are hardly mentioned in many warriors’ accounts from the period. Takezaki Suenaga, a warrior who fought against the Mongols, never mentions the storms at all in the scroll he commissioned to show his exploits, despite making references to the gods and their divine will.\(^{30}\) Also, he states that, “the term *kamikaze* was absent from Kamakura documents concerning the invasions as well, and can only be found in the diaries of thirteenth-century courtiers.”\(^{31}\) Conlan points out that the myth of the storms provided a perfect excuse for the failed Mongol commanders and that it gave Japanese priests proof that the gods were indeed on their side.\(^{32}\)

Conlan dismisses the traditional calculations of troop strength as gross exaggerations and he attempts to propose more plausible estimations instead. He points out that the 140,000 troops assumed to have taken part in the second invasion rivaled the logistical feat accomplished during the D-Day landings in Normandy in 1944.\(^{33}\) Kubilai Khan’s armies had to travel a staggering 116 miles from Korea and 480 miles from China as opposed to the mere 20 miles of the English Channel, making such a feat infinitely more difficult.\(^{34}\) Conlan points out other examples of exaggerations of troop strength, such as a twelfth-century courtier’s account of an advancing army that was estimated to have numbered upwards of 10,000 but actually consisted of only 1,080 horsemen.\(^{35}\) He seems to believe that estimations of troop strength from this period from narrative sources “are better conceived as metaphors for an army’s strength than as reliable estimates.”\(^{36}\) When taking the overwhelming logistical difficulties the
Mongols would have had to overcome to sail an army of 140,000 to the Japanese mainland, this conclusion seems logical.

The concept of the *gokenin* fighting out of a sense of nationalism is rejected here as well. Conlan uses the language of Takezaki Suenaga’s scrolls to illustrate how the average warrior conceived of his reasons for fighting the Mongols. He argues that, “nowhere in Takezaki Suenaga’s account can one uncover evidence of a ‘national’ consciousness, whereby ‘Japan’ existed as a transcendent entity worthy of defense.”

“Rather than fighting for the defense of Japan,” says Conlan, “personal and familial goals...propelled him [Suenaga] to risk his life in battle.” He further states that “even his grim determination to behead as many enemy as possible stemmed more from his need to have proof of his ‘valor’ than to exact revenge from foreign invaders.” The words of Takezaki Suenaga himself make a compelling argument that most warriors were more concerned about their own rewards rather than national defense. Further evidence proving this point exists in the wealth of documents from the Kamakura *bakufu* that deal specifically with rewards based on verification by witnesses of warriors’ battle service.

Conlan’s most important argument is that, “the warriors of Japan were capable of fighting the Mongols to a standstill without any explicit divine or meteorological intervention.” Interestingly, Conlan believes that the invasion force was not overwhelmingly larger than the assembled samurai defenders. Also, he believes that the Japanese were not completely overwhelmed by the Mongols’ technology and battle tactics. “Both Japanese and Mongol accounts refer to the prowess of Japanese archers,” he says. Also, he claims that, “the skirmishing skills of the Mongols and the Japanese were roughly comparable.”

Accounts from the time of the invasions say that the Mongols were unable to occupy northern Kyushu and that they were forced to withdraw in the face of a fierce defense during the first invasion of 1274. The first typhoon may have been used by the Mongol commanders as a convenient excuse for their defeat, since they put more emphasis on it than did Japanese accounts. During the second invasion of 1281, the Mongols seemed to have been repulsed by the defenders entrenched behind the walls of Hakata Bay. If there was in
fact a typhoon that destroyed the Mongol fleet, Conlan states that it “merely provided the coup de grace for a defeat that had been long in the making.”

While the arguments Conlan makes are extremely provocative and raise important questions about the invasions, other historians have previously expressed some of his views over the years. He is right to question the troop estimates, the legend of the kamikaze, the sense of Japanese nationalism in the minds of the samurai, and the assumed competence of the gokenin defenders. But, it is on this last point where others have already made the same assumption as Conlan: that the Japanese defenders had more responsibility for the Mongols’ defeat than did the unexpected arrival of the typhoons. The existence of this point of view has already been pointed out in the works of Vice Admiral Ballard, from 1922, and John Hall, from 1968. Two further examples can be found in George Sansom’s 1958 work, *A History of Japan to 1334*, and in Morris Rossabi’s 1988 biography titled, *Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times*.

In Sansom’s account, the essential sequence of events concerning most of the invasions remains similar to previous accounts. However, Sansom seems to make a point of emphasizing the ferocity and strength of Japan’s samurai during this time when he states that the Japanese had “the advantage of a highly trained warrior class whose pride would make them redoubtable antagonists for even the fiercest barbarian soldiery.” He also states that the warriors’ “hereditary function was to protect the state against its enemies.” It is in Sansom’s description of the first invasion that an important distinction is to be found. He claims that in the initial battles, the Japanese withdrew behind earthworks and “were by no means defeated, since given time they could overwhelm the Mongols by superior numbers.” The weather then supposedly turned violent and the Mongols withdrew to their ships in an attempt to make it to open waters before their vessels were destroyed. According to Sansom, the storm only grew worse though and many ships were sunk, killing about half of the invading soldiers. Sansom’s depiction creates a less catastrophic image than previous accounts and, like Ballard and Hall, he gives a great deal of credit to the Japanese defenders in driving off the invading Mongols.
For the second invasion in 1281, Sansom estimates that two armies totaling about 140,000 Mongol, Korean, and North Chinese troops were to rendezvous for the invasion of Kyushu.\textsuperscript{51} When they landed, Sansom states that the Japanese defenders proved themselves more than capable of staving off the Mongols and they “were able to move from the defensive to a counterattack in which they maintained a steady pressure against the enemy.”\textsuperscript{52} He claims that, “from June 23 to August 14, a space of over seven weeks, the long line...was firmly held.”\textsuperscript{53} When the storm struck, allegedly more than half of the fleet was destroyed and a huge number of troops drowned. Sansom’s final conclusions about the success of the Japanese defenders mirror that of Conlan:

The success of the Japanese arms was beyond all expectations, and although the Court and the Bakufu were very willing to echo the clergy in thanks to the divine powers for saving the country, there can be no doubt that the direct cause of victory was the courage and discipline of a military class which had been formed and nourished by Yoritomo and his successors.\textsuperscript{54}

Sansom clearly would agree with Conlan’s argument that the samurai were more than a match for the Mongol invaders, even though Conlan would disagree with his numbers, allusions to national consciousness, and depiction of the kamikaze.

Morris Rossabi’s biography of Kubilai Khan offers an interesting perspective on the invasions, seeing as it is supposed to be from the Mongol leader’s point of view. It is interesting that his accounts of the invasions seem to show that Kubilai Khan did not appreciate that the Japanese would not be easily conquered. Rossabi says that the Khan sent about 20,000 troops to Japan during the first invasion and that this force “was neither sizable nor imposing. He surely underestimated the resistance that the Japanese were capable of offering.”\textsuperscript{55} The defenders, however, were unprepared for this first attack and they were having difficulty staving off the Mongols when the first typhoon came to their assistance.\textsuperscript{56} While he seems to think the first Japanese defense was not very formidable, he gives more credit to the defenders of the second invasion.
In the wake of the first invasion, Hojo Tokimune’s bakufu spent the next seven years preparing the defenses of Kyushu for the Mongols’ return. Rossabi details the extensive fortifications he had built as well as troop movements he ordered to the island.\textsuperscript{57} When the 140,000-strong second invasion force landed in June 1281, Rossabi says the first expeditions to southern Kyushu “failed miserably.”\textsuperscript{58} “Through August,” he says, “the Japanese soldiers were able to prevent the Mongol-led forces...from breaching the defenses afforded by the wall.”\textsuperscript{59} When the typhoon arrived, it devastated the invaders and Rossabi claims that nearly half of them perished.\textsuperscript{60} He then makes an interesting claim that the kamikaze led to “increased Japanese ethnocentric views” because, as they saw it, “the gods would never allow Japan’s enemies to conquer and occupy their territory.”\textsuperscript{61} The devastating effect on Kubilai Khan’s empire is emphasized as well, since he claims that, “the failures shattered the Mongols’ mantle of invincibility in East Asia.”\textsuperscript{62} Rossabi, like Conlan, gives credit to the Japanese warriors in defeating the Mongols despite his allusions to a national sense of favoritism by the gods that he claims the Japanese possessed.

As these arguments clearly illustrate, the history of the Mongol invasions of Japan is a problematic one. For years it has been assumed by numerous historians that as many as 90,000 invaders did battle in the first invasion while as many as 150,000 fought in the second invasion. Also, it had been assumed that there existed a concept of Japan as a nation among the gokenin and that they were fighting to defend their country. Furthermore, many had assumed that the Japanese faced certain defeat at the hands of the overpowering Mongol hordes and that only the miracle of the kamikaze saved them from total destruction. Thomas Conlan artfully refutes all of these points in his much-needed reexamination of the invasions. He would put the numbers of invaders at a few thousand, 10,000 at most, and he would claim that the invaders were fighting more out of the hope of honor and reward rather than a sense of duty to one’s nation.

However, Conlan was not the first to hypothesize that the samurai were capable of holding off the Mongols indefinitely and that they were on their way to victory when, or if, the kamikaze struck. Scholars such as Ballard, Sansom, and Rossabi had recognized the tenacity of the
entrenched Japanese defenders of Kyushu well before Conlan put pen
to page in their defense. This should not detract from Conlan’s work,
though. He has taken up the cause of reconsidering the depiction of the
invasions in the history of medieval Japan and has broadened the scope
of the debate over how they happened. This sort of reassessment is
important in the field of history, in that it keeps its scholarship from
growing stagnant and complacent with the passage of time. Hopefully,
his work will lead to further investigation and more vigorous debate
about these events in the future.
Notes

2 Ibid., vi.
3 Ibid., 148-155.
4 Ibid., 163-172
5 Ibid., 173-174.
6 Ibid., 105-106.
7 Ibid., 142.
8 Ibid., 143-147.
9 Ibid., 178.
10 Ibid., 193.
11 Ibid., 227.
12 Ibid., 212.
13 Ibid., 226.
14 Ibid., 240.
15 Ibid., 244.
17 Ibid., 27.
18 Ibid., 29.
19 Ibid., 30.
20 Ibid., 36.
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27 Ibid., 332.
28 Ibid., 334.
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32 Ibid., 259.
33 Ibid., 255.
34 Ibid.
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37 Ibid., 271.
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41 Ibid., 255.
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43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.,
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46 Ibid., 269.
48 Ibid., 440.
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51 Ibid., 448-449.
52 Ibid., 449.
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54 Ibid., 451.
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60 Ibid., 211-212.
61 Ibid., 212.
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SUBVERSIVE FILES:
RED SQUADS IN OUR OWN BACKYARD

Thomas James Caron

“Surveillance induced morality: relics of cultural retardation.”
Marc Maron

“The file collections became precious police assets…. Sheer accumulation of entries – signature on a peace petition, presence at a demonstration protesting welfare cuts, receipt of left-wing literature, a speech at a panel of police brutality, each innocuous in itself – leads the intelligence mind to the conclusion that the subject is subversive. Quantity is transformed into quality; the end result is greater than the sum of its parts.”
Frank Donner, Protectors of Privilege

At times of war it is often argued that for the sake of national security the citizenry must relinquish personal rights for the sake of the public well-being. Indeed, the debate over privacy versus security is as old as the conception of the modern state. Advocates for national security argue that surveillance is just a necessary evil. Certainly, no one raises a question or concern when information is uncovered which directly benefits him or her or foils a murderous intrigue. What happens, however, when surveillance is used for more malicious things, for political purposes, or for discrediting a legal social movement? Where is the line drawn to protect and ensure American first and fourth Amendment rights? These questions, along with many others, must be addressed when evaluating the necessity of the Red Squad and surveillance programs of the 1960s.

It is clear that the Red Squad files kept by the Michigan State Police, Detroit Police, and other governmental agencies in the state of Michigan were a direct assault on the privacy and civil rights of Michigan citizens.
These Red Squads crossed the line when unnecessarily surveilling and intruding into the privacy of public citizens’ lives. The Red Squad’s surveillance was unnecessary and was conducted on false pretenses.

This paper begins with an introduction on the Michigan State Police’s Special Investigation Unit. It then discusses: the extent of surveillance undergone by the Michigan State Police and the Detroit Police during the 1960s on “subversives”, the collaboration of varying levels of government on surveillance efforts, the effects on the student movements and the New Left, and the outcome of the court case Benkert et al vs Michigan State Police et al. In conclusion, it analyzes the necessity of such surveillance programs in American society.

**Introduction to Red Squads**

The notion of state-led surveillance does not usually bring to mind the United States. What do come to mind however, are the former East German and Soviet Russia regimes. Both had large networks of informers and a technology base in surveillance equipment. Historians consider these regimes police states because they each were a totalitarian state controlled by a political police force that secretly supervised the citizens’ activities. Unbeknownst to most, however, the United States has also had its own history of political surveillance.

With a heritage dating as far back as the Haymarket Riot in 1886, domestic surveillance became popular in larger cities, such as Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles, in the 1920s.¹ The federal government established Special Investigation Units or “Red Squads” to aid police in curbing and preventing potential actions against the United States. These programs specialized in infiltrating, harassing, and gathering intelligence on political and social groups. In the beginning, the primary function of a Red Squad was to seek out and destroy labor union organizers and anti-government sentiments. The term “red squad” originates from the police’s view of labor organizers as communist or “red”. These organized squads were to ferret out domestic communist or “red” tendencies in America. During the Great Depression such programs became more commonplace but during the calm of the 1950s they were scaled back and sat idle.² America emerged from the Second World War with a sense of relief. The fifties were characterized by
domestic stability as the weary American public recovered from the tragedies of war, hence the use of Red Squads was less necessary. However, as the era of McCarthyist politics developed and political protests against Vietnam increased in the late 1960s, the Red Squads re-focused their attention on political dissidents.

At a time when a majority of the people supported such policies due to the fear surrounding McCarthyite politics, legislation passed at both federal and local levels expanded the use of Red Squads and surveillance. Documents released confirm that the political surveillance was a countrywide program with top politicians not only aware of the illegal actions but also in support of such policies. In fact the 1968 Kerner Commission, which was established to evaluate the racial crisis in major American cities, called for cities to develop intelligence units. The U.S. Deputy Attorney General, Richard G. Kleindienst, further illustrated the sentiment of the government during this statement made in 1969:

If [Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)] or any group was organized on a national basis to subvert our society, then I think Congress should pass laws to suppress that activity. When you see an epidemic like this cropping up all over the country – the same kind of people saying the same kinds of things – you begin to get the picture that it is a national subversive activity …[SDS and other new left activist] should be rounded up and put in a detention camp.

The types of groups that Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst was referring to in his statement were liberal leaning social activists. For example, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) was a student organized activist movement advocating social change in America with regards to civil rights and an end to America’s involvement in Vietnam.

It was with the aftermath of the race riots during Johnson's administration and Watergate during Nixon's administration that led to public criticism of the Red Squads for illegal and harassing tactics. In response to this public criticism, the U.S. Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978 to limit the power of police and Federal agencies. It also
ended the official use of Red Squads as instruments of political surveillance in the United States.

The State Of Michigan’s Red Squad

It is important to stress that the beginnings of Michigan’s history of politically oriented surveillance commenced far before the turbulence of the 1960s. According to Philip D. Schertzing, a Michigan State Police Inspector and graduate of the FBI National Academy, “Michigan’s red squad was […] not merely an aberration of the Cold War Era; rather, this specialized unit was the most sophisticated and institutionalized in a succession of antiradical drives […] which had operated with relative continuity since the department’s war time inception in 1917”. During a century engrossed with extensive radical thought and two world wars, the concerns of national security were at the forefront of American public policy. The state of Michigan, as a heavily industrial based state, has been the host of political dissent for a majority of this turbulent century. In 1913, at the end of the progressive era and beginning of WWI, the state of Michigan was host to the major automobile companies and a racially diverse proletariat. Michigan, for these reasons, was a breeding ground of dissent in regards to labor and civil rights. For conservative government officials something was needed to curb any possible public dissent and maintain the decorum of American society.

Following the progressive era, a nation-wide state police movement allowed for the creation of a Michigan statewide counter-subversive entity. Inspector Schertzing explains in his 1999 doctoral dissertation that the founding purpose of the Michigan State police, from the beginning, has been counter-subversive surveillance.

Further, Michigan’s is the only American state police created explicitly to suppress foreign enemies and domestic radicals within the context of a wartime emergence, and which then survived on a permanent, peacetime basis with the now more familiar dual role of criminal investigation and highway patrol. But the original, paramilitary mission of state and national security did not, apparently, end after the Armistice.
During WWI and later the Great Depression, the American public unrest was viewed to be a threat to the nation. Internal conflict, it was feared, could weaken the dominance of the US in the international arena and, therefore, cause further power struggle in the world. It was for these reasons that a movement was created to promote state-level programs to control public conscience. Compared to other state police organizations “the Michigan State Police campaign exhibited almost unparalleled intensity and longevity”.\(^8\) In fact, “Michigan led the nation in red scare politics at the state level”.\(^9\)

However, internal state politics often threatened the continuation of the red squad as questions were raised on the purpose of the MSP. As the roles of America’s police force expanded during the years of prohibition, transit expansion and mass immigration, the focus of the MSP operations were commonly a point of discussion. During the Depression-era, it was Commissioner Olander who oversaw the expansion of the MSP’s responsibilities. Olander feared that the federal and state governments were not doing enough to curtail the communist efforts at the time. It was by his discretion that beginning in 1933, “state police detectives conducted covert political espionage and compiled political intelligence files for the ostensible purpose of exposing and mitigating the Red Menace”.\(^10\) In 1933, the three-hundred member Michigan Protective League, a department within the MSP directed by Lt. Harold Mulbar, was created to conduct, investigate and collect files on Michigan radicals.\(^11\) It is because of Olander that the Michigan State Police remained firmly rooted within the practices of political subversion until the 1960s.

Following further labor unrest and another world war, efforts were taken more seriously to enforce the Truman doctrine of containment within America. President Truman advocated the extension of military and economic aid to foreign countries threatened by Soviet and communist influence. This principle was also extended domestically to prevent against an internal communist struggle. The state of Michigan, again proving to be a hotbed of political unrest and activity, was crucial in the implementation of domestic American fulfillment of this principle. First in 1941, Michigan’s legislature passed Acts 93 and 115 in a series of acts confirming and legitimizing the anti-subversive squad.\(^12\) Renamed as the “special investigation squad (SIS)”, Mulbar’s unit expanded to twenty-five
detectives. And again, in 1950 Michigan’s conservative-majority legislature ruled unanimously on three acts expanding the practices of the SIS. On September 24, 1950, Governor G. Mennen Williams signed into law Public Acts 38 through 40 expanding the subversive activities of the state police and creating the red squad files that would carry the MSP into the 1960s. The creation of Michigan’s “little FBI” was hailed by the public and supported by popular press. It is this red squad that would operate and conduct surveillance on the New Left throughout the state during the civil right and anti-war movements of the 1960s.

**Extent of the Surveillance**

In an era of massive social upheaval, the government was in a frenzy to protect itself from foreign and domestic assaults. For law enforcement agencies during the 1960s the collection of information was an essential aspect of everyday work. Frank Donner discusses in his book titled *Protectors of Privilege*, “Intelligence theory and practice virtually mandate the storage of accumulated data in files, dossiers, and indices”. These files “became a highly important resources in the development of support for antiradical operations and an effective weapon in discrediting critics”. The mere existence of files, therefore, is not unheard of, however the extent to which the Michigan State Police and other law enforcement agencies conducted surveillance is nothing short of alarming.

To fully comprehend the extent of the political surveillance undertaken in the State of Michigan, it is important to look at numbers and the range of the surveillance targets. The data collection process frequently began with an individual’s mere attendance at a rally, meeting, forum or demonstration. Once recognized to be in attendance the MSP surveilled that individual depending on his/her potential for political dissonance. The Michigan State Police Red Squad collected information on 38,000 individuals and 400 organizations between 1950 and 1974. This number is a rough estimate, albeit the most reliable, released by the MSP in the mid seventies following a court decision to release the documents. A compiled list of East Lansing groups under MSP Red Squad surveillance during the 1960s shows over ninety organizations. The Red Squad investigators infiltrated bars and other popular places of student interaction as suggested by the list where a
bookstore, “Tom Sawyer Book Raft”, is cited. Groups ranging from communes and small student factions focusing on anti-war, civil rights, and draft resistance efforts, to more well known organizations such as the KKK, Black militants, SDS, and the NAACP were all surveilled.

The Detroit Police Department was also active in surveilling political dissent within the State of Michigan. The Detroit Police Red Squad files contain the names of 1.4 million individuals and 1,450 organizations. The “Detroit files exceed those uncovered to date in such cities as New York and Chicago. They also far outstrip the political surveillance records of the Michigan State Police Red Squad, which collected information on 38,000 individuals and 400 organizations between 1950 and 1974”. The Detroit Red Squad targets ranged from antiwar and student groups to consumer, environmental, feminist, and gay groups. Their targets also included organizations such as the American Friends Service Committee, the ACLU, and Concerned Parents for Peace.

The Red Squad files contain a plethora of information on the individuals and organizations surveilled. The aforementioned organizations and individual files often contained information on third-party interviews, newspaper clippings, documents and literature supplied from informers, criminal history (if any), a variety of other public records, and if available a subject’s photograph. When reviewing files donated to the MSU Special collections, information regarding the subject’s address, spouse, “localities frequented”, friends, personal characteristics, and traits were recorded. It was often practice for Red Squad investigators to collect information on individuals by copying down license plate information and then trailing the subject for further surveillance. A log was kept on the whereabouts of one SDS member for several months by logging the whereabouts of his vehicle. Further documentation revealed a subject’s positions of leadership within an organization, speeches publications, out-of-town trips. Additionally evidence shows that the MSP Red Squad managed to compel the First National Bank of East Lansing to provide information on SDS’s checking account transactions.

The goal was to collect information, and in some circumstances regardless of its validity. “Many of those who have seen their files report the records contain false or misleading information”. For example, in one
account police trailed the wrong person. The Michigan State police tracked Sol Cohen, the father of Jeff Cohen, after the family car was spotted at an SDS meeting. Jeff was a teenager at the time and had borrowed the family car to attend the meeting, but the police incorrectly identified the driver and assumed it was driven by whom the car was registered to. Upon reviewing his Red Squad file, Jeff found a record of his father’s road trips and other personal information filed under the wrong identity.

Cooperation of surveillance

As suggested by the numbers, the extent to which political surveillance permeated society was enormous. To coordinate such a mass operation of government led surveillance and illegal activity, many organs of the federal and state governments had to cooperate in these activities. The CIA, FBI, MSP, Detroit Police Department, MSU’s Department of Public Safety, and East Lansing Police all were active in surveilling activism in the state of Michigan.

Since the range of targets was extensive and broad, it was necessary for the Michigan State Police’s Red Squad to work with local agencies in its surveillance efforts. In a symbiotic relationship, the MSP Red Squad fed and was fueled by the city Red Squads. The expansion of surveillance duties to the city Red Squads allowed for city Red Squads to become an operational resource of federal agencies such as the FBI and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Donner suggests that the Secret Service and Army intelligence were also active in data dissemination and exchange with state and local police. As information on the contents of the files gradually began to emerge, press reports speculated that Red Squad data had been disseminated via LEIN to the secretive, nationwide Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU) in which the Michigan State police participated. This Law Enforcement Intelligence Network (LEIN) compiled information on individuals such as license plates, names, and addresses from across the country. Donner argues that the city and state cooperation was even beyond mere file sharing. The city and the state Red Squads not only shared investigative information and files, but also conducted joint operations, and consulted in such matters as target selection.

As the federal umbrella agency for domestic surveillance, it is no shock
that the FBI was active in surveillance operations in Michigan. The FBI’s COINTELPRO programs aimed at the New Left, Civil Rights organizers, and the American Indian Movement often held operations within the states borders especially in Detroit and Wayne State University. For example, the FBI successfully prevented a coalition between the Panthers and SDS in Detroit. The FBI worked closely with local and state law enforcement agencies in curbing the dissent. By sharing information collected by the local agencies the FBI was able to better concentrate resources.

Although strictly beyond the parameters of their jurisdiction, the Central Intelligence Agency was also involved with domestic surveillance. The CIA provided local police departments with training. It was the CIA who trained and educated local law enforcement officials in the arts of surveillance. Training and instruction, however, were not the only CIA contributions to the police intelligence sector. The CIA provided an extraordinary assortment of material, equipment, and gadgetry, including explosives, recorders, receivers, transmitters, explosive-detection kits, safes for storage of sensitive material, photographic equipment, lighting equipment, microphones, radio-equipped cars, forged identification cards, and polygraphs.

The surveillance conducted on the Michigan campuses occurred quite regularly and incorporated various levels of law enforcement. These massive attempts to surveil the student activism on the MSU campus are alarming. East Lansing police chief Charles Pegg, in cooperation with the MSU Department of Public Safety (DPS), established a political surveillance unit, which compiled files on hundreds of faculty and student activists. These files, made possible in part by infiltrating various groups, were shared with the Michigan State police Red Squad and the FBI. During the 1968 SDS Conference held at MSU, for example, three hundred undercover police agents and FBI agents, with crew cuts and suits, were on hand to watch and surveil the proceedings. The university also employed State News reporters as informants who provided photographs and phone tips on student groups to DPS. Furthermore, the campus and East Lansing Police often worked side by side in collecting even further information on students under the auspices of drug violations. Once students were arrested for drug possession, it was a common practice for the police to offer deals. In exchange for information, infiltration and reports on SDS and UCM meetings, the police would drop the
drug charges against students.\

**Effects of Surveillance on the New Left**

When examining the effects of the surveillance on the New Left and the student activism during the 1960s, one must examine all angles. The dissemination of files caused various emotions of “bewilderment, anger and laughter – and a sort of pride.” For some, the surveillance acted as a deterrent from political activity, while for others it acted as a motivation to continue their efforts, and still others just viewed the presence of undercover agents apathetically. To evaluate the necessity of such programs, one must examine what directly resulted from the surveillance.

What happens when the surveillance apparatus, while seeking to expose threats, indirectly promotes them? This paper argues the existence of “Red Squads” across America during the 1950s to mid-1970s promoted political dissent it was targeting. It is likely that people would have quit their endeavors if they felt they were not making a difference or turning any heads. Activists are motivated by their passions and strive for validation of their perspective. Hence, once activists become aware that their efforts are actively being watched, and thus legitimizing, their motivations are not abated but intensified. It seems likely this is what occurred during the 1960s when students became aware that the Michigan State Police and other governmental organizations were tailing them.

In an interview, a former SDS member from Wayne State University in Detroit, Diane Cookinham of Dearborn, Michigan highlighted this reality. “We were determined, [the surveillance] gives you a cause”. During her nine years at Wayne State and Monteith College, Cookinham was both politically active and aware. “The campus was not like it is now” explained Cookinham, “it was a gritty, dirty campus […] it lent itself to the kind of activism you are talking about. People coming from near poverty.” She continued to discuss in detail the realities of going to school during this period. It seemed in her opinion that most students, even those not particularly involved in the activism or vocal part of the movement, supported and believed in the civil rights and anti-war causes:

When we were fighting so hard, I was thinking we are really
These students were sincere in their beliefs and refused to succumb to “the Establishment” and its scare tactics. Aware of the consequences of their actions, the students continued to actively protest and stand for what they believed in. It was clear to the students that they were being heard and their ideas were being silenced because of their legitimate quarrels against the status quo of American policies.

In contrast, some students were turned away from protesting in fear of the consequences of being surveilled. Prior to an interview with a MSU alumnus who wishes to remain anonymous, when first approached with the topic of this paper, her reaction to the phrase “Red Squad files” was nothing short of alarming. Her skin turned pale and her demeanor changed when approached in an inquisitive tone about the files. This highlights her apprehension and the negative connotation some still hold to this day in reference to the MSP Red Squad. At the start of the scheduled interview, the MSU alumnus first expressed concern over whether or not the public had the ability to obtain a list of names surveilled during the time period or worse yet the actual files of individuals. Upon assuring her that that information was restricted and thought to have been destroyed since 1995, she was more willing to discuss the topic. During the interview she acknowledged her awareness of the undercover police and that she probably had a file kept about her. “We were aware that we were being watched,” confirmed the MSU alumnus, “it wasn’t hard considering we all had long hair and some of the officers had short hair at the rallies, they stuck out. And frankly it scared the hell out of me”. She continued to say that many of her friends continued to actively protest but a few of them went along with her and took a more passive role in the demonstrations. Her reaction to the existence of a Red Squad was extreme albeit expected. For the purpose of the Red Squads was to do just that, to prevent further dissent against the United States.

Diane Cookinham did attest to the fact that there was some genuine concern about surveillance, “a sense of paranoia”. “Being followed at night
in the dark, and myself being a female in a large city, was not the most comforting sensation”. Cookinham then shared a story of being followed by a uniformed officer one late night back to her dorm. Upon confronting the officer, he assured her that he was just trying to make sure that she arrived home safely. “It was odd though.” She often wondered why the officer, if truly just escorting her, didn’t approach her and let her aware of the fact that he was just doing so. To this day Cookinham remembered other stories of being shushed by friends when discussing politics in bars or public places. One vivid example was when she was with a group of friends in a bar called the “Traffic Jam” in Detroit following a show at the Masonic Temple. Cookinham stated, “At that point in time everything was about Castro and Che Guevara. Everyone has real strong feelings about it and I remember saying something about Guevara real loud. And one of the people at the table said ‘hey you have to be quiet, you gotta keep it down.’ “It never dawned on me until now that he must have known that someone was their listening.”

Still for some students their devotion to the anti-war and civil rights movements could not and would not have been deterred regardless of the existence of surveillance. This category of apathetic students, apathetic in regards to possible deterrence away from activism not towards their political beliefs, felt to the deepest of their beings that these causes were just. “Hypothetically speaking, whether or not we were being followed” as Diane Cookinham elaborated, “we would have continued our efforts against the war”. This notion is important to recognize because of the dire realities of the late parts of the war. With high casualty counts and further polarization of American society toward the end of the sixties and early seventies, regardless of the Red Squads there was bound to be American dissent against the war. And indeed the civil unrest at home would have pushed for a resolution to American racism regardless of whether student campuses were infiltrated by Michigan State or Detroit Police.

There is little to no evidence that can be found regarding any plots that were foiled as a consequence of the surveillance. No assassination attempts were uncovered, no anarchic plans were unearthed – perhaps simply because none were planned – instead the only information found by surveillance was when, where, and who would take place in the next protest, demonstration, or meeting. This information hardly warranted such extensive surveillance.
operations. The consequences of the surveillance were that thousands of innocent American citizens and legal demonstrators were stripped of their first and fourth amendment rights.

There were other consequences, however, of the surveillance. Some people lost their jobs or were blacklisted from employment due to tips by the MSP and the SIU. MSU president John A. Hannah, who was obsessed with weeding out and exposing any Communist sympathetic faculty, personally blocked the promotion of American folklore instructor Gene Bluestone after being tipped by a Minnesota state police Red Squad. In another case, a Macomb County Community College professor Jim Jacobs was fired after partaking in a strike while other faculty was docked pay upon participation. He was later reinstated after a board could find no just cause for his dismissal. When he viewed his Red Squad file he found files that showed that Macomb college officials had received details about his involvement with SDS while at UofM. Furthermore, it was common practice for information to be shared between businesses and the Red Squads. Although officials insisted that records were kept confidential, several retired MSP and Detroit officers have confirmed that it was common practice to share the files with private companies. “The director of the MSP, George Halverson admitted that the Red Squad routinely gave information on employees and job applicants to Panax Corp., the Michigan-based newspaper conglomerate”. Similarly, files regarding the labor movements and unrest were shared between the major automobile companies. Chrysler, Detroit police, and the FBI collaborated in information sharing. As discussed by Donner:

Chrysler provided the Detroit unit and the FBI with information from its voluminous files concerning the political activities of workers and allowed the Detroit Red Squad to place informers and undercover agents inside various plants. In return, the police provided Chrysler with membership lists of allegedly subversive organizations and in some cases recommended the firing of activist employees.

It is uncertain how many have been denied jobs or promotions, but some who have seen their MSP Red Squad files have sued and been reimbursed. Ray
Will, a worker for the Secretary of State’s office, was denied a promotion because his file contained information on his brothers’ anti-war activities. He was awarded $100 in back pay.⁵⁸

**Where are the files now?**

**Walter Benkert v. Michigan State Police et al.**

In July 1974 a grass-roots consumer group, the Michigan Association for Consumer Protection (MACP), led by a Detroit plumber, Walter Benkert, filed a suit against the MSP for their illegal surveillance tactics. This MACP aimed to picket and demand better quality merchandise and customer respect.⁵⁹ The Benkert’s case became a class action law suit within a year as the defendant list grew to include the Detroit Police Commission, Detroit police chief, and the Detroit mayor, and the plaintiffs’ list expanded to include fourteen plaintiffs.⁶⁰ The broad scope of the defendant list highlights the extent of the Detroit and MSP surveillance operations, the plaintiffs included: an attorney with activist clients, a consumer protection advocate, a labor leader, a professor, a radical political activist, a nonprofit alternative newspaper, an attorney for pro-Arab groups, and later even prominent UAW officials.⁶¹ This lawsuit would spawn a large public debate and the release of the Michigan Red Squad files.

The landmark case, *Walter Benkert et al. vs. Michigan State Police et al. (1976)*, exposed the true atrocities and illegal activities undergone by the police by making the files public. With the ruling in favor of Walter Benkert in his case against the Michigan state police the judgment delivered a strict guideline for the proper release of the files. First, a list of all individuals named throughout the files was to be created. Any name with information regarding name, job, drivers license, and the last known address was to be cataloged and a mailing was to be sent to the individual. The mailing was to notify the individual that a file was indeed kept by the MSP and the procedure to retrieve a copy of the file prior to its destruction. Similarly, a list of all organizations mentioned in the red squad files was to be compiled and notices sent to remaining institutions. Furthermore, notices were to be published in the Sunday, weekly, or daily editions of major newspapers throughout the state for the purpose of alerting more individuals. See Appendix B for a sample of the type of announcement that was released to
the public. This specific document was located at the end of a Detroit News article found in a supplement of the Sunday paper on December 6, 1981. As shown by the microfilm, this information was inserted between common weekly advertisements and coupons, and it is uncertain how many people actually saw this information.

Questions have been raised as to whether the attempt was taken light-heartedly on behalf of the MSP and Detroit Police to alert the “subversives”. As discussed in Schertzing’s dissertation, “only 7000 requests reached the state police. More than 17,000 notices had been returned by the U.S. Post Office as undeliverable”. Due to the enormity of the surveillance operations, the release of documents “would require five full-time staff persons 8,000 hours to copy and mail 175,000 pages at a cost of more that $325,000”. Because of the strain on resources many feel the efforts of the MSP and Detroit Police were minimal and that for the sake of time and their own deteriorating reputation destroyed some contents of the files. Upon conducting interviews for this paper it became apparent that some people were unaware that files could be obtained. People had known that the files were released but were unaware of the process necessary to obtain their personal files. Diane Cookingham stated, “I am absolutely certain that I had a file, as confirmed by my FBI friend” but she was never contacted by officials to which she responded, “it was naive of me to assume they would put forth an effort to find me, that is if they didn’t destroy the file first”.

Following the release of the documents under the ruling of *Benkert vs. the Michigan State Police* as earlier discussed, some of the individuals who retrieved their files donated them to be preserved at local and university libraries across the state. Michigan State University’s Special Collection houses approximately ten files. The University of Michigan’s Bentley Historical Library houses seven files and the Walter E. Reuther Library of Wayne State houses another four files of interest. Other remaining unclaimed files were transferred to the custody of the State Archives and sealed for fifty years. This claim is substantiated in an email dialogue with a Ms. Shanon Akans, from the department of public relations of the MSP, “the Michigan State Police has not maintained any of these files since approximately 1995. Any files that remain would be housed at the State Archives”. As of this date, I have received no confirmation from the State
Archives directly as to the whereabouts of the files, although I have tried several times to retrieve information.

As for the Detroit Police Red Squad, over 550,000 files are being preserved under lock and key in the Burton Historical Collection in the City of Detroit’s Main Public Library. As shown in an informational packet given to interested patrons, “the Wayne County Circuit Court agreed to order their preservation.” Therefore, the Wayne County Circuit Court “ordered the physical control and possession of the City of Detroit’s Red Squad files be transferred to the Burton Historical Collection”.69 (see Appendix A). It is noted within this publication that the files being held in Burton Historical are untouched originals “limited to the staff of Burton.” Once released the files will be scanned by a library official to ensure that “all third party references” are deleted.70 Cookingham plans to actively pursue this opportunity in hope of finding her file. It is this author’s hope that more will do so. For research purposes the files will remain under lock and key until after sixty years has passed from the date of the files’ creation. “Beginning in 2017, only that part of the collection which is 60 years old will be open to the public.”71 Therefore, it is not until 2030 that the files dated up to 1970 will be released to the public.

Epilogue

The Red Squad files kept by the Michigan State Police, Detroit Police, and other governmental agencies in the state of Michigan were a direct assault on privacy and civil rights of Michigan citizens. These Red Squads crossed the line when surveilling and intruding into the privacy of citizens’ lives. The Red Squad’s surveillance was unnecessary and done on false pretenses in the name of national security. Taking into consideration the colossal size of the surveillance and the manpower and effort necessary to maintain the files, the political surveillance operations in the State of Michigan were unwarranted, unrevealing, and undemocratic.

In light of the research, it is this author’s deepest hope to have shed some light on the extent and degree of surveillance in the 1960s. It is important to remember and consider the political ramifications of our history. The cliché “history repeats itself” should be examined in this context. A sense of historical amnesia seems to quickly replace eras of activism and
progressivism. It appears people become apathetic towards politics until a serious threat upon civil liberties is perceived. Americans seem to fight for their beliefs then lay idle following the long battle only to watch their freedoms be encroached upon again. A battle may be won but the war rages on. Just recently in the news there has been a searing political scandals regarding the White House and a president’s executive decision to illegally wiretap incoming international calls and the abuse of the powers granted to the FBI under the Patriot Act. The Iraq War has re-introduced anti-war sentiments into the political discourse and recent legislation against same-sex marriage, abortion, and affirmative action has awakened Americans’ political consciousness. Racism still remains in American society, despite the efforts of activists in the 1960s, and has been highlighted by the poor government response to Hurricane Katrina.

As these issues and more enter the political debate once again, there have been recent attempts to begin a “New Civil Rights Movement.” SDS, and similar student focused groups like By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), have been actively recruiting and expanding all over the country. It may be time for the next progressive era of American history. If we are about to witness the next wave of student and public activism, America must be aware of what the history books teach. Americans are not safe from the threat of surveillance or future infringements of civil liberties. In an article dated August 3, 2004, under the heading “immediate release”, the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan announced the filing of a lawsuit on behalf of its members and three individuals. The plaintiffs included former Michigan Governor William Milliken and a Catholic nun, urging the court to stop the MSP from participating in “MATRIX, the Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange surveillance program”, until they are willing to comply with state law. MATRIX, similar to its predecessor LEIN, allows the MSP to share driver’s license, motor vehicle registration and arrest records with eight other states participating in the program. The ACLU argues that MSP involvement in MATRIX is a violation of the 1980 Law Enforcement Intelligence Organizations Act, enacted after the Benkert case alerted the public of Michigan’s Red Squads. This law, signed by Governor Milliken, aimed at preventing “unsupervised and uncontrolled access to information about individuals”. The ACLU is concerned that Michigan
residents are vulnerable to inaccurate data collection under MATRIX, much like they were during the days of the ‘Red Squad files’, and that the risks are even greater as a result of 21st century technology.”.75

According to the MATRIX website viewed on May 3, 2006, “The MATRIX Pilot Project has been completed” and the MATRIX Web site has been discontinued.76

Appendices Index

Appendix A

"MS/Detroit. Police - Red Squad Collection." Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library, Detroit, MI.

This informational packet was given upon inquiry about the Detroit Police Red Squads files to individuals at the Detroit Public Library. It explains in detail the procedure of which the library staff will complete personal requests and compile ones file, if it exists, for a small charge. I was able to supply this information to a few interviewed individuals in hope they would follow up by obtaining their files.

Appendix B


At the end of a Detroit News article was this notice to apply for your file. This publication was released in late 1981 as an effort to inform individuals of the possibility of political surveillance conducted on themselves during the 1960's. This publication is an example of the information that was released to the public following the ruling of Benkert et al. vs. Michigan State Police et al.. Publications and notifications like this were sent to all major monthly, weekly, and daily newspapers across the state of Michigan as ordered in the ruling.
Appendix A

MS/DETROIT. POLICE - RED SQUAD COLLECTION

Guide:

As early as the 1930's the Detroit Police Department began gathering information on various political, social and cultural activities of citizens and visitors to Detroit. This secret political surveillance program was organized under a specially created police unit known as the "Red Squad." It violated the constitutional right of citizens to privacy, invaded their freedom of assembly, speech, and religion and, was ruled illegal by the courts.

Although the City of Detroit had requested the destruction of the files, the Wayne county circuit Court agreed to order their preservation. The Court ordered the physical control and possession of the City of Detroit's Red Squad Files be transferred to the Burton Historical Collection. The Burton Collection received over 550,000 files, containing police statements, photos and newspaper clippings. The oldest surviving file is dated 1945, but the vast majority are from 1950 to 1974.

RESTRICTIONS

In view of the "substantial privacy concerns that exist with respect to the files," the Court ordered the following restrictions:

A. Except for your own personal file, the entire collection is closed until the year 2017. Beginning in 2017, only that part of the collection which is 60 years old will be open to the public.
Examples: Starting in the year 2017, Burton may make available to any person, a copy of any part of the collection created from 1945 through 1957. In the year 2020, Burton may grant access to any information created from 1945 through 1960).

B. Access to the original files is limited to the staff of Burton. Researchers will not be allowed to handle the original files. They will be provided photocopies after filing an application.

C. Burton will make available to any person named in the Files a photocopy of their own file on the following terms and conditions.

1. Burton will delete all third party references when it appears in conjunction with information of a highly personal nature about that person, and the names of police officers, undercover agents, government employees, informers, and their badge numbers or other identifying file numbers.

2. The Person making the request must
   a) provide satisfactory proof of their identity.
   b) acknowledge in writing that they will not release any information their file might contain about any other person, without the prior written consent of that other person.
   c) acknowledge in writing that the information contained in the files is not necessarily accurate, has not been verified and, in some cases, is known to be inaccurate.
   d) acknowledge in writing that they have read the Wayne County Circuit Court Order for the Archival Preservation of the Former City of Detroit Red Squad Files.

E. Prior to the year 2017, any person who has a file in their own name
within the files may fill out the appropriate Burton form and request their file not be released. Upon receipt of such a request, Burton shall not release that person's file to anyone until the year 2050.

CHARGES

The search fee will be charged in advance, payable to the - _________________.

No other fees will be levied if a personal file is not found. If a personal file is found, fees will be charged to cover the cost of processing and photocopying the file. Photocopies of files will only be mailed out, Certified, Return Receipt Mail. Otherwise, they will only be released to the original applicant after the requested proof of identification is again provided.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
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<tr>
<td>Search Fee</td>
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<td>Processing Fee</td>
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<td>Photocopy Fee</td>
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<td>Certified, Return Receipt Mail</td>
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HOW TO APPLY FOR YOUR FILE

To request your own personal file a completed notarized application must be submitted in person. Upon application two proofs of identification, one of which shows your picture, must also be offered for examination (suggested items of identification are listed below). The Burton Collection will begin the process of retrieving all relevant information contained in your files after receiving your "Application for Personal File" and payment of the search fee. Although it is quite possible the files contain no information about you, the search fee will remain non-refundable.
All requests are completely confidential. The Burton Historical Collection and the Detroit Public Library are not responsible for the contents of the "Red Squad" files.

**HOW TO OBTAIN A COPY OF YOUR FILE**

You will be informed by post card of the status of your search request. The post card will indicate either: "No File found", or "File found and photocopied, please pay $______, to the ________________.

Upon such notification, you may pick up this information by presenting your postcard in person, and with at least two items of identification, one of which must show your picture, and paying the processing and photocopy charges. Suggested items of identification are listed below.

If you cannot personally pickup your completed order, you may request that your material will be mailed by certified, return receipt. In that case, after a notarized application, two proofs of identification (one of which shows your picture), and advance payment of all fees, the completed order will be mailed to your home address.

An applicants access to photocopies of their files must not violate the "Wayne County Circuit Court Order for the Archival Preservation of the Former City of Detroit Red Squad Files," dated 19 November 1992.

**USE ANY TWO OF THESE ITEMS OF IDENTIFICATION:**

- Driver's License or State ID
- School ID with a photo
- Native American Tribal documents
- Driver's License issued by a Canadian
- Government authority
- Original Social Security Card
- Birth Certificate with official seal of issuing authority
- Certification of birth by State Department. Certification of birth abroad by State Department. Native American Tribal document
- Unexpired INS employment authorization
- Unexpired Reentry Permit (INS form 1-327)
- Unexpired Refugee Travel Document (INS Form 1-571)
- U.S. Citizen Identification Card (INS Form 1-197)
- Identification Card for use of Resident Citizen in the U.S. (INS Form 1-179)
- Passport issued by a government authority
- Draft Card
- U.S. Military Card
- U.S. Military Dependent's ID Card

MS/DETROIT. POLICE - RED SQUAD COLLECTION

APPLICATION FOR PERSONAL FILE

I am requesting a copy of all records found under my name.

Name       Last _____________________________________________
First ______________________________________________________
Middle ___________________________________________________
Current Address _____________________________________________

(Not a post office box)

City____________________________ State____________________
Zip_______________
Phone (Home) ____________________________ (Work)

Date of Birth___________________________________________
Social Security Number_____-_______-_________
Driver's License (State & No.)________________________________
Other Names (Aliases, Maiden, etc.)
Organizations you belonged to (optional)

Events you Attended (optional)

Affidavit:
I acknowledge that I will not release any information that my file might contain about any other person, without the prior written consent of that other person. I acknowledge that the information contained in these files is not necessarily accurate, has not been verified and, in some cases, is known to be inaccurate. I acknowledge that I have read the Wayne County Circuit Court Order for the Archival Preservation of the Former City of Detroit Red Squad Files.

________________________________
Signature Date

Your application will be processed as soon as possible.

NOTARIZATION

Before me, the Notary Public named below and whose 'signature appears below, appeared the person named, identified to me as that person and signed the above affidavit in my presence.
Date ________________________________
Signature
Notary Public in and for the

________________________________
County of State of

__________________
State of

___________________________
My Commission expires

___________________________

Seal or Stamp

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - FOR OFFICE USE ONLY
Satisfactory proof of identification provided Date Application Received
Date Application Mailed/Picked Up
Amount Prepaid: $ Amount Outstanding: $
How to obtain a copy of your
State Police Red Squad file

The Michigan State Police may have a Red Squad file on you, but you may not know it because you were never notified. Although the deadline for requesting your file is past, you may still obtain it if you enclose a letter of explanation stating why your request is late. (Any reasonable explanation such as "I just learned about the Red Squad case" or "I just heard I could still request my file") will be accepted.) Mail the form below along with your written request and a self-addressed, stamped envelope to: Commanding Officer, Investigative Support Section, Department of State Police, 714 South Harrison Rd., East Lansing, MI 48823

Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller, two former FBI officials convicted of approving illegal break-ins.

The White House and some members of Congress are also pushing for changes in the Freedom of Information Act that would exempt the CIA, NSA and Defense Intelligence Agency from having to disclose their records. Public access to the files of other law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI, would be sig-

I am confident we will see a resurrection of this sort of activity.

David Sobel, a lawyer for the Washington-based Campaign for Political Rights, says he fears that increased political surveillance by federal agencies will "filter down" as it has in the past and "get the local levels back into the spy business.

CLAUDIA CAPOS

The court has issued an order restricting the release of third-party names as follows:

"Information regarding any individual other than the individual to whom the file is released may not be released by the individual to whom the file is released without the written consent of the other individual.

I have read and am aware of the court's restrictions on the release of third-party names quoted above and I agree to be bound by these provisions.

_i wish to obtain my Red Squad file from the Michigan State Police office at:__

Bay City
Northville
Detroit
Paw Paw
East Lansing
Grand Rapids
Jackson
Traverse City
Negaunee
Other

The table one time," although he can't lay the specific details of the conversation when it occurred.

The former Detroit police commissioner said they had no knowledge of the Red

abuses.

"Detroit Police never had a Red Squad," said Johannes Spreen, who served as com-

missioner from 1965 to 1970 and is now Oak-

munity sheriff. "We did not involve our-

self in any political surveillance." Spreen

said that the police compiled a Red

file. "I was not aware of it," he says. "If

not, I would have done something about.

F. Nichols, who succeeded Spreen as

commissioner and held the job for three

years, disputes the court finding that Detroit

were acting unlawfully. "I have not seen

even one Court decision saying anything ille-

gal," says Nichols, who is now Farm-

Hills police chief. "Until I know what

government did and until I've had a chance

to see the file, I wouldn't be stupid e-

to say anything."

Coulter says the Red Squad never

did do a secret police: "Every executive

officer knew about it. So did mayors and

men. There was never any secretive ef-

col that the Supreme Court, in 1997, held that the

Red Squad's activities were illegal."

The court's decision has caused a stir in the state. Some — including Gov. William

and Mayor Young — fear a rash of laws have been enacted that the spy files be

replaced. Mayor Dick Sobel has a better idea. "We place the Red Squad files in archives

they will be available to scholars and his.

Part of the purpose of the Benkert is to show people that the government always act in their interest. This is real government run amok."
Notes

2 Ibid. 47.
6 Ibid. 6.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid. 4.
9 Ibid. 299.
10 Ibid. 251.
11 Ibid. 281.
12 Ibid. 284.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid. 307.
15 Ibid. 308.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid. 296.
20 "MS/Detroit. Police – Red Squad Collection.” Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library, Detroit, MI.
23 Ibid. 295.
24 Kenneth J. Heineman. “Kenneth Heineman archive of interviews and correspondence relating to the History of the Anti-Vietnam War Movement at Michigan State University.” Ms. Large mss 225. MSU Special Collection of Manuscripts & Archives. MSU, East Lansing, MI.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
32 Ibid. 296.
39 Ibid. 188.
40 Ibid. 83.
41 Ibid. 186.
43 Diane Cookinham. Personal interview. 8 April 2006.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Anonymous. Personal interview. 21 April 2006.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Diane Cookinham. Personal interview. 8 April 2006.
50 Diane Cookinham. Personal interview. 8 April 2006.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
59 Ibid. 19.
61 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Diane Cookinham, Personal interview. 8 April 2006.
67 Ibid. 368.
68 Shanon Akans. E-mail interview. 21 April 2006.
69 "MS/Detroit. Police – Red Squad Collection." Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library, Detroit, MI.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
In *France in Crisis*, Timothy Smith provides an important critical analysis of the failure of the French social welfare state. He defines his vision of true solidarity and describes what France could do to remedy its problems and reach this ideal. While certain flaws exist in his analysis (primarily his occasional use of misleading rhetoric), Smith nonetheless provides the reader with an eye-opening analysis of today’s French welfare state.

“Most French people believe, as an article of faith, that an increase in ‘social’ spending translates into an increase in solidarity and a decrease in inequality” (p. 2). France has consistently increased “social” spending in recent decades, yet unemployment has also dramatically risen and continues to do so. The problem lies in the fact that this “social” spending is not redistributed; a select body of workers (primarily white men working in the public sector) gain more and more benefits (including higher wages, shorter working hours, longer vacations, and higher pensions) while others (youth, immigrants, and women) are excluded. Often, these public-sector workers actively employ their right to protest, marching in the name of solidarity, as an expression of their dissatisfaction when a policy is proposed which jeopardizes the benefits they receive.

But to what exactly does solidarity refer and where does a French passion for this concept originate? According to Smith, solidarity is an ideology that emerged from and gained symbolic strength during the French revolution, alongside the broad concept of egalitarianism. Smith notes that “the original definition of ‘solidarity’ stressed the obligations of the comfortable and the privileged to their less fortunate compatriots- not the rights of the comfortable themselves” (p. 8). Smith further posits that unlike its original meaning, the word solidarity today
is used to advocate a policy of protection of those excessive benefits which the privileged receive, even if this comes only at the price of excluding others (p. 10). The meaning of the term solidarity has evolved, and Smith believes that the current misunderstanding of this word is one of the barriers to establishing solidarity in its original and truest sense.

What sorts of provisions are necessary for true solidarity to exist in society? First and foremost, Smith asserts that solidarity necessarily implies a policy of egalitarian redistribution. While French citizens today often equate an increase in social spending with a direct increase in solidarity, Smith argues that this can only be accomplished if social spending is redistributed properly. In this way, redistribution is crucial for transforming the French social welfare state. Such a universalistic approach, in which all citizens receive benefits from the government, is discussed by Smith: “The universalist welfare state, providing benefits to all, can be retained: it might also be reoriented in the name of solidarity, by introducing sliding-scale universalism, whereby everyone receives something, but the poor receive more than the rich and the middle class” (p. 18). Smith believes that redistribution will allow France to achieve true solidarity, yet contrary to this, “discussion of significant ‘social’ spending cuts (or reshuffling) is taboo, and is equated with a wholesale assault on the philosophical underpinnings of the welfare state, of ‘solidarity’- even of ‘civilization’” (p. 61). In this way, misleading rhetoric is preventing redistribution, which is necessary, Smith asserts, to achieving solidarity. In addition to redistribution and a proper understanding of the term, solidarity requires a forgoing of only some of the most excessive comforts received by the privileged for the common good. Lastly, a certain public trust is needed for the formation of a solidaristic state. Short-sighted citizens might be unable to recognize that certain present policy decisions, which seemingly restrict workers’ benefits and thereby limit solidarity (according to the current distorted understanding of this word), in fact enable true solidarity to emerge in the future via egalitarian redistribution.

Smith recognizes that the French have been unable to achieve solidarity for a variety of reasons which will subsequently be discussed. Yet these myriad problems all stem from one of two primary sources:
misleading rhetoric (in reference to “globalization” and “solidarity”), and poor policy decisions (including the pensions, the amount of public sector work, and the tax system). The result of these factors has been the establishment of an exclusionary system which, because of its inegalitarian nature, inherently opposes true solidarity.

In Smith’s view, the pension system is the greatest contributor to France’s current inegalitarianism; “Pensions constitute, by far, the largest government expense” (p. 149). The origin of extremely high spending on pensions today comes from the _trente glorieuse era_ (1945-75), a time during which old-age poverty was a serious problem which policy aimed at eliminating. Dramatic changes in pension policy were successfully able to solve this problem by the 1970s, yet the same pension structure is in place today, even though these high pensions are not distributed equally. Public sector workers comprise 30% of retirees, but take 60% of pensions, while the remaining work force comprises 70% of retirees but receives only 40% of pension benefits (p. 23). Smith also notes that “no other social expense has put such a heavy demand on the tax system, on employers and employees, as pensions” (p. 163). Employers must contribute significantly to their workers’ pensions. Therefore, when pensions are very high, employers lose much incentive to hire new workers because it has become so costly to do so. This phenomenon has directly contributed to France’s rising unemployment today. While politicians may be convinced that directing large amounts of social spending towards pensions yields positive results, this allocation of funds is, in fact, harmful for the welfare of the state as a whole because it perpetuates joblessness in a significant portion of the population. In this way, the increasing amount of social spending devoted to pensions is directly preventing a redistributive policy from being established, yet French politicians have consistently made the conscious decision to avoid reforming this outdated system that was established to cater to the needs of French society in the late 1950s and early 1960s (p. 153). By the 1970s, the reformed pension policy had succeeded in virtually eliminating old-age poverty, but politicians from 1980 and beyond failed to recognize this fact. Today, the pension system instead serves to reaffirm already-existing income inequalities, primarily those inequalities based upon sector work divisions and, because older white males tend to dominate
the public sector, age, ethnicity, and gender inequalities are reinforced as well.

When considering the shortcomings of the French social welfare state, it is necessary to address the factor of race and how it plays prominently into French housing and unemployment trends. Historically, France had a strong colonial presence in North African nations for a number of years. When these nations called for their independence from France, tension between North Africans and the French grew and persist to this day. The majority of immigrants in France today are of North African descent, and their race is a decisive factor in determining their social condition. The only form of social spending the immigrant population in France receives is for public housing projects, which are ethnic ghettos where crime and unemployment are rife, and are from an essentially insignificant welfare payment (p. 176). Smith acknowledges how employers often use race as a factor in determining employment (which explicitly contributes to the high rate of joblessness in the immigrant population), yet his examination of this complex issue seems highly inadequate. He implies that racism is a personal decision made by employers and other on the individual level that the state cannot control and therefore race should not be an issue to seriously consider when examining welfare policy. By merely glossing over this issue in a few pages, Smith’s analysis of race and welfare policy is insufficient. He does not take the time to address the historical foundation for French racism and marginalization of its immigrant population, one of the three groups most excluded from the benefits of the social welfare state.

In addition to the pension system, another creation of French policymakers which serves as a barrier to true solidarity is the amount of public-sector work. Smith indicates that approximately 57% of households have some direct connection to a public sector worker (p. 216). Government policies have caused this increase in the number of public-sector jobs by nationalizing some private industry and by creating barriers to private-sector job creation (p. 98). Since public-sector workers constitute a majority population and the government serves to represent the majority, the government acts with a bias instead of as an impartial mediator in union-employer negotiations. One of the primary reasons Swedish corporatism has been successful is that the
government has effectively acted as a mediator between unions and employers, helping them compromise. Yet in France, because of its disproportionate amount of public-sector work, the government supports more benefits to public than private-sector employees.

In Smith’s view, another significant barrier to change in France is an exaggerated fear of globalization. While globalization is in fact affecting French society and many other nations around the world (something Smith is rather reluctant to admit), the French use globalization as an excuse for the vast majority of their internal problems (p. 1). Many French politicians argue that they cannot do much to alleviate the unemployment problem with domestic policy reform because the uncontrollable growth of globalization is the true cause. Smith argues that this is simply not true. He cites statistics illustrating the minimal affect globalization has had on French employment: “Only 2 to 3% of the entire French workforce has been directly affected by Third World competition” (p. 86). He believes that rhetoric deceives the French people into firmly believing globalization is the problem, when unemployment can in fact be solved if proper policy decisions are made.

The French tax system is another great obstacle to establishing solidarity. Three primary components of the tax system will be considered: income tax (somewhat progressive), sales tax and payroll tax (both regressive). Although the French income tax, because of its progressive nature, charges the wealthier a greater percentage of their income than the poor, current income tax rates are very low. Policy change to increase the income tax (thereby increasing the progressiveness of the tax system) would likely prove ineffective at generating significant government revenues due to a widespread tax evasion problem (p. 131). Sales tax, regardless of what its exact value may be, affects the poor much more than wealthy. Sales tax is a flat rate for all citizens but the tax takes larger portion of a poor individual’s meager wealth than the greater wealth of a richer person. Payroll tax is a strong deterrent to job creation and therefore a primary cause for high unemployment in France in recent years. This tax must be collected from both employee and employer (similar to Social Security in the U.S.) so a high payroll tax makes hiring new workers significantly more costly for firms. These three components of the tax
system, designed and implemented by French policymakers, exemplify how poor policy decisions are truly causing unemployment, not uncontrollable outside factors, such as globalization. Additionally, Smith believes that reform to the tax system can lead to the creation of a true solidaristic state because public trust is needed for solidarity and, according to Smith, “if politicians introduced a more progressive income tax model, there might be more social trust and a diminished sense of grievance towards the wealthy” (p. 132). Comparatively, one reason the Swedish corporatist model has been more successful than its French counterpart is that the Swedish people tend to trust their authorities, while the French are often skeptical about the motives behind policy changes (p. 133).

While Smith asserts that misleading rhetoric is a direct obstacle to the formation of a solidaristic state (in reference to both “solidarity” and “globalization”), in *France in Crisis*, Smith himself employs a strategy of using deceptive language and giving only partial facts to make his assertions seem more convincing.¹ This criticism is two-tiered: on one hand, Smith uses rhetoric to glorify certain characteristics of other nations’ economic models. On the other, he over dramatizes the current crisis plaguing France today.

Smith suggests that France should adopt characteristics of U.S. neo-liberalism to stimulate employment. He cites an overall US unemployment rate significantly lower than French unemployment to support this stance. However, Smith does not consider how greatly unemployment can vary in the US when looking at certain races and age groups. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the overall US poverty rate in 2005 was 12% yet this proportion skyrocketed up to nearly 35% for blacks under the age of 18, demonstrating that certain groups based on race and age are excluded in American society just as in France.² Similarly, Smith glorifies the Dutch economic hybrid of neo-liberalism and a generous welfare state. While it is true that the Netherlands have achieved near full-employment of their society, this fact is not nearly as impressive when one considers the underemployment in the Dutch labor market. Budgen notes that the Dutch Central Statistical Bureau estimates underemployment affects 20% of the total workforce.³
In addition, Smith uses the power of rhetoric to paint a portrait more grim that the reality in France today. He over dramatizes the current “crisis” by suggesting its profound widespread influence on every aspect of society. Budgen states that “Smith’s view of the political and intellectual scene is liable to make Francophone readers feel they have entered a parallel universe: the country Smith depicts has a few familiar features but bears little resemblance to the France they inhabit”. His rhetoric misleads the reader into believing the crisis today is much more dire than it truly is.

Smith’s analysis of this situation in France is somewhat flawed because of the way he occasionally employs rhetoric to support his arguments. Nonetheless, Smith views and discusses the French situation with a critical and analytic eye, providing an analysis to stimulate the minds of readers and encourage change.
Notes

3 Budgen, 155.
4 Ibid., 156.
FROM INYENSI TO GACACA: GENDER AND REPRESENTATION OF THE 1994 RWANDAN GENOCIDE THROUGH FILM

Amanda Baranowski

In the wake of the ten year anniversary of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, filmmakers seem to have discovered the 1994 events as a new favorite film subject. From Academy Award appearances to small-time documentary releases, many recent films have attempted to explain the horrors of the genocide and the reasoning behind it. While analyzing the way gender is represented is not always a common feature in film analysis, it is particularly important in this context. Genocide is a gendered phenomenon, and examples of how it is gendered can be found in nationalist propaganda, systematic rape, mutilation, emasculinization, and other ways. Along with this complexity, Rwanda also has an intricate history concerning colonialism and the formation of ethnic groups. Especially because the films come from a Western source and are directed at a Western audience, how is the genocide portrayed through these films and therefore interpreted? Is it represented as a gendered event? Is it simplified to make the history “easier” to understand, or are all of the complexities addressed?

Both documentaries, such as Ghosts of Rwanda (2004) and God Sleeps in Rwanda (2004), and docudramas, such as Sometimes in April (2005) and Hotel Rwanda (2004), have attempted to portray the events of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Both of these types of film are important to look at because of the different philosophies they subscribe to. Documentary film, is a broad category of cinematic expression united by the intent, or stated intent, to remain factual or non-fictional.¹ Although it is impossible to be completely unbiased, as the director, editor, and crew generally come from Western backgrounds and have their own ideologies and perceptions, the point is that their intention is to represent factual information about the event of the genocide. In the genre of docudrama, on the other hand, films are a “hybrid of melodramatic fiction and news documentary.”² Unlike a documentary, a drama may be loosely based on an event that occurred
during the genocide, but will change characters and events to create a coherent, concise story. The director is more concerned with creating characters and evoking emotion from his or her audience than he or she is with sticking strictly to facts of the event.

Both docudrama and documentary film strive to portray the 1994 genocide, but a documentary film attempts to connect with its audience by portraying shocking reality and actual people. A fictionalized docudrama film attempts to connect with its audience by sacrificing specific facts and actual people in order to create characters with which to identify and recreating scenes from the event to show what thoughts and emotions the characters must have been thinking and feeling at the time. Between the two, the one that feels more “real” is a choice left up to the audience. Because documentaries and docudramas have different intents and methods for portraying the same event, it is important to analyze both in their representations of the genocide in Rwanda and see if they portray it as a gendered event.

Each of these films has been publicly recognized for its work on the subject by winning or being nominated for international and national film awards. Furthermore, each takes a distinct approach towards portraying the genocide, and because of this diversity, the collection best represents the range of publicly-recognized film on the topic.

In this analysis, I will examine both docudramas (Hotel Rwanda, Sometimes in April) and documentaries (God Sleeps in Rwanda, Ghosts of Rwanda) and analyze their foci, their omissions, their portrayals of men and women. The main aspects I will be looking for will be if each portrays the different effects of the genocide on men and women, systematic rape, mutilation, gendered targets for killing, and gendered propaganda. I will also watch for other possible gendered aspects of the genocide, especially through the testimonies of survivors of the genocide.

**Background**

Rwanda is a small country in Central Africa that shares borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda (United States). In spite of its small size, it is the most densely populated country in Africa. In pre-colonial times, the
country was known for its highly centralized monarchy and its people, Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, shared a single language, economic networks, and common religious traditions. The differentiations between the groups existed mostly through an economic framework—the Hutu were farmers while the Tutsi were herdsmen. People from both groups intermarried, and “Hutu could become hereditary Tutsi and vice versa.” In the 1890s, the country was conquered and colonized by Germany, but power was transferred to Belgium after the First World War. Under the colonizers, groups of different economic standing were separated into separate “ethnic” groups—the Hutu (85%), the Tutsi (14%), and the Twa (1%). The Belgians “entrenched the monarchy of ruling Tutsi and gave them access to administrative posts, education, and jobs in the modern sectors.”

In 1959, the Hutu majority began to revolt against the oppressive Belgian control and Tutsi monarchy. In 1962, the Belgians withdrew from the country, the first Hutu president of Rwanda was elected, and the Tutsi were persecuted by the newly-empowered Hutu majority. During the next three decades, the Tutsi were oppressed by the Rwandan government, excluded from universities, disfavored for employment, and sometimes massacred. Conflict was especially heavy when groups of exiled Tutsis launched military attacks from Burundi in 1962 and from Uganda in 1990. The attack from Uganda was launched by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), an organization of Tutsis living in Uganda as a result of earlier persecution and refugee exiles. Despite this ongoing conflict, 40% of the country had intermarried by ethnic group by the 1980s.

The 1990 offensive attack by the RPF started the civil war, and violence grew more frequent. French soldiers and soldiers from Zaire were called in on multiple occasions to back up the Rwandan army, which also began to train civilian militias, called Interahamwe or “those who stand together.” On August 3, 1993, the Arusha Peace Accords were signed by the RPF and the Rwandan Hutu government, allowing “for the return of refugees and a coalition Hutu-RPF government.”

Before the plan could be implemented however, the Rwandan President’s plane was shot down, killing the President of Rwanda as well as the President of Burundi who was traveling with him, on April
6, 1994. Hutu leaders blamed the Tutsi rebels for the assassination, though it is unclear who carried it out, in order to incite the beginning of the violence against the Tutsi. In the next 100 days, from April to June, “the military, militias, and civilians murdered between 500,000 and one million people...Hutu and Tutsi killed each other as well as members of their own group, but this was primarily a genocidal attack of the Tutsi.” Roughly 600,000 Tutsi were killed, which represented 70% of all Tutsi in Rwanda. An initial report estimated that 250,000 women were raped during the genocide. This systematic plan of rape was used to terrorize, to torture, and to force women to bear children of the rapists’ ethnicity.

The U.N. peacekeepers in Rwanda were ordered not to intervene, and the international community did not act to stop the genocide. The genocide technically ended when the RPF won the civil war by capturing the capital city of Kigali in July 1994. Half of the country’s population was displaced by the conflict, fleeing to other areas of Rwanda, as well as to Burundi, Tanzania, and the DROC (then Zaire). Sexual violence and killing continued in refugee camps, and AIDS also continues to claim victims of rape during the genocide.

1) Ghosts of Rwanda

Background

Ghosts of Rwanda is a Frontline documentary that focuses on the question, “How did this happen?” The film begins in April of 1993 and follows General Roméo Dellaire’s experience as the commander of the U.N. Peacekeeping Mission to enforce the peace between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Through interviews with key actors like General Dellaire, Prudence Bushnell - Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Phillipe Gaillard - head of the Red Cross in Rwanda, Madeleine Albright - U.S. Delegate to the U.N., Kofi Annan - head of U.N. peacekeeping office, and Anthony Lake - national security adviser to President Clinton, the film shows the failure of the bureaucracy to act
as well as the regrets and sometimes frustrations of the people at the top. When General Dellaire plans to raid an arms cache supposedly belonging to Hutu extremists, he is ordered by the U.N. to stand down. When the genocide begins after the president’s plane is shot down, he is ordered not to intervene and to avoid conflict. Because of fear of manipulation, fear of another event like Mogadishu, Somalia, and general indifference of the international community, neither the U.S. nor the U.N. moved to intervene. Through interviews with people like Joyce Leader and Laura Lane - U.S. embassy employees in Rwanda, General Paul Kagame - commander of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a young Tutsi survivor named Valentina, a Hutu farmer who participated in the killing, and humanitarian aid workers, as well as real footage from 1994, the film shows and tells of people’s experiences with the genocide and the pain it has caused them. They personally witnessed or experienced the failure of the international community and have the emotional and sometimes physical scars to prove it.

Ghosts of Rwanda was made by director Greg Barker, who visited Rwanda in 1997 and started interviewing survivors, U.N. peacekeepers, and U.N. aid workers. He made the film for Frontline in 2005, and it won the Alfred I. duPont-Columbia University Award that same year. While the documentary has been called “enlightening,” its participants have also been highly criticized for their lack of real explanation of failure of U.N. and U.S. intervention in 1994, as well as the absence of a reversal of ideology regarding peacekeeping or nation-building in Africa. The New York Times review also states, “these apologists seem to believe it is better to be seen as having bumbled along with no plan last time than to state a plan and be taken to task for it in the future.” Though a few interviews with Rwandans are included, the film is clearly about the story of the Rwandan genocide told mostly from the viewpoints of Western observers and leaders.

Gender Analysis

Ghosts of Rwanda never speaks directly of the genocide as a gendered phenomenon. Its pictures, however, speak to some of the gendered parts of the 1994 events. Some of the most prominent images in the film are those of the Interahamwe, the Hutu extremist “civilian
death squads” that are considered for carrying out “much of the mass killing during the genocide of 1994.” In the film, the picture of a young man holding a machete and a young boy with a machine gun show how the militia also recruited many young men and boys to act as perpetrators in the genocide. In the same way, these boys can also be considered as victims of the Hutu extremist leaders, who used propaganda to recruit and train these youth to act out their plan. The only interview with a perpetrator in the film is that with a Hutu farmer, who participated in the massacre at the church where survivor Valentina was hiding (see below). He too speaks of propaganda that convinced him to act in order to revenge the past acts committed by the Tutsi against the Hutu some generations ago. The leaders of the Hutu extremist movement, a few of whom were discussed in the film, were also all male. All of the pictures and footage of the Interahamwe and others who joined in to participate in the killings show that the main perpetrators of the genocide were men.

The film also seems to portray the killings as indiscriminate according to gender. The film shows actual footage of men, women, and children dead on the roads, as well as wounded taking refuge in churches. While it is true that men, women, and children were killed in the genocide, “more men than women died-there are now 100 women for every 87 men” in the country today. The fact that more men than women were killed is not covered in the film. The systematic rape of women is also absent, who were targeted in order to attack the future of the Tutsi ethnic group and to emasculate Tutsi men who were unable provide protection for them.

While largely ignoring effects on women, Ghosts of Rwanda does have a young girl to represent the survivors of the genocide. Valentina, a Tutsi, was a 12 year old girl in 1994, when she was seeking refuge with her parents in a Catholic church. In her interview, she speaks of how the male governor of the area, instead of protecting the people he was supposed to, told the Interahamwe that the people hiding in the church should be killed. When they came to the church to massacre the people there, Valentina survived only by hiding under dead bodies. The killers thought that she was already dead, with blood all over her. With her fingers hacked off and a machete wound on her head, Valentina woke up to a dog eating the body next to her. She hid in the church for
43 days until she was found. None of her family survived.

Valentina survived, but like many others, she suffered mutilation by the commonly-used machetes of the Interahamwe. She also continues to suffer from the loss of her family, the loss of her fingers, and the memories that haunt her.

Overall, *Ghosts of Rwanda* visually portrays some of the gendered aspects of the genocide such as the makeup of the Interahamwe and men as the main perpetrators, although these are also implicit and left to the viewer to perceive. Other important details, like men as suffering more casualties, women as targets for systematic rape and mutilation, and the results of each, are completely absent from the film.

2) *Sometimes in April*

Background

*Sometimes in April* is a made for television docudrama, written and directed by director Raoul Peck. It was filmed in Rwanda and produced by HBO Video in 2005. This film stands out not only because of its director, who was born in Haiti but spent some of his childhood living in Africa, but also because it takes a “deeper, more disturbing look at the 1994 genocide than does *Hotel Rwanda*.” It begins in April of 2004, when the main character Augustin, is living with his girlfriend Martin and teaching in a classroom in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. As he does especially every April, Augustin is remembering what happened to his family and his country during the genocide ten years earlier.

This April, however, is unique in that Augustin goes to visit his brother, Honoré, who Augustin has not seen since 1994 and is now on trial at the war crimes tribunal in Tanzania. He is charged with inciting genocide through his Hutu extremist radio show on RTLM. Through long flashback sequences by Augustin, we learn how in a few short days, Augustin goes from a respected soldier in the Rwandan military to a fugitive, hunted because of his moderate Hutu views and marriage to his Tutsi wife Jeanne. He is desperate to get his Jeanne and his two young sons to safety at the Hotel Milles-Collines, and so convinces his brother Honoré to try to take them in his car, because of Honoré’s
connections and influence with the Hutu extremists who control Kigali. This is the last time that Augustin sees his wife and sons.

Through Honoré’s story and flashback during Augustin’s visit, we learn, as does Augustin, that his two sons were murdered at a road checkpoint and that although his wife Jeanne did not die from the encounter, she later was raped by Hutu soldiers at the church where she was staying. She died saving the other women who suffered with her.

While Augustin is facing the reality of what happened to his wife and two sons, his girlfriend Martin is also trying to come to terms with her own experiences with the genocide. As Martin visits a deserted school, we learn through flashbacks that in 1994, Martin was a head teacher at this Sainte-Marie School, 150 km west of Kigali. Augustin’s daughter Anne-Marie was one of Martin’s students at this girls’ school where Hutu soldiers massacred 120 schoolgirls. Martin escaped, with Anne-Marie and another girl, all of whom were severely injured, but Anne-Marie died during their constant fleeing from Hutu soldiers. At the end of the film, we witness a gacaca court, which means “justice on the grass” in Kinyarwandan. It is at these local courts where people accused of genocide are identified by their own community members, who also serve as witnesses to the trials. In the film, a small number of men accused of murdering the 120 girls at the Sainte-Marie School stand in front of the community. When one of the judges asks for these men to be identified, Martin comes forward, saying that she knows these men, that she was there, and that she is a survivor. The film ends on Martin’s decision to face her memories and testify.

As mentioned earlier, this film has been widely recognized as darker and more disturbing than its counterpart Hotel Rwanda. Reviews have identified the “contrasting time periods” as one of the most effective methods of the film because the contrasts “give voice to the victims' terror as well as to a less examined consequence of that genocide: the crippling depression of survivors.” However, the film has also been criticized for this very reason. The premier of Sometimes in April was held in Kigali on January 22, 2005 and shown on a large screen in Amhoro Stadium to an audience of over 25,000 people. The New York Times journalist present at the event writes that, “While Hotel Rwanda is a story about survivors, Sometimes in April is about those who died” and cites a Rwandese man who, after viewing the film,
says “I did not want to see this movie -- no, no, no…People don't need to be reminded. They don't want to be reminded.” Nonetheless, other journalists reviewing the film for Western audiences call it “broader in scope and richer emotionally than Hotel Rwanda and argue that it offers “a more soul-satisfying experience, even if it comes at the expense of an uplifting Hollywood ending.” Sometimes in April won Best Film at the Durban International Film Festival and was nominated for an Emmy Award.

Gender analysis

Sometimes in April provides a much more comprehensive view of the genocide as a gendered event. To begin with, gendered propaganda is evident in the film during a scene at the RLTM station. The line, “cockroach always give birth to cockroach,” (cockroaches or inyensi was the consistent stereotype of Tutsis) directly attacks Tutsi women, their reproductive labor, and their children. Also in the scene, it is shown that both men and women work at the radio station. In a later scene, as Martin is escaping from the school massacre with two of her students, more radio noise can be heard. A woman’s voice is heard, saying “Young men of Gikondo, well done, but save your bullets…Cut them up with machetes…” This rare view of women as perpetrators in the genocide displays how women can contribute to violence by encouraging and/or shaming men into participating.

Gendered propaganda in the print media is also evident when Jeanne brings home the booklet that someone left on her desk at work. Of special significance to her, and to the audience, is the sentence, “No member of the military shall marry a Tutsi”. This shows the importance that the Hutu extremist movement placed on sexual and reproductive limitations between Hutus and Tutsis in order to make the Tutsis into an “other.” In order to incite rape during the genocide, the Hutu extremist propaganda also “identified the sexuality of Tutsi women ‘as a means through which the Tutsi community sought to infiltrate and control the Hutu community’.” Hutu men were encouraged to rape the “arrogant and superior” Tutsi women in order to break the resistance of Tutsi society.

As in the other films, Sometimes in April portrays men as the main perpetrators of the genocide. Groups of men dressed in civilian
clothing are seen walking down the streets towards groups of Tutsis and moderate Hutus with machetes and clubs in their hands. The all-male militias invade Augustin’s home and commit the massacre at Martin’s Catholic girls school, and all of the roadblocks are operated by men. Male Hutu soldiers are the rapists of the women at the church where Jeanne is seeking refuge, and the Catholic priest is the man who allows it to happen, supposedly sacrificing them for the safety of more refugees in the church.

While the film depicts both men and women as victims of the genocide, it also attempts to show the differences between the possible experiences for each. Both men and women are the victims of the Hutu extremist killings, as can be seen by the bodies in the streets, the diverse group of people shot in front of the mass grave at Sainte Famille Church, and the massacring of 120 girls at Sainte-Marie School. Men and boys, however, are more “targeted” to be killed. For example, Augustin’s friend and co-worker in the Rwandan military has his name announced on the radio as being a traitor and a target to be killed, for which he is eventually shot down and killed at a roadblock. Augustin himself finds out earlier that his name is on a list of those who should be killed, because he is a moderate Hutu who is married to a Tutsi. This is why he separates himself from his family, sending them ahead to refuge. When the car containing Honoré, Jeanne, the two boys, and a family friend is stopped at a roadblock, Jeanne is wounded and left for dead in a ditch, but the two boys are taken out and immediately shot. This is presumably in order to prevent them from growing up and joining the Tutsi opposition. Only one woman is presented as a specific target, and that is the Rwandan Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who was killed because of her political power and position.

Women are targeted because of their reproductive role in society, and consequently they are also the victims of systematic rape as a method of the genocide. More than one example of this atrocity is presented in the film. Jeanne is raped, alongside other women, by Hutu militia at the Sainte Famille Church, where they are seeking refuge. Her appearance and desperate courage in the scene suggest that they have been repeatedly raped. As she menacingly asks “Do you think I am afraid to die?,” she pulls the pin out of the grenade she is holding,
killing herself, two soldiers, and the priest. Valentin, who Augustin meets at the hotel when he is visiting Honoré, testifies at the International Tribunal in Tanzania about how she was also raped during the genocide. She speaks of how she was holding her baby in her arms when a Hutu soldier took her baby, put it on the floor, then raped her twice. After that, she was held in a room with other girls and repeated raped by different men. When four men in a row raped her, she said she “just wanted to die.” She was eventually dragged back to her house, but not before a young man told her, “There is no place for you now.” She later found out that all of the girls that had been with her had been killed.

In Rwanda, rape was used to “terrorize the community and warn all people of the futility of resistance,” to control women’s reproductive labor, and to wrest land and resources from women. In his study, “Understanding Genocide,” David Newberry describes the situation:

> During the genocide, Tutsi women were targeted as reproducers of society. But women were not killed simply as a ‘by-product’ of war, as ‘collateral damage’; instead, targeting was a policy specifically encouraged and directed to further the goal of the leaders of the genocide:
> to destroy all Tutsi as a social group.

Rape was committed by both Hutu extremists and the RPF. One reason was to make women bear children in order to bear more children for the individual community. Hutu men raped Tutsi and Hutu women because through the patrilineal system, the children would be considered Hutu, while later Tutsi men raped Tutsi and Hutu women for the same reason. As the line “There is no place for you now” denotes, the stigma of being raped harms survivors for years to come. Mother and child are often ostracized by the community, as they are “seen by society as a curse and relic – visible reminders of the bitter memories of a past that everyone loves to forget.” Rape had and continues to have severe effects on the lives of Rwandan women, as will be furthered explained during the *God Sleeps in Rwanda* section.

Apart from victims and perpetrators, both men and women are portrayed as actors in the peace-building process, 10 years after the
genocide. In the scenes of the *gacaca* courts, which loosely means “justice on the grass” in Kinyarwandan, men accused of killing in the 1994 genocide are brought before the community. In the scenes, both men and women serve as *inyangamugayo*, or judges, and also make up members of the community who witness the process and testify against former neighbors. During one testimony, one woman says that the accused man pushed 2 people through her yard, then cut off the woman’s feet and hit the man with a machete. This is one example of how mutilation was also used as a means of controlling women’s labor, their productive labor, and therefore their very livelihood and ability to support themselves. In the last scene of the film, Martin comes forward to a *gacaca* court held in the community where her school was and testifies about the massacre. These scenes show how the important roles that women are playing in the rebuilding of the country and its search for justice.

3) *Hotel Rwanda*

*Hotel Rwanda* is the most well-known of the films about the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Directed by Terry George, it is a docudrama that tells the real-life story of Paul Rusesabagina, the manager of Hotel Milles Collines, a Belgium-owned high-class hotel in Kigali. The story begins with the U.N. peace agreement press conference intended to ensure power-sharing between the Hutu and Tutsi political groups, which occurs at the Milles Collines a few days before the genocide begins. Paul, who is Hutu, has business connections with the Hutu General Bizimungu and the future leader of the Interahamwe, George Rutagunda. He maintains these connections to get his work done, and quietly refuses to join the Hutu power movement, but he can’t deny what is happening in Rwanda when the killing begins. Using his influence, persuasive tactics, and access to money and commodities, he manages to get his wife Tatiana, who is Tutsi, his children, and many of his Tutsi neighbors to the Milles Collines. During the next few days, more Hutu and Tutsi refugees continue to flow into the hotel as French soldiers and others arrive to escort French nationals and whites out of the country. Paul is left in charge of the hotel, which is now housing 1,268 refugees, including 100 staff members. Over the course of the
next three months, Paul continues to plead and struggle for support and soldiers from the U.N. and Hutu General Bizimungu, while the hotel is in constant danger of attack from the Interahamwe and the Hutu army. When some of the refugees are finally granted visas to other countries, Paul sends his wife and children along in the U.N. convoy, which comes under attack from the Interahamwe. Some of the people are attacked, and the convoy barely makes it back to the Milles Collines. Opportunity for safety finally comes when the RPF advances so much that it controls half of Kigali. The refugees from the hotel are able to move behind the lines of the RPF, to a refugee camp from which they are to be bussed out of Rwanda.

*Hotel Rwanda* was highly reviewed in its context of a Hollywood movie. “It's simultaneously haunting and inspiring. You don't know whether to look away in disgust or stand up and cheer,” says one reporter. Actor Don Cheadle, who played Paul Rusesabagina in the film, has been especially recognized, “His transformation is subtle and utterly believable, and it's the heart of the film.” Following this praise, *Hotel Rwanda* was nominated for three Academy Awards—Don Cheadle as Best Leading Actor, Sophie Okonedo as Best Supporting Actress, and Terry George for Best Screenplay. While more than one reporter draws the comparison between this film and “Schindler’s List,” the two different approaches of the films are marked. Instead of approaching the genocide as a whole, “*Hotel Rwanda* is an intimate portrait. It doesn't seek to depict a million deaths; its goal is to profile a man who tried to save one life at a time.” Scenes of actual violence are few and far between, one showing a road covered with bodies through the mist, though no close-ups are done of the people lying there. The film, as mentioned above, depicts the events of 1994 through the view of one man’s experience, where the threat of the unknown shows the audience a glimpse of the nerve-wracking, terrifying months of the genocide.

**Gender Analysis**

While *Hotel Rwanda* does acknowledge many ways in which the genocide was a gendered event, it mostly focuses on the stereotypical portrayals of men and women in war. The main image of men is that of their role of perpetrators. One of the most pervasive images in the film,
as in others, is that of the Interahamwe. The paramilitary group is shown first at a Hutu extremist rally, where a large group, consisting mostly of men, is walking and jogging down the street in Kigali, singing songs and waving banners, before the genocide begins. As the violence erupts, trucks of young men, many wearing the clothing pattern of the Interahamwe, are riding around in the beds of pickup trucks, packed in and waving rifles and machetes. George Rutagunda, leader of the Interahamwe, and General Bizimungu, of the Hutu army, are also male and the leaders of the two main groups of perpetrators of the genocide.

The stark differences between the portrayal of men as perpetrators and men as victims cannot be missed. Especially in the scene of Rutagunda’s Interahamwe camp, the male perpetrators are over-masculinized, wearing minimal, rough-looking clothing, showing bulging, glistening muscles, and carrying large guns and other weapons. The men staying at Hotel Milles Collines, or “the victims”, are shown as weaker and therefore less masculine. They wear collared shirts and glasses, or in the case of Paul, suits and ties, and have little power to stop the killing. Paul saves his family and neighbors only by paying money to the soldiers, and collecting jewelry and other valuables from the people huddled before him to offer. The men as victims are also the first ones to be pulled off the truck and beaten when the U.N. convoy is attacked. They have no physical ability or weapons with which to fight back.

The male victims are essentially saved by the arrival of the RPF in Kigali, which again is made up of mostly young men. Unlike the Interahamwe however, the RPF soldiers are portrayed as organized and controlled, wearing uniforms and working in formation. They are depicted as the liberators of Rwanda, and the only effective actors in stopping the genocide. And while most sources do credit the RPF and its advances for stopping the genocide, a lesser-acknowledged fact is that the force also massacred unarmed Hutus during its take-over of the country, a point not even hinted at during the film. The fluidity and ambiguity between the roles of liberator and perpetrator are completely ignored.

Amidst the male mainframes of the film live the overwhelmingly voiceless women of Rwanda. Nevertheless, the film does address some
of the specific effects of the genocide on women. The scene of George Rutagunda's Interahmwe camp shows how Tutsi women were captured and tortured through repeated raping. At Rutagunda's camp, the women are kept in a large cage, many naked and huddled together. Two soldiers are beating one woman and tearing her clothes off while she screams, while George's only comment to Paul is, "Tutsi prostitutes are bitches." Clearly these women are sex slaves, not prostitutes, and they are being targeted for rape and torture in order to humiliate and dehumanize all Tutsi.

The only significant female role in the film is that of Tatiana, Paul's wife. She, like the women above, is a victim with little to no power to save herself or her family. When the whole family receives visas to go to Belgium, Paul remains behind, sending Tatiana and the children in the convoy with the others who have to chance to escape. Upon the re-arrival of the convoy which had to turn back, Tatiana is infuriated with Paul's actions, which completely disregard her say. She says that he left them, that it was not his decision to make, and that they make their decisions together. She asserts her right of equal decision-making within the family and regains what little power she has left to protect her whole family. This is the only point of the film in which a woman is shown with some power, instead of just as a helpless victim. The film shows some of the ways in which the genocide is gendered, but fails to show the fluidity of the roles during the conflict. Instead, stereotypes of the different roles of men and the one role of women are the rule for characterization throughout the film.

4) God Sleeps in Rwanda

Background

*God Sleeps in Rwanda* is a short documentary film that was written, directed, and produced by Kimberlee Acquaro and Stacy Sherman in 2004. It follows five women who are survivors of the 1994 genocide to understand how they live and how their lives have been altered since the genocide. The women represented include mothers, rape survivors, a child head of household, career women, students, and important community leaders. The focus of the film is to determine how Rwandan women, who now make up almost 70% of the country's population, are rebuilding their lives, "redefining women's
roles in Rwandan society and bringing hope to a wounded nation."

Nominated for an Academy Award for Best Documentary Short in 2005, *God Sleeps in Rwanda* has been hailed as "ultimately uplifting." One reporter writes, "*God Sleeps in Rwanda* demonstrates that neither the violence nor the killing ended in July of 1994... Yet [the film] reveals itself to be less a reproach of the genocide and its aftereffects than a testament to the startling opportunity that that horror has created." Some of the new opportunities for women can be seen through the dramatic increases in the representation of women attending college and serving in Parliament. More than ten years later, "colleges that prior to the genocide were once only six percent female are now as much as fifty percent women" while "the Rwandan Lower House of Parliament alone is 49 percent women, the greatest proportion of women in any parliament in the world." The film has been shown at special events to raise money for the Rwandan AVEGA Association of Genocide Widows and Orphans, and the filmmakers are also working on a "sustainable trade project for women in Rwanda" called "The Teddy Bear Project."

**Gender Analysis**

Although the reviewers focus on the hope and opportunity for women presented in the film, the stories of what these women went through during the genocide are harrowing. Severa Mukakinani speaks of how she lost her seven children in the genocide, her husband and three sons killed in front of her. She was raped so much that she "cannot count the men" who "came one after another." They cut her and threw her into the river, but she survived. Shortly thereafter, she found out that she was pregnant with one of her rapist's children. Although she wanted to get rid of the child, she realized it was innocent. Severa continues to struggle, not only with her own memories, but with what of her history she can tell her daughter.

Just as Severa was targeted to destroy the Tutsi through attacking women and their psychological, physical, and emotional health, Fifi Nuyangoga and Chantal Kantarama also suffered rape as victims of the systematic torture planned by the masterminds of the genocide. Because of this "method" of the genocide, the death toll of the 1994 events is still rising, as women like Fifi, who contracted HIV from one
of her rapists, suffer and die because of AIDS. While many of these women are victims of systematic rape during the genocide, the film also speaks of the woman behind this system of torture. Fifi and Chantal were hiding together in 1994 when they came face to face with Pauline Nyiramusuhuko, then-Rwandan Minister for Family and Women's Affairs. Along with her son, Pauline came to where Fifi and Chantal, along with others, had been hiding and she chose which women were to be raped. She is the "first woman to be tried for war crimes for personally directing her son and squads of Hutu men to torture, rape, and butcher Tutsi men and women." Through investigation of Chantal's interview and other sources, the film reveals that while the perpetrators of the genocide were mainly men, women were also involved. It was a woman who perpetrated the raping and torture of thousands of Tutsi women.

At surface level, the statement that the Rwandan population is now almost 70% female may suggest that women were spared from the genocide. Through the interviews with these five women, however, it is apparent that they were not, and that the "heavy burden" part of the equation cannot be forgotten in lieu of the newfound opportunities for women. While Delphine Umutesi, survived the genocide, she witnessed her mother being taken away and killed and her father killed right before her eyes. As the oldest child, she started taking care of her five younger siblings when she was only ten years old, carrying bricks to earn money for food instead of going to school like the rest. While Odette Mukakabera is now a policewoman and hopes to become a lawyer, she is HIV-positive and cannot afford to buy medicine for her also-HIV positive son Jean Bertrand, much less herself. Rwandan women have to fight against these burdens every single day, in order to live their own lives and to care for others.

On a more positive note, women like Joseline Mujawamariya, are also becoming actors in the rebuilding of the country and the hope of the people. Having survived by hiding in a swamp with her siblings, Joseline is now an important leader in her community. She was elected Head of Development of her village in 1999 and is working with other women, many of whom are survivors, on building a road to Kigali, in order to improve opportunities for healthcare, trade, and jobs. She is optimistic, speaking of how women have advanced, as they are now
more involved in decision-making and hold important political positions. As women step into traditionally male roles, such as heads of households and business owners, they are stepping up as actors in the rebuilding of Rwanda and of their own lives.

**Conclusion**

During genocide, ideas of gender, masculinity, and femininity are taken and twisted so as to have the most profoundly devastating effects on the targeted ethnic group. At this point in time, gender also largely determines the roles that men and women play in genocide, as in other violent conflicts. Therefore, *not* recognizing the gender component of the genocide is what is historically inaccurate about some of these films. The real point of analyzing gender here is trying to show and understand that this was a real event during which hundreds of thousands of people were killed, raped, and injured, physically and psychologically. More than that, each of those people has a story to tell of his or her own personal experience, which was intrinsically affected by his or her gender.

The four films analyzed above show a wide range of historically accurate representations of the 1994 Rwandan genocide according to it being a gendered event. The representations vary somewhat between documentaries and docudramas. The documentaries have narrower foci and therefore, give either total attention to how gender played a role in the genocide (*God Sleeps in Rwanda*) or little attention at all (*Ghosts of Rwanda*). Both of the docudramas attempt to show a larger, life-like picture of what life was like during those 100 days and acknowledge more of the gendered aspects than *Ghosts of Rwanda*. Other than that, the portrayals are not overwhelmingly similar by type of film.

Both *Hotel Rwanda* and *Ghosts of Rwanda* fail to show the continuing tragedy and aftermath of the genocide. Instead, each portray it as a one-time event with no acknowledgement of the continuing effects on Rwandans, which specifically discounts the experiences of women who survived and are now struggling with the burdens of being widows, having their rapists’ children, running households alone, etc. The two films emphasize the “inyensi” (cockroach) beginning of the experience, with the propaganda and the killing, but fail to recognize the “gacaca” (justice on the grass), which represents the far-reaching
consequences for Rwandans, which continue to this day. These films also take a binary perspective on the genocide itself. Characters and people are “good” or “evil,” “victim” or “perpetrator,” instead of the reality of a mixture of these characteristics, where perpetrators can also be victims and vice versa. Without acknowledgement of how these roles during conflict are fluid and interwoven, experiences of men and women of Rwanda are oversimplified and historically inaccurate.

*Sometimes in April* on the other hand, shows multiple experiences of different men and women. The film acknowledges that gender often dictates what type of experience a person may have, but doesn't “rank” the experiences by which is more horrible. It also delves into more of the complexities of the genocide, such as the paradox between ideological hate and familial love. In drama form, *Sometimes in April* tries to accomplish the same overall goal of *God Sleeps in Rwanda*—to humanize the events of the 1994 genocide by embracing the complexity of the roles, the hardships, and the experiences of the people of Rwanda. By allowing Rwandan women to tell their own stories, *God Sleeps in Rwanda* accomplishes this goal and makes a statement about the role of gender within genocide. These two films acknowledge the genocide as a gendered event with a complex history that has ongoing consequences for its survivors, and through this recognition, *Sometimes in April* and *God Sleeps in Rwanda* are more accurate and truthful portrayals of the genocide.

Each of these four film serves as a part of the historical process to tell the world and future generations the story of what happened in Rwanda in 1994. In doing so, each of these films also has a responsibility to depict the truth, to honor those who have died, and to respect the Rwandan people and their individual experiences it seeks to represent. To acknowledge the genocide as a gendered event, with all of its complexities, moves a film that much closer to fulfilling these responsibilities and thereby creating a work characterized by truth, honesty, and respect. To do anything less is to make a mockery of the people who lived it.
Notes

5 Ibid.
10 Meredith Turshen. "The Political Economy of Rape."
11 Ibid.
12 "Rwanda: a Historical Chronology."
13 Catherine Newbury.
14 "Rwanda: a Historical Chronology."
15 Meredith Turshen. "The Political Economy of Rape."
16 Ibid.
18 Meredith Turshen. "The Political Economy of Rape."
20 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
30 Cyprian F. Fisiy.
31 Meredith Turshen. "The Political Economy of Rape."
32 Ibid.
36 Marc Lacey.
37 Ibid.
38 Alessandra Stanley.
41 Cyprian F. Fisiy.
43 Clotilde Twagiramariya and Meredith Turshen.
44 Ibid.
45 Meredith Turshen. "The Political Economy of Rape."
47 Clotilde Twagiramariya and Meredith Turshen.
48 Meredith Turshen. "The Political Economy of Rape."
52 Jeff Strickler.
58 Ibid.
59 Deardra Shuler.
60 Ibid.
CONTRIBUTORS

Amanda Baranowski

Amanda Baranowski is an International Relations and Social Relations junior in James Madison College. Her current academic interests include gender studies, international development, and environmental sustainability. In her free time, Amanda enjoys reading, riding her horse, watching all kinds of movies, and spending quality time with her family and friends. She hopes to serve as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Latin America after graduation.

Erin K. Biebuyck

Erin K. Biebuyck is a senior at MSU majoring in Social Relations and History. She is particularly interested in modern East European and Romanian history. Within East European history, she plans to focus on cultural history including collective memory, intra- and intercultural representations, ethnic relations, and the history of gender and sexuality. Erin is the 2007 recipient of Indiana University's Romanian Studies Fellowship, and she will begin work on a Masters degree in Russian and East European Studies at IU in the fall of 2007. After completing an MA, Erin hopes to continue her studies, working towards a Ph.D. in history.

Thomas James Caron

Thomas Caron is a sophomore in James Madison College working towards a dual degree in International Relations and Political Theory Constitutional Democracy. Also Tom is pursuing a specialization in Muslim Studies. During his freshmen year at MSU, Tom had the opportunity to research campus life during the civil rights movement. Tom became enthralled by his research on state surveillance on campus during the 1960's and 70's and shocked by his findings. In response to this work, Tom urges everyone to be more alert and skeptical of the government's actions in the name of 'national security'.
Ryan Etzcorn

Ryan Etzcorn is a sophomore history major from the black rolling biomass of Kalamazoo, Michigan. Nothing much is known about what the future will bring except that Ryan feels strongly pinned to his purpose of being a teacher, hopefully at the collegiate level. He is especially enthralled by the socio-religious history of Judaism and Christianity from the Babylonian captivity to the fall of the Roman Empire. Ryan also enjoys fishing and playing drums for the East Lansing band Frontier Ruckus.

Patrick Michael Gottry

Patrick Michael Gottry is a senior majoring in History with minors in Psychology and Criminal Justice. After he graduates in May 2007, Patrick plans to attend law school (because being poor and going to classes was so much fun for four years at MSU, that being even more poor and going to even harder classes will be greater fun for three years at Law school). In his spare time, Patrick enjoys going to movies, traveling, arguing, and reading (primarily Calvin and Hobbes).

John Haezebrouck

John Haezebrouck is a history major in the College of Education from Southfield, Michigan. He plans to graduate in 2008 with a BA in History and a minor in Geography. After graduation, he hopes to teach high school history as well as coach basketball. During his free time he enjoys playing football and basketball as well as hanging out with his friends. He thanks his family and friends who have supported him throughout his college career.

Claire Knittel

Claire Knittel is currently a political theory and constitutional democracy (PTCD) senior at James Madison College, working on her thesis for graduation in May 2007. Her interest in South African history was sparked by a Study Abroad trip to South Africa and Lesotho in the summer of 2006, where she also discovered her passion for education and the social circumstances that influence it. She plans on working for the Capital Area
Literacy Coalition in Lansing for a few years before pursuing her masters in educational research, and dreams of returning to South Africa.

**Jared Natzke**

Jared Natzke has been fascinated by history ever since he started reading. At the age of five, he published two well-regarded crayon and construction paper volumes on pirates and knights, which his mother lovingly had laminated for him. Currently, he is a junior double-majoring in history and anthropology and a member of HAMS. Jared hopes to continue studying history at the graduate level, possibly after taking a break to travel or serve a stint in the Peace Corps. He will serve as Editor in Chief of the 2008 *MSU Undergraduate Historian* and is starting to wonder just what he has gotten himself into.

**Erin Reardon**

Erin Reardon an elementary education major, with a teaching major in language arts. Erin is currently a junior at MSU, and excitingly anticipating her senior year. She is originally from Saginaw, MI, where she attended Swan Valley High School. After graduating college, Erin plans to pursue her degree and become an elementary or middle school teacher.

**Nada Zohdy**

Nada Zohdy is a freshman double-majoring in International Relations and Psychology with a Muslim Studies Specialization. On campus, she is active with different student organizations, including the Muslim Students' Association and Amnesty International. She also spends time volunteering at a local elementary school through Student Literacy Corps and at the Lansing Refugee Development Center. One of her great aspirations for the future is to named a Rhodes Scholar.
**LESSER-KNOWN ACADEMIC SPECIALIZATIONS IN THE MSU HISTORY DEPARTMENT**

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ESSAY SUBMISSION POLICY

The MSU Undergraduate Historian gladly accepts submissions of essays, book reviews, and other written works by MSU undergraduate students. Submissions can be of interest in a wide range of areas, but all should relate to history or the study of history. Submissions that are accepted will be expected to be of professional standard and are expected to make a significant statement or contribution to interpretation of unpublished and primary sources as well as a broad range of supporting secondary sources. Submissions that have been published previously or that are being considered for publication elsewhere will not be considered by this organization.

Submissions can be of any length. A cover sheet must be included with your essay. The cover sheet should include the piece’s title, student name, student number, email address, class standing, major field of study, topic of paper and geographic region in the top left-hand corner. There must be no identifying marks on your essay except for your student number. The student number on your paper will be matched to that on the cover sheet to ensure that each submission is reviewed and selected anonymously. Submissions must be in Times New Roman 12-point font and be double-spaced. Your student number must be on both your essay and your cover sheet in order to be accepted for review. In addition, a digital copy on either a floppy disk or a CD must be provided with your submission, if turning in a hard copy. If you choose to submit your essay electronically, please e-mail your submission and cover sheet to msuhistorian@gmail.com.

Submissions will be accepted until the first week of January 2008 for the 4th Edition of The MSU Undergraduate Historian. Exact submission deadlines will be announced in fall 2007.

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